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396

PF 600485 / VOL 2

600485 / VOL 2

NAUJOCKS ALFRED

HISTORICAL

HELD
H/R2B

TRAY No.

S Form 924A rev 10.74

Box 150


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PF600485/V2

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
93	PA	21 MAR 1978						
		01 MAR 1978						
	R2B	20 MAR 1978						
93	PA	29 MAR 1978						
Q	RSF	11 AUG 1978						
	HS							
	R2B	11 SEP 1986						
	R2B							
	R2B	1/12/98						
	PA							
	AMSX	8/8/00						

KV2/280

S Form 960

PF 600485 / VOL 2



MINUTE SHEET.Reference P.F. 600,485

136.

~~18.1.45. Receipt from S.H.A.E.F. for Top Secret Document re NAUJOCKS. 136a.~~*Dest: 18.11.60.*

137.

~~18.1.45. Receipt for Top Secret Document on NAUJOCKS from R.I.S. 137a.~~

138

~~18.1.45. B.I.B. Note re NAUJOCKS. 138a.~~

139.

~~18.1.45. From Camp 020 enclosing copy and translation of letter to Col CHRISTIE. 139a~~~~19.1.45. Receipt for Top Secret Document from American Embassy. 139b~~*Dest: 18.11.60.*

140.

~~19.1.45. To Camp 020 re NAUJOCKS. 140a~~

141.

~~19.1.45. To Foreign Office re NAUJOCKS. 141a.~~

142.

~~19.1.45. Note on Professor Walter HEINRICH. 142a.~~~~19.1.45. Receipt for Top Secret Document from G.S.O.2.I(b). 142b~~

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[OVER]

143

~~20.1.45.~~

~~B.I.B. Note on NAUJOCKS,~~

~~Dest: 18.11.60.~~

143a

144.

20.1.45.

Receipt for Top Secret Document from Foreign Office re NAUJOCKS.

144a.

145.

23.1.45.

B.I.B. Note enclosing Photostat copies of Dedication in leaf of book by Walter HEINRICH.

145a.

146

~~23.1.45.~~

~~Receipt for Top Secret Document from C.S.O.1.(b). 21st Army Group~~

~~146a~~

~~Dest: 18.11.60.~~

147

24.1.45.

To Camp 020 enclosing Trace summary on the case of NAUJOCKS.

147a.

148

26.1.45.

To Camp 020 re NAUJOCKS and Bank of England Notes forgery.

148a.

149

26.1.45.

B.I.B. Note to War Room re NAUJOCKS.

149a.

MINUTE SHEET.Reference PF.600,485 V.4.

150

Dest: 18.11.60.~~27.1.45. To Camp 020 enclosing trace summary on the case of Alfred NAUJOCKS. 150a~~

151.

~~29.1.45. To Camp 020 re NAUJOCKS. 151a.~~

152

~~29.1.45 From Camp 020 returning questionnaire for NAUJOCKS and the result of interrogation 152a~~

153

~~30.1.45 From Camp 020 re NAUJOCKS and Boris CHICHKINE v 153a~~

154

~~30.1.45 To Camp 020 forwarding trace summary re NAUJOCKS 154a
30.1.45 From the Foreign Office re NAUJOCKS. 154b~~

155

~~31.1.45 B.l.B. Note to B.l.B. (Sir Edward Reid) re NAUJOCKS 155a~~

156

~~31.1.45. B.l.B. Note from Capt. Noakes to Sir Edward Reid re NAUJOCKS. 156a~~

157

~~2.2.45 From Camp 020 re NAUJOCKS. 157a~~

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158.

20.2.45. From B.1.B. to War Room forwarding list of persons from NAUJOCKS' reports, known to us.

158a.

159.

20.2.45. Copy of B.1.B. note re DICTIONARY, mentioning NAUJOCKS.

159a.

160.

27.2.45. Note from A.D.B. to B.I.B. re DICTIONARY, mentioning NAUJOCKS and HEIDRICH. Also reply from B.I.B.

160a.

Det 18.11.60.

161.

1.3.45. Note to E.5.(L) from B.I.B. re NAUJOCKS.

161a

162

~~2.3.45 E.5.L. Note to B.I.B. re Czech officers to be present at interrogation of NAUJOCKS~~

Det 18.11.60

162a

163

6.3.45 To S.H.A.E.F. re disposal of NAUJOCKS

163a

164.

~~6.3.45. Letter from Home Office re return of "prisoners" to Belgium.~~

164a.

~~7.3.45. To Camp 020 re obtaining a specimen of NAUJOCK's handwriting.~~

Det 18.11.60

164b.

165.

9.3.45. Camp 020 report on subject dated 9.3.45.

165

10.3.45. Letter to the Home Office in reply to 164a.

165a.

166.

Det: 18.11.60

~~13.3.45. From SHAEF re disposal of NAUJOCKS.~~

166a.

13.3.45. Note from E5L to BIB enclosing Copies of Czech Interrogation on NAUJOCKS.

166a

Register No.

Minute Sheet No. P.F.600,485 Vol 4.

167

~~15.3.45. Int. Memo. from BIB to Camp 020 re 116a~~ *Dest: 18.11.60* 167a

168

~~21.3.45. Letter to Forrest from P.G. Mason (ref. 12799/1523/VF1)~~ *Dest: 18.11.60* 168a
 21.3.45. Camp 020 report on subject dated 21.3.45. (Original report in 168b
 German at 168b(1))
~~25.3.45. From SHAEF re NAUJOCKS.~~ 168c.

169

26.3.45. Miss Chenhalls from B.l.a. Comments on NAUJOCKS 169a
~~26.3.45. Note by Miss Chenhalls on memo on NAUJOCKS indicating DUNKERN would not~~
 talk. *Dest: 18.11.60* 169b

170

~~20.3.45. Internal Memorandum from E.5.(L) to J. Winslow W.R.C.3.~~ 170a

171.

28.3.45. To S.I.S. returning original and two copies of comments on NAUJOCKS
 by DICTIONARY. 171a

CLOSED - V.S.

Volume 4 closed at 171a dated 5.4.45.

MINUTE SHEET.

Reference PF:500,485 NAUJOCKS.

172

2.4.45	From Camp 020 enclosing report on NAUJOCKS.	172a
4.4.45	To S.I.S. re NAUJOCKS.	172aa
5.4.45	To Camp 020 enclosing note on NAUJOCKS.	172b
5.4.45	To Camp 020 with inf. on NAUJOCKS from FRANCK.	172bc
11.4.45	To H.O. re NAUJOCKS.	172c

Det. 18.11.60.

173.

12.4.45.	To HO in reply to 172a.	173a.
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174.

12.4.45.	To Camp 020 re NAUJOCK's handwriting.	174a.
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175.

12.4.45.	W.R.C/4d. Miss Chenhalls to WRC Mr. Milmo.	175a.
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176.

14.4.45.	To S.I.S. re NAUJOCKS.	176a.
16.4.45.	From S.I.S. enclosing questions by Scandinavian Section for NAUJOCKS	176b
18.4.45.	To 020 enclosing questions at 176b.	176c

Det. 18.11.60.

177.

19.4.45.	From H.O. in answer to 173a and informing us of instructions for formal internment of NAUJOCKS.	177a
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178.

21.4.45	From S.I.S. re publication of information given by NAUJOCKS	178a
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179.

21.4.45	From SHAEF asking for information about NAUJOCKS.	179a
22.4.45.	From SHAEF enclosing extract of interrogation on ZIMMERMAN.	179b

Det. 18.11.60.

180.

23.4.45	From Camp 020 giving replies of NAUJOCKS to questions at 176b	180a
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181.

23.4.45	From Camp 020 re forgeries of British banknotes.	181a
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Det. 18.11.60.

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182.

~~25.4.45. To S.I.S. forwarding answers to 176B.~~*Det. 18.11.60.*~~182a~~

30.4.45

From S.I.S. drawing attention of information on NAUJOCKS in FRANCK report.

182b

183.

1.5.45.

To SHAEF enclosing note on NAUJOCKS case in answer to 179a and 168c.

183a

184.

~~1.5.45. From Section V.F. re NAUJOCKS from Belgian source.~~~~184a.~~*Det. 18.11.60.*

185.

3.5.45. To Camp 020 forwarding report at 184a.

185a.

186.

25.5.45. From Camp 020 re NAUJOCKS, HAGEMANN and LEDEBUR.

186a.

187

7.8.45. From M.I.19(a) with report re NAUJOCKS' activities in Belgium.

187a

188.

~~8.8.45. From USFET Main re despatch of prisoners from Camp 020 including NAUJOCKS.~~~~188a~~*Det. 18.11.60.*

189.

14.8.45. W.R.C.3a note to V.F., V/48/F. and D.S.Doc. enclosing copies of 187a.

189a.

MINUTE SHEET.Reference P.F. 600, 485.

190.

17.8.45.

To the Home Office re the despatch of a party from Camp 020 to the American Zone of Germany.

190a

191.

17.8.45.

To USFET Main in reply to 188a.

191a.

192.

17.8.45.

To Camp 020 enclosing copy of 187a.

192a.

193.

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20.8.45.

Copy letter from the Home Office in reply to 190a.

193a.

~~29.8.45.~~~~Copy of a letter to A.P.M(V.P.) Chelsea Barracks, with reference to the departure of NAUJOCKS and others.~~~~193b.~~~~29.8.45.~~~~Cable to U.S.F.E.T. re the return of NAUJOCKS from the U.K.~~~~193bc~~

31.8.45.

Copy of memorandum from Camp 020 re the return of NAUJOCKS to American Occupied Zone.

193c

~~31.8.45.~~~~From Camp 020 enclosing a certificate of health for NAUJOCKS.~~~~194a~~*Det 18.11.60*

195.

4.9.45.

Minute from S.I.S. (V.F.7) re BLESCKE.

195a.

196.

18.9.45.

Letter from Home Office enclosing letter from War Office, A.G.3. asking for whereabouts of NAUJOCKS.

196a.

197.

25.9.45.

Letter to W.O. A.G.3. informing them that NAUJOCKS is with USFET.

197a.

198.

26.9.45.

Letter to USFET informing them of A.G.3 enquiry and enclosing copy of letter at 197a.

198a.

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199.

~~4.2.46. Enquiry from the Belgians re NAUJOCKX.~~~~199a.~~

8.2.46. E.I.A. minute to B.I.W. re 199a.

199b.

8.2.46. Extract from Int. Org. A.C. Austria report mentioning NAUJOCKS

199c

200.

~~13.2.46. To E.I.A/S suggesting reply to Belgian enquiry at 199a.~~~~200a.~~~~Det: 18.11.60~~

201.

16.2.46. To the Belgians in reply to 199a.

201a.

202.

16.2.46. From the Belgians further to their letter at 199a re NAUJOCKX.

202a.

203.

22.2.46. E.I.A/B minute to B.I.W. re 202a.

203a.

204.

27.2.46. To the Belgians re NAUJOCKX (ref. P.1097, at 202a.)

204a.

205.

5.6.46. Secret cipher telegram from I.B.C.C.G. (B.E.) BAOR, re Alfred NAUJOCKS and requesting of 020 interrogation report.

205a.

206.

6.6.46. Copy of letter to I.B., C.C.G. (B.E.) BAOR, in reply to 205a.

206a.

207.

22.4.49. Copy of report of FLICKE's paper on the FORMIS Case, .

207a.

Reference.....PF . 600,485.....

208

10.11.65.

Cutting from DAILY TELEGRAPH 29th October, 1965

208a

CODE 18-75



PF600, 485

PF600, 485

PF600, 485

PF600, 485

PF600, 485

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P.F.600,845

NAUJOCKS Alfred.

CODE No. 27-22

PRO CHECKLIST

FILE REF

REPAIRS & ATTACHMENTS

PF600485/v2

⁵
pa 4 photo's in poly wallets, repair &
pa s.206a,205a,199a,193a. Note
repairs needed to s183a page 1&3.
Note repairs to s180?last page. pa
handwriting at s145 in poly wallet.

S. 13 A. BOTTOM OF PAGE

169A

OLD SLOOTAPE ON MINUTE SHEETS

Cutting from the DAILY TELEGRAPH of 29th October, 1965.

WAR CRIMES CHECK ON BBC FILM

1939 NAZI PLOT

PETER KNIGHT

Daily Telegraph TV and Radio Staff

A BBC film from the television series "Man Alive" is to be examined by the Director of Public Prosecutions for West Germany for evidence which might help to convict a Nazi of war crimes.

The film, "The Man Who Started the War," which will be shown on BBC-2 on Nov. 11, is about ~~Alfred Naujocks~~, 54, a former major in the Nazi secret service. In it, he claims to have started the 1939-45 war.

Naujocks tells how he was called to see Heydrich, head of Nazi security, on Aug. 31, 1939, and told to go with troops in Polish uniform to a radio station just inside Germany. The station was stormed and Naujocks broadcast an attack on Germany.

The broadcast was transmitted throughout Germany and overseas. Hitler told the German people later that they would take military action against Poland because of the broadcast and so the war started.

Gaoled after war

At the Nuremberg trials after the war, Naujocks was sentenced to four years for espionage.

Gordon Thomas, script writer of the programme, said yesterday: "Dr. Egon Westerman, the Director of Public Prosecutions in Germany, has been trying to bring war crime charges against Naujocks for four years."

A BBC spokesman said: "Dr. Westerman is coming over here to see the film, to see if it can be of help to him to bring his dossier up to date on Naujocks."

CODE 18-76

208a

RWWK
17 116
TIA/P
10/2/65

DEW R.5.
19.5.49.

COPY

Copied 19.5.49. DMB.

For: P.F. 47,321 STRASSER & P.F. 600,485 NAUJOCKS.

Original filed in: -

Dated 22.4.49.

TOP SECRET

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

24/49/TOPSEC-AS-14

Copy No. 17

From CSGAS 14

To: GCHQ

TOP SECRET

DF-116 V.

24/49/TOPSEC/AS-14-TICOM

FLICKE: THE FORMIS CASE

1. The attached is an Army Security Agency translation of a paper written by Wilhelm Flicke, former chief evaluator and the officially designated historian of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command, German Armed Forces.

2. The present paper, German title: "Der Fall Formis," is a second expanded version of a section of the same title in Flicke's original manuscript. It would be interesting to know whether Flicke's additions here, e. g., the conversation reported, rest on actual reports by participants or are invented by Flicke.

3. Flicke's major contribution, entitled "The War in the Aether" has been translated at Army Security Agency and will be given regular distribution as soon as it is reproduced. The various items issued under DF-116 were written as supplements to the main work.

4. Questions which arise in connection with any of Flicke's papers can now be referred to him for clarification through Army Security Agency, Europe.

22 April 1949
Translated: RWP

Distribution: Normal

30 copies; Copy No. _____

14 pages

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207a

The Fornis Case

The action against "Roehm and Gen." was the first large-scale action which was based on the surveillance and research of the Forschungsamt. At that time it aroused special attention in Germany and abroad because it had been directed by Hitler against his own Party companions.

But who could count all the cases which occurred in those days and in which the victims were individuals, members of labor unions, intellectuals, communists, socialists, members of the Reichstag, Jews, clergymen, etc., who had been opposed to the NSDAP or who were suspected of being opposed? Thus the action against Professor Lessing in Karlsbad, the attempt on the life of student Bell in Kufstein, the abduction of Jakob Salomon - to mention only a few - were due to discoveries of the Forschungsamt.

Most of the "seizures" occurred quietly, and, aside from the nearest relatives or friends of the victims, no one found out anything about them. Officially in channels everything was in perfect order; the claim that there were concentration camps was a base invention of evil people and belonged in the realm of atrocity propaganda. There was no one who would have ventured to reveal the truth to the German people. For people regarded the broadcasts of the Comintern radio in Moscow very skeptically, and the radio stations in other countries held back. There was no audible voice raised against the National Socialist regime, especially no German voice.

None? Really none? - Yes! There was one; it was the voice of a German, a Württemberger, a former SA man who knew all sorts of things. But you could only hear it if you had a so-called short wave part in your receiver which would permit you to hear short wave broadcasts which were just coming into fashion.

The affair which is to be reported here may serve to show that it is false to say that no German had the courage in the early years of the Nazi regime to express himself audibly against all those misdeeds which poured out over Germany like a spring flood; it may also show the

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fate which inevitably threatened those who ventured to take such a step. Whether they might be in the country or abroad, no matter how cleverly they might seek to camouflage and render themselves secure, the Forschungsamt was in a position to discover them sooner or later and the Gestapo then did its part.

Wilhelm Formis had only one passion: that was tinkering with radio. His home in Stuttgart resembled a technical laboratory and it was a great deal of trouble to find a free spot where one could set down a plate of sausage and salad, and a bottle of beer or new wine for supper without coming into conflict with the countless tools, wires, and wiring diagrams. Formis therefore solved this problem in a simple fashion by taking his evening meal in a nearby restaurant.

This place was just then turning into a meeting place ("Stunmlokal") of the SA, and it was not long before the good-natured, portly, and somewhat prosperous looking Formis was drawn into the discussions of the beer-drinking SA men. He had never bothered his head hitherto with politics; in fact, his head was only filled with wiring diagrams, call signs, and QSL postcards, and he understood very little of the things which went on in noisy fashion about him here. But he also saw no reason for taking a hostile attitude toward the gay drinking companions, especially since much of what he heard here seemed to him illuminating, or at least interesting. And when the SA men found out one evening that Formis was an enthusiastic radio amateur, and they gave him to understand that he would have quite other opportunities if he would join the radio groups of the SA, which would give him the possibility of working on a far broader basis, he decided to join the SA. True, it brought no broader, technical working basis for him but only an abundance of duties, commands to be executed, and the obligation to fill up his free time with marches, night drills, and beer evenings instead of with radio experiments. However, they consoled him with the statements that after the inevitable seizure of power by the "Movement", his - Wilhelm Formis' - hour would strike and he would be entrusted with far greater assignments than he could even dream of.

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Formis resigned himself to his fate, drank beer, sang countless songs - the learning of which was one of his new duties, and became more corpulent from day to day.

Then came the 30th of January 1933. There was a lot of marching, a lot of singing, and a great deal of drinking. Formis became the training director of a newly set - up SA signal unit, and sometime thereafter he was made technical director of transmission of Radio Stuttgart. That, after all, was an appropriate recognition of his hitherto moderate services to the cause of the "Movement." Formis was content, tinkered along in his free hours, sent and received the QSL cards of radio amateurs, and performed his duties.

Up to that time his career showed nothing out of the ordinary, and it would probably have remained the same story for the rest of his life down to the time of the denazification, had not Formis in the course of time come into contact with the higher command of the SA and the SS. Of course his duties involved that. Formis, without thinking much about it, had come into contact with the NSDAP because of a mis-directed idealism and had believed that all the high-sounding phrases and aims would one day find a decent realization. From a political point of view he had thus far been not only a blank sheet of paper but also a "pure fool". But now a number of events and trains of thought were revealed to him which slowly but surely turned his good-natured, peace-loving, Swabian soul into new paths. He began to defend his own views now and then, and to call attention to bad conditions. The answers he got were not calculated to strengthen his previous credulity.

Formis expressed himself more clearly; his superiors did likewise. There were some violent arguments which ended by their calling Formis a vagabond and an enemy of the Great Cause of the Führer, and they reserved the right to take further steps against him. A chain of lesser and major intrigues against him began.

Formis shut his mouth but not his heart; and he kept his eyes and ears open. He now began to regard very critically everything that went on within the circles accessible to him. And now it was not very long before he had, as we say, his nose full.

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One day Formis had disappeared from Stuttgart. They searched and scolded; they had the police look for him; but they found neither a trace nor even a suspicion of the direction in which he might have gone.

* * *

Months had passed. Radio Stuttgart had a new technical director and nobody any longer thought of Formis. The events of 30 June 1934 and of the following weeks and months saw to it that people's thoughts were fully occupied. Furthermore, every day was bringing its news, partly through the coordinated press and partly through the equally coordinated broadcasts.

Of course, there were even then people who turned on their radios only with reluctance; but there were also some who slowly began in the evening to run up and down the wave bands of their sets until they discovered something which was more to their taste than the offerings of the German stations which were controlled by the Party. And these "searchers in the ether" made a remarkable discovery in the early days of November 1934. If they came into the vicinity of the 31-meter band at certain times of day, then they heard a transmitter which in the beginning they could not quite comprehend. First there was some music and then followed a news report. And this news report really "was something."

The original supposition that it was a Comintern transmitter had to be abandoned because these broadcasts were of an entirely different kind. The characteristic phrases peculiar to broadcasts coming from the Soviet Union were missing. Likewise, the assumption that it was Radio Strassbourg did not prove correct.

The broadcasts were in the German language; their content was directed in an ever sharper fashion against the National Socialist regime and its standard bearers.

The concept of an "illicit transmitter" was little known at that time. But one had a suspicion that this could be nothing else.

One day the station began to designate itself as the "Transmitter of the Black Front." Now people in Germany became attentive. A "Transmitter

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of the Black Front" meant the existence of a resistance movement. And of this people had not even dared to dream, so impressed were they by the terrorist system.

It was astonishing to note how many listeners this first German anti-Hitler broadcasting station found within a short time. The method of whispering propaganda introduced and cultivated by the National Socialists now saw to it that news of the existence of this sender and details regarding the contents of its broadcast spread with great rapidity. If the number 31 was mentioned anywhere sotto voce or if people mentioned "6 P.M." or "about 10 A.M." you could bet anything that they were talking about this mysterious transmitter. The demand for short wave receivers increased. There were people who became very disagreeable if they were disturbed around six o'clock in the evening or around ten o'clock in the morning. But they were very pleased if you called on them at 6:30.

The broadcasts of this unknown station showed that there must be behind it a very well-functioning and rather extensive organization for gathering information. The speaker was very well informed about all happenings within the NSDAP and the government. He offered hundreds of details regarding the doings of the great men of the Party, about their rather dubious private lives, about the arrests which were being made all the time, about the concentration camps and the life therein, about the internal struggles for power within the Party and its organization, details regarding Hitler, Goering, Himmler, and many others. The general tendency of the broadcasts was directed toward an overthrow of the Party government and the elimination of the entire system. "Brown is the, " cried the speaker one day, "and Hitler is leading us to"

Along with many tendentious and often incredible sounding reports the speaker - always the same person - often brought things which must be taken very seriously and the accuracy of which could be checked. He gave details which could not fail to cause the skeptically inclined listener to reflect. His political surveys were very noteworthy. The thing which was especially astounding was the fact that the speaker often predicted events which were only to occur after some time; this gave a chance to check the value of his information; and as a rule the check turned out in favor of

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the mysterious broadcaster. That was noteworthy because it allowed one to infer that his sources of information must be found in high and very high official positions.

People listened to his daily broadcasts with pleasure. It was really a delight to hear at last one voice from the ether which ventured to speak against this new regime of force which suppressed any criticism.

People in general began to ask where the transmitter might be located and who was behind it; for there was no doubt that more than the action of an individual was involved, and that there must be an entire organization. The speaker himself designated his group as the "Black Front."

As for the first question, it was very difficult to get any clarity. On the one hand, expressions occurred which made one believe that the location was outside the boundaries of the Reich. But then expressions cropped up which suggested the contrary. Thus the speaker said once in December 1934 "We stand here at our microphone and beside us are 600 pounds of dynamite. If the black dogs come (meaning the SS) they will fly into the air with us." Another time he said: "We here in Germany....," or "When we look out the window and see the brown rascals passing by ...," or "Yesterday I stood in front of one of the pleasure palaces in which these rascals hold their orgies." Of these expressions one could not determine which was intended to mislead.

But, aside from the many people who listened with interest, there were others who had a much more burning interest in this new transmitter. Those were the men in the Forschungsamt. The transmitter had been heard by various Party officers and the question was raised as to how it was possible to render this dangerous station innocuous. For it was certain that the broadcasts concealed a danger which must not be underestimated. They spread with the swiftness of the wind, and one frequently could hear questions which referred indirectly to one of the last broadcasts of the "Black Front." The Forschungsamt was the agency to which fell the duty of identifying the station.

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Each of the B-stations of the Forschungsamt had been equipped with long range direction finding apparatus. After they had listened to the transmissions for a while, they began with their direction findings; and, in so doing, had the most curious surprises. The readings from Constance indicated precisely a line toward Königsberg in East Prussia. Eutin got readings in the direction of Hamburg and swore up and down that the station must be in the general area of Hamburg. That signified a slight difference of opinion; but it became even worse when the B-stations at Templin and Jübben reported in complete agreement that there was no doubt but that the transmitter of the "Black Front" was in Sweden.

The readings were then repeated; the result remained the same. Now close range direction finders were put to work in the Hamburg and Königsberg areas. But they yielded such a merry-go-round of shifting and contradictory readings that nothing could be made of them; from this it was possible to conclude that the transmitter was not in these areas and that what had been fixed was the so-called sky wave which gave this strange effect in the case of the close range direction finders.

So Sweden was left; but this assumption was contradicted a few days later by a report received from the B-station in Breslau which stated that the station had been fixed beyond question in the direction of Warsaw and that it was doubtless a transmitter located in Polish territory.

Meanwhile, the announcer of the "Black Front" continued his reports; he gave all conceivable details of the action of 30 June 1934; gave an abundance of side lights on Hitler's sphere of influence; told of resistance groups which had been formed within the SA and disconcerted every Party big-wig when, forty-eight hours after the event, he read off the menu of his latest sumptuous banquet.

Since the Forschungsamt was getting nowhere with direction finding, it turned with a plea for help to the direction finding service of the Ministry of Defense. A direction finding station in Münster in Westphalia was entrusted with the task and reported after a few days that they had gotten a clear reading in the direction of England which pointed to the area north of Sheffield or Leeds.

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They now investigated the direction findings which had been made previously and, in so doing, discovered that they could essentially be reduced to a common denominator, namely by extending the rays leading to Poland, Sweden, and England backward at 180°; these now crossed the lines from Constance and Cologne and formed a great pentagon which embraced the cities of Prague, Kladno, Karlsbad, and Marienbad; now there was no doubt left that this station was in Czechoslovakia, especially since new clues which had been investigated in Stuttgart pointed in that direction. Now there were two things to work with: the approximate area in which the station was located, and the person of the speaker.

The Forschungsamt now ordered a wholesale use of direction finders; all pieces of apparatus from now on were in readiness at all the scheduled times of the station sought. After barely three days the area to which the readings pointed had been so contracted that it embraced only the western edge of Prague and a few nearby villages. The task of the Forschungsamt had been fulfilled. The rest was up to the Gestapo.

Even before he went to Czechoslovakia, Fornis had made contact with the opposition Strasser group or "Strasser-Movement", which was then taking shape, and he had made good preparations for his flight. In Prague the central office of the "Black Front" had meanwhile been set up which was composed of former Party members, SA men, some emigrants, and some Sudeten Germans with leanings toward the left. The organization was not very large, but had excellent connections with all places in Germany and had built up a very clever courier service. Since a great many people who had succeeded by the skin of their teeth in escaping from the bloody night of 30 June 1934 belonged to this group, the general attitude toward the Hitler regime was bitterly hostile.

However, they were quite aware that they could not change things in Germany by any direct action; therefore, they chose the course of enlightening propaganda which had as its aim a disintegration within the SA and the SS. Fornis happened along at just the right moment for this group. With his aid they thought to set up a propaganda broadcasting station in order in this way to carry their own ideas and their agitation against Hitler and his system across the frontier to Germany.

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Now they had it! So it was the English again! The Foreign Office was informed. But even before they got around to a diplomatic demarche, the B-station in Cologne reported that it had located the elusive transmitter in the direction of Karlsbad in Czechoslovakia.

Now they had enough of their direction finding! They cursed the equipment, the men who operated it, and the confounded transmitter which did not give them a minute's rest. And they did so all the more when the B-station in Cologne reported a short time thereafter that the line ran not toward Karlsbad but toward Marienbad.

Now it was clear that no progress was being made by direction finding. The locating of short waves at great distances was then still in its infancy and was not to be compared with the present state of development. They determined to get an approximate idea of the location by intensive observation of the transmitter. Every broadcast was recorded on phonograph records and studied word by word. From the character and content of the broadcasts they hoped to discover clues to the sources of the interesting reports. But they progressed only slowly in this task. They could neither find out where the station was nor who the speaker was, although he had a fairly characteristic manner of speaking and could be recognized instantly.

Now in the evaluation center of the Forschungsamt there was an inspector who among other things, was working on the transmissions of the "Black Front"; he had formerly been employed at an army radio station in Stuttgart and had then gone over to the Forschungsamt. He asked and received permission to listen to these broadcasts for several days. Already on the third day he declared positively that the speaker was none other than Formis whom he had known in Stuttgart and with whom he had formerly had contact.

They went into the Stuttgart affair once more and now found a few clues which led to Czechoslovakia.

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Formis went to work with Penthesilea, and within a short time he built a short wave transmitter for telephone use which was of such small dimensions that it might have been carried easily in a lady's handbag. He took up quarters in an inn in a western suburb of Prague and installed his radio apparatus very cleverly in the upholstered arm of a big easy chair so that outwardly nothing of the entire installation could be recognized.

In order to insure an unobtrusive antenna connection, Formis set up a small broadcast receiver and was now able to attach to the antenna the one or the other apparatus at will by use of a Jones plug.

After these technical preparations had been completed, Formis received twice a day from the information bureau of the "Black Front" news which appeared suitable for propaganda work in Germany. The transmission and the talking into the microphone Formis undertook himself.

The disguise of the station had been carried out in the best possible way; Formis rarely left the inn, unless to do a few brief errands or for a walk. He never acted in a way to attract attention and kept out of any political activity. He had stated that he was an agent and in this way explained the visitors he frequently received.

After two months he changed his quarters and moved along with his apparatus and his easy chair, regarding which he maintained it was the only piece of furniture from which he would never part as long as he lived, into a room in a small market town some 20 kilometers west of his previous location. He resumed operations from here.

* * * * *

On a Monday afternoon at Tetschen-Bodenbach, a six-seated passenger automobile crosses the Saxon-Czech boundary. Inspection of passports and baggage is quickly finished, the papers are in order, the baggage consists of two small handbags and reveals nothing in particular.

The chauffeur, a rather young man, handles the machine well. The trip is along the Elbe in the direction of Leitmeritz.

In the back of the car sit two men; one of them has identified himself at the frontier as an engineer, the other as a commercial traveler. But their conversation turns about other matters than technology or business.

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"I am afraid there will be an alarm," remarks the one, "and then the matter is soured."

"It's not sour in any event; it will work this way or that."

"Yes, but the first way would be definitely preferable. Dead men can no longer tell anything. And in this case we must rely on statements if we are to find out anything about the backers."

"Perhaps we will find papers."

"There won't be any time to look for them. The whole thing has got to be done like a flash."

"It will be; as I know the fellow, he will not even make an attempt at resistance. He is far too fat and easygoing to be able to defend himself."

"How did you really find the fellow?"

"That was anything but easy. I had scared up a photograph of him in Stuttgart. Well, you know of course - photos don't always agree with nature to the point that you can always recognize the man. So Paul and I searched around first in Prague; we listened here and there and finally ascertained at the office where the inhabitants' residences are recorded that the man had lived for a time six months ago in a small hotel at the western edge of the city."

"And then?"

"Then he departed for an unknown destination."

"And there were no further entries in Prague?"

"No. But since the station was still working in that area, the only possibility was that the man had gone to one of the smaller places in the vicinity."

"The number of possibilities was still pretty large."

"Yes. Theoretically, I should have had to go around Prague in an ever greater spiral. However, I preferred to shorten the matter and took lodgings with Paul in that hotel; there I found out that the fellow had been taken away one day in an auto with a Prague registration number; the auto had not gone toward Prague but toward the northwest and had been seen again an hour later returning to Prague. Paul and I

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now went on our search separately and I had the good luck to run into the man at supper in an inn two days later."

"Was it the same inn in which he was living?"

"Yes. Paul now watched him for several days and ascertained that he had frequent visitors and went out for rendezvous. But it was not possible for the two of us - without arousing attention - to find out any details about these contacts. In a foreign country the work is not as simple as it is among us."

"Is there a police station in the place?"

"Yes. There are usually two men on duty and it is quite a distance away. By the time the people appear we shall be over the hills and far away."

"I hope with our friend. Have you the papers for his return journey with us at hand?"

"Yes, they are made out in his true name; we even have his photograph on them. We just have to see to it that he doesn't make any noise at the frontier. Paul has been living in the same inn since day before yesterday. He will be waiting for us at the entrance to the village at nine o'clock."

A few minutes after nine o'clock in the evening the automobile stops about 100 meters from the north exit of the market town; it is already dark; the chauffeur turns off the headlights while the two other men get out. From the shadow of a nearby shed a figure emerges and draws nearer slowly.

"Max?"

"Yes, Paul. Everything in order?"

"Excellent. But we must wait. At ten he begins broadcasting. Two minutes later would be the correct time."

"Yes, Paul. But Sturmbannführer Wieland is now in charge."

The three men stroll along the street. Wieland gets a report with details regarding the house and the latest discoveries. The public room is quite empty; the place will probably be closed in half an hour. Paul has the key to the house door. He will let the two men in. His room is opposite that of Fornis. Both rooms are in the supper story. The window of Fornis' room is on the court. However, flight is unlikely because of

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the height.

The three men get into the auto, drive to the market place; the auto turns and goes back slowly; a few meters from the inn it stops. The motor is kept running.

The public room is still lighted up; two men are sitting there drinking beer; the host leans wearily against the bar; his wife is rattling dishes in the kitchen.

Paul orders three glasses of beer and says he will be right down again with his companions. Morosely, the host fetches the glasses while Paul and his companions climb the stairs and disappear in his room. Here they remain standing for a few moments; Wieland gives the final instructions. Now the time has come.

Paul stands by the stairs on guard with drawn pistol. Wieland gently tries to open the door to Formis' room; it is locked; now the two men throw themselves against it with all their weight. The door flies open.

At the same moment Formis cries into the little microphone that he is holding in his hand, "The dogs are coming!"; then he throws it on the table, seizes a pistol lying there and ducks behind the chair. "Hands up!" cries Wieland, but at the same instant Formis presses the trigger and grazes his opponent's shoulder. Immediately afterward rings out a shot from the revolver of the second Gestapo agent. Formis is hit in the leg and shoots again, this time without hitting anything; at the third shot his pistol fails; he throws it in Wieland's face and springs to the window. A second bullet hits him in the thigh. He throws up the window; then the two men rush at him. But with a wild scream Formis turns on them, throws them back into the room, reaches into his pocket, pulls out an egg shaped grenade, pulls out the safety pin and throws it between the two of them, whereupon they hastily rush to the door. In the same instant Formis has turned around and is trying to squeeze through the window frame; then the grenade explodes and he sinks back.

Both the Gestapo agents likewise were hit by splinters; they rush into the room again and fire two more shots at Formis; then they seize the microphone, tear open the arm chair to which the cord is connected,

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pull out the instrument, gather up what they can in their haste, leave the dying Formis, and hasten to the stairs. There the third Gestapo agent has been holding in check with his revolver the horrified innkeeper, his wife, and the two guests.

As the three men jump into the automobile it starts and soon they are off at top speed for the frontier. It is a question of reaching it before the sentries are alarmed.

Shortly after midnight the automobile approaches the nearest frontier station; the gate is down and the sentry is standing in the door of his guard house. The auto drives up to the barrier at high speed, two men leap out, raise the barrier, spring back into the auto, and before the sentry who hurries up in a daze has recovered from his astonishment, the machine has vanished into the night.

* * * * *

This encroachment by the Gestapo evoked great indignation in official circles in Czechoslovakia. But the government did not desire any political complications, and limited itself to a lukewarm demarche in Berlin. The press and radio kept silent about the affair and the transmitter of the "Black Front" was silent too.

For a long time many German listeners searched vainly for the mysterious station before they finally realized that all their efforts were in vain. The first German voice to be raised against the Hitler regime had ceased to sound.

206A

PT.600,465/B1b/JC.
Yr. Ref: IB 4032.

L.B.,
C.C.G. (B.E.),
B.A.O.R.

Alfred NAUJOCKS.

With reference to your telegram of 31.5.46, the above was transferred from Camp 020 to the American zone on 31.8.45. On 1.5.45 we sent to A.C. of S, C.I. sub-division (for the attention of Colonel Sheen) a note on the NAUJOCKS case written from the point of view of NAUJOCKS being considered as a war criminal. Since this date we have also been approached by the Belgian authorities asking that they might have an opportunity of interrogating this man. We are in full sympathy with their request, but had to inform them that NAUJOCKS was no longer under our jurisdiction, and we gave them much the same information as we are passing to you now.

We can only suggest that you get in touch with Colonel Sheen, who is still in the American Zone, and find out what the position is from them.

A copy of NAUJOCKS' Camp 020 interrogation report was sent out to BAOR in accordance with the usual distribution, and an additional copy will be found at CSDIC(WEA), I believe. So, unless we receive another request from you, we are not proposing to send out to you our only spare copy.

B.1.b.
6.6.46.

J. Chenhalls.

✓
12.6.46.

S. Form 100.

SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER

From : EXFOR Office File No. _____ Originator's No. IB 4032
 _____ Passed for _____ Date of Origin 31.5.46.
 Action to B.1. Date of Receipt 5.6.46.
 Copies to _____ Deciphered by NCM

SECRET.For WARREC.

Please advise present location ALFRED NAUJOCKS your PF 600485 formerly at 020. It has been suggested he be tried as criminal but we have no record of his return to Germany. We should also be grateful for copy of 020 interrogation report.

*File & spare 020 report
requisitioned.*

The text of this telegram is **Unparaphrased**, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being **Paraphrased**. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

S. Form 51

SECRET.

EXTRACT

Extract for File No.: P.F. 600, 485 Name: NAUJOCKS, Alfred.

Original in File No.: S.F. 52/11/24 Serial: 13a. Receipt Date: 8.2.46.

Original from: Int. Org. A.C. Austria. Under Ref.: Ib/I/PF/1238/A/17. Dated: 8.2.46.

Extracted on: 1.12.49. by: ASM Section: R.5.

Extract from letter from Intelligence Organisation, Allied Commission for Austria (BE) APO. S. 564, CMF, enclosing copy of Interrogation report for Major Hans Ludwig Von USLAR, and mentioning Alfred NAUJOCKS.

.....

3. If reference is made to the original Camp 020 interrogation report on Sturmbannfuhrer Alfred NAUJOCKS, which was written in approximately December, 1944, it will be seen that NAUJOCKS handed himself over to the British professing that he had been entrusted with a special mission by the Austrian underground movement. This, he alleged, involved the establishment of contact between the Austrian underground movement and a certain Colonel CHRISTY of the British War Office, and the password which NAUJOCKS was to use was "Vater der Schlosskinder".

4. NAUJOCKS' alleged mission was thought to be bogus at the time when he was interrogated, and the unexpected reference to the password "Vater der Schlosskinder" in the report on Von USLAR lends weight to this supposition.

5. The above information, which is an interesting side-light on the NAUJOCKS case, is forwarded to you for what it may be worth.

COPY.

193c

SECRET.Box No. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET, B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.Telephone Nos.
REGent 6050.
WHITEhall 6789.

31st August, 1945.

MEMORANDUM.To: B.I.W., - Mr. H.P. Milmo.

GAMBKE, Gotthard.
 HUNTERMANN, Gerhardt.
 JOST, Heinz.
 KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst.
 KUBART, Wilhelm.
 LORENZ, Fritz.
 NAUJOCKS, Alfred.
 OLMES, Frederick.
 PETERS, Sergius.
 RAUPACH, Hans.

PA
PF. 600, 425

I have to advise you that the above-named ten
 German Nationals were this morning conducted under
 escort to Hendon Airport and returned by plane to
 the American Occupied Zone.

All property went forward with these bodies.

(Sgd.) D.B. STIMSON,

Lt.-Col.

Camp 020
 DBS/JG

13 SEP 1945

225/1611
 14.9.45

Attached to file: PF 600, 425
 Attached to paper from:
 Received: Their Ref.:

REGISTRY ACTION SLIP

Amend the following for:

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Name | At ser. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Address | At ser. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Personal particulars | At ser. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Occupation | At ser. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Security information | At ser. |
| (Specify unless obvious) | |

(Use one action slip for each new file to be made)

MAKE FILE FOR (Full Names)

Reason for recording:

(THIS SPACE TO BE LEFT FOR REGISTRY USE ONLY)

COPY, EXTRACT, TRANSFER and/or OTHER
 INSTRUCTIONS (Delete inapplicable items)

Please ext. para. 3 of encl. in
183a re SOETTSCH in
his own PF 602, 842, and
then transfer action on latter file
as on att. A/S

(Continue overleaf if necessary)

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Return File to | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Open New Volume | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PA File after Action |

Signature of Officer my

Section R22 Date 14.1.76

S. Form 180/rev.

R 14765/B155 100m 1/73 TC

R3A

P.F.600,485/B.1.W/HPM.


1st May 1945.

From: Mr. Milmo, War Office.

To: A.C. of S. G.2. C.I. Subdivision
(For the attention of Colonel Sheen).


Reference your letters GBI/CI/000/5-1 of 25.3.45.
and 21.4.45., attached herewith is a note on the NAUJOCKS
case written for the point of view of NAUJOCKS being
considered as a war criminal.

It will be appreciated that this note does not
purport to set out any evidence, but rather to suggest
lines of enquiry which might be pursued if it was
thought that proceedings are likely to take place against
this individual.



H.P. Milmo.

HPM/MH.



Alfred NAUJOCKS.

Name: Alfred NAUJOCKS @ Alfred DONSEN.
 Born: 20.9.1911.
 Nationality: German.
 Height: 5'11½"
 Weight: 11 st. 9 lbs.
 Hair: Light brown, receding at temples.
 Face: Short straight nose.
 Peculiarities: 4 vaccination marks right upper arm; appendix scar; mole on left side of abdomen; scar inside of left knee; bullet wound by big toe of right foot.
 Occupation: Representative for a drug business and member of the S.D.
 Rank: S.S. Hauptsturmführer.

1. Alfred NAUJOCKS was arrested on the 19th October 1944 by troops of the 102 American Cavalry Reconnaissance Group whilst attempting to cross into the Allied lines at a point four kilometres from Wirtzfeld. He was carrying a German passport in the name of Alfred DONSEN and refused to give any particulars of himself stating that he was enlisted for a secret mission. He was later interrogated by C.I. and subsequently sent to the U.K. where he arrived at Camp 020 on the 3rd November. His case has been fully investigated from a C.I. point of view, and has been the subject matter of a report which has been distributed to S.C.I.

2. The present note is being compiled at the request of G.2. SHAEF, C.I. Subdivision, who wish to submit to G.1. Division such information as is available and relevant concerning NAUJOCKS' more discreditable actions for consideration of the possibility of treating him as a war criminal. It must be pointed out that the material in this note depends exclusively upon all admissions made by NAUJOCKS under interrogation, and accordingly must not be regarded as evidence in the strict sense of the word. It must also be borne in mind that NAUJOCKS has lied extensively to his interrogators; thus he has represented that as a result of a quarrel with HEYDRICH he was in January 1941 disgraced and deprived of his rank in the S.S., though information is available in the form of a captured document showing that at a later date he was listed as a Hauptsturmführer in the S.S.

3. Plan to Murder Otto STRASSER.

At the end of October or beginning of November 1934 HEYDRICH informed NAUJOCKS that pursuant to a policy of conducting a wholesale purge of members of the Opposition in the Nazi Party, he, NAUJOCKS, together with one, Werner GOETTSCH, were required to liquidate Otto STRASSER who was then living in Prague. NAUJOCKS agreed, and with GOETTSCH set out for Prague where they made enquiries as to STRASSER's habits and mode of life with a view to planning his murder. After fourteen days stay in the Czech capital they abandoned the plan, having become nervous of the attentions of the local police. NAUJOCKS asserts that this failure marked the beginnings of his estrangement from HEYDRICH.

4. Murder of Rudolf FORMIS.

In February of 1935 HEYDRICH sent for NAUJOCKS and explained to him that he was required to kidnap and bring back to Germany alive one, Rudolf FORMIS, whom HEYDRICH stated was broadcasting anti-Nazi propaganda from a remote mountain village in Czechoslovakia; the

E, J
 PF 602, 842

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precise place from which FORMIS was operating was indicated to NAUJOCKS who proceeded to the locality and easily recognised the house. NAUJOCKS having reconnoitred the ground and made a study of his proposed victim decided that the mission was too difficult to carry out alone and so returned to Berlin where he obtained permission from HEYDRICH for his friend GOETTSCH to accompany him. After staying three days at the local inn NAUJOCKS proceeded to FORMIS' room, intending to sabotage the W/T apparatus, in the belief that FORMIS was out. He alleges, however, that he was surprised by FORMIS in the darkness, the latter firing several shots at him with a revolver and wounding him in three places. NAUJOCKS, who asserts that he was unarmed, states that he sprang at his assailant and in a furious struggle which ensued FORMIS was shot dead with his own pistol. NAUJOCKS and his companion having wrecked the wireless set drove off at full speed across the Czechoslovakian frontier. He states that HEYDRICH was displeased with his performance as the orders were to bring back FORMIS to Germany alive and not to murder him.

(NOTE: The Czechoslovakian Security Authorities have had an opportunity of interrogating NAUJOCKS in the U.K. Their records show that this incident was deliberately organised by the G.I.S. They are satisfied from the detailed descriptions which NAUJOCKS has given them of the locality and of the murder itself that he must have played a principal part in the affair.)

5. Proposed Murder of BERNDT.

At the beginning of 1939 HEYDRICH instructed NAUJOCKS that he was required to murder a certain BERNDT who worked in the Propaganda Ministry and who in some way had incurred HEYDRICH's displeasure. His instructions on this occasion were not specifically that he was to liquidate BERNDT but that he should arrest BERNDT, and he was given to understand that he was to use his revolver without hesitation if the victim made the slightest attempt at resistance. The matter was put to him in a way that made him realise that he was practically being asked to commit a murder. He says he begged to be excused, but that his appeal fell on deaf ears. He took refuge, so he states, in going sick and retiring to bed. He says that this incident resulted in a further deterioration of his relations with HEYDRICH, but admits that not long afterwards HEYDRICH told him that he wanted him, NAUJOCKS, to gain control of, or organise, a bacteriological laboratory which could be used entirely for the surreptitious liquidation of persons whom he, HEYDRICH, regarded as dangerous. NAUJOCKS states that he informed HEYDRICH that he could not assist in this project.

6. Polish Frontier Incidents.

August 1939: On the 10th August HEYDRICH sent for NAUJOCKS and told him that the Fuhrer had determined to attack Poland within a month, and that it would be necessary to stage "Frontier Incidents" which would lead the world to believe that the first aggressive move had been made by the Poles and not by the Germans. For this purpose it was proposed to take selected life term prisoners from the concentration camps, kill them by means of hypodermic injections, dress them in Polish Army uniforms, and having riddled the bodies with bullets place them in carefully chosen positions in German frontier villages of Upper Silesia so that it would appear to the casual observer that small parties of Polish troops had been carrying out abortive raids on Reich territory. This plan was immediately put into effect and NAUJOCKS states that the bodies were forwarded to the villages where they were required in packing cases labelled "preserves". Some of the victims arrived at their destinations only half dead, having been given inadequate injections, and these had to be put out of their mis-

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before they could be used. The part played by NAUJOCKS in the affair was as follows:- in order to lend colour to the "frontier incidents", HEYDRICH and his friends decided to publish a story to the effect that the Gleiwitz broadcasting station had been attacked by Polish insurgents, and he, NAUJOCKS, was accordingly sent to that town with five or six men to make the necessary arrangements. On his arrival there he arranged for a Polish-speaking German to take possession of the microphone "by force" and to begin broadcasting an appeal to his "countrymen" urging them to rise against the Germans. The broadcast was then abruptly broken off, shots were fired in the studio, and finally a corpse, with which NAUJOCKS had previously been provided, was left lying on the floor close to the microphone riddled with bullets. NAUJOCKS remained for more than a fortnight in Gleiwitz before being ordered back to Berlin: it was only a matter of days before war broke out.

(NOTE: The Polish Ministry of National Defence state that the above facts as disclosed by NAUJOCKS insofar as they relate to the "frontier incidents" are true.)

7. The Venlo Affair.

On the 9th November 1939 NAUJOCKS took a leading part in the kidnapping on Dutch territory at Venlo of the British Officers Best and Stevens. He states that this operation was planned and put into execution by SCHELLENBERG now head of Amt VI of the RSHA. The British officers were inveigled to the frontier in the belief that they were going to make contact with Opposition elements from within the Reich. NAUJOCKS was summoned to Dusseldorf on the morning of the 9th November and was first informed of the plan by his colleague GOETTSCH. NAUJOCKS was to be second in command and to take charge of the actual kidnapping, his instructions being to bring two Englishmen across the frontier alive. His party consisted of nine or ten men, all armed with revolvers, and two sub-machine guns; all wore civilian clothes. The party proceeded by car to Venlo and in due course Best and Stevens drove up to a hotel on the Dutch side of the frontier, backing the car into a passageway. The British officers were driven by a Dutch chauffeur and accompanied, according to NAUJOCKS, by a Dutch officer in civilian clothes. When the British car was backed into the passageway one of NAUJOCKS' men drove a car in front of it to block it and shooting started, allegedly by the Dutch officer who was the first to realise the situation. NAUJOCKS and his men pounced on Best and Stevens before they could defend themselves, and hustling them into the German car drove them across the frontier into Germany. During the affair the Dutch officer received serious wounds from which he later died. NAUJOCKS asserts that he and GOETTSCH received the Iron Cross 1st Class for their part in the incident.

8. Mission to Denmark.

In February 1944 NAUJOCKS who was then stationed at Brussels received orders from KALTENBRUNNER, head of the RSHA, to return to Germany at once. He did so and was instructed by KALTENBRUNNER to proceed to Denmark to organise reprisals against the Danish patriots who were carrying out increasingly daring acts of sabotage and becoming a serious menace to the German Administration. NAUJOCKS states that he asked to be excused but KALTENBRUNNER insisted that no-one else was available to undertake the job and assured him that he need only visit Copenhagen to make the arrangements for his campaign against the patriots, after which he could return to Brussels provided he was prepared to go from time to time to Denmark to see that his instructions were being carried out. KALTENBRUNNER passed NAUJOCKS on to SCHELLENBERG who introduced him to SKORZENY with whom, he states, he was to collaborate.

Over

- 4 -

Denmark. NAUJOCKS asserts that SKORZENY regarded him as a rival and that although he went to Copenhagen and remained there for three days he was able to report back to KALTENBRUNNER that the situation was a difficult one and that he would require further men and materials before he could do anything. Three weeks later he returned to Copenhagen and found that SKORZENY had the matter well in hand, sabotaging Danish concerns in retaliation for each German concern which was sabotaged by the patriots. He would have us believe that he himself never did or directed anything.

From the above picture which NAUJOCKS paints of himself it is evidence that over a period of many years he was regarded by the leaders of Nazi Germany as a desperado and a thug who could be relied upon to carry out any mission, however dangerous and however disreputable. His claims to have been degraded and disgraced as far back as 1941 are not consistent with the evidence in our hands, nor can they be reconciled with his admitted history after that date. It is, to say the least of it, doubtful as to whether many of the incidents related above did not reflect less favourably upon NAUJOCKS than he has represented, and it would not be at all surprising to find that his account of the Denmark affair referred to in paragraph (8) is a gross understatement, as it attempts to limit his responsibility for the reprisals which were doubtless taken at the time against Danish patriots.

1.5.45.

H.P. Milmo.

180a

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM.

To: Colonel Stephens.

From Captain Scott-Harston.

re NAUJOCKS.

NAUJOCKS was seen today with regard to B.I.B's (Mr. Wilson's) memorandum and enclosure dated 18.4.45.

NAUJOCKS' reactions to the questions therein contained are as follows:-

1. NAUJOCKS states that he has a "bad head" for dates and now wishes to modify those relating to his visits to Denmark. He now thinks that his first trip to Copenhagen took place about the middle of January 1944, when he had his conversations with Dr. BEST and the chief of the local SIPO - BOVENSIEPEN. *OK SF 52 Denmark 12/23/49*

The second visit to Copenhagen was made on or about the 8th or 9th February 1944, when NAUJOCKS paid SIEBOLT (sic) a visit and borrowed some books from him to read. NAUJOCKS attempted to visit this man again a few days later, in order to return these books, but learnt that he had been "severely wounded". NAUJOCKS is unaware as to whether SIEBOLT survived these wounds.

It was on this second visit that NAUJOCKS discovered SKORZENY to have got "the matter well in hand" (as described in the liquidation report, p.25).

The third trip to Copenhagen was undertaken on or about April 20th, 1944.

2. NAUJOCKS cannot confirm for certain that Regierungsrat JAHN was identical with the person introduced to him as BOVENSIEPEN's deputy. The deputy that NAUJOCKS met, worked in BOVENSIEPEN's office at the Dargmarhus, Copenhagen. BOVENSIEPEN, in this office, introduced his deputy to NAUJOCKS.

NAUJOCKS can give the following information concerning these offices:-

Storey 1 and Storey 2 - Dr. BEST's offices.
Storey 3 - HSSUF and ORPO Chief.
Storey 4 - SIPO (Amt IV)
Storey 5 - SIPO.

3. NAUJOCKS first met BOVENSIEPEN at the latter's office in the Dargmarhus. BOVENSIEPEN had been previously notified of NAUJOCKS' pending visit. BOVENSIEPEN's office was probably situated on the fourth storey of this building. NAUJOCKS had three discussions with BOVENSIEPEN, as follows:-

- a) First time - alone with BOVENSIEPEN. *sub.*
b) Second time - discussion with SCHWERDT, BEST, and BOVENSIEPEN.
c) Third time - ----- do -----

In the course of these conversations, a mild interpretation of Berlin orders in respect of counter-sabotage was decided upon, and further, a suitable report for Berlin was considered. NAUJOCKS at this point stated that SCHWERDT was very unenthusiastic regarding the carrying out of Berlin orders.

4. NAUJOCKS knew two DAUFELDS (both brothers) from his old Kiel days, *PTO*

- 2 -

and one of them he heard from the other had gone to Switzerland. NAUJOCKS remembers that their respective christian names were HELMUTH, and HANS CHRISTIAN, but cannot remember which possessed which christian name. He understands the DAUFELD he visited to have been an Obersturmbannführer, though he is not certain of this as the man wore civilian clothes. He thinks that this DAUFELD was probably a member of Amt. VI. Only personal matters were discussed at his brief meeting with DAUFELD and he does not recall the names of the other officials present upon that occasion.

5. At the Dagmarhus, NAUJOCKS visited the following persons:-

- a) First storey - [BEST.] PF 601, 152
- b) Fourth storey - BOVENSIEPEN.
- c) Fourth storey - Reigierungsrat HOFFMANN (description attached hereto) now in Amt. IV, whom he had already met at the Hague in August 1940 in connection with the arranging of exit permits for the Jews controlling the Film Co. NAUJOCKS was to purchase. HOFFMANN then worked under Brigadefuehrer HARSTER.
- d) Fifth storey - the Head of Abteilung V (name unknown).

6. In addition to the Dagmarhus in Copenhagen, NAUJOCKS only visited the German General Consulate at Vesterporthus.

He claims he visited no other SIPO or S.D. offices in Copenhagen.

7. (a) NAUJOCKS claims that he received no instructions from Amt. VI. RSHA. and only had his orders from KALTENBUNNER. NAUJOCKS received no instructions to liquidate individuals hostile to Germany, but he believes that Berlin were contemplating this, though he stated that the Copenhagen people were opposed to carrying out such a policy. Indeed, the Copenhagen people had decided to water down considerably Berlin's ideas on counter-sabotage.
- (b) NAUJOCKS believes that Berlin may have had specific persons in mind, but he himself could give no further information on this point.
- (c) Acts of counter-sabotage were decided locally in Copenhagen, the decisions being taken by BOVENSIEPEN in collaboration with BEST and SCHWERDT.
- (d) Such information regarding counter-sabotage, as was given, emanated from SIPO, Abteilung IV, Copenhagen, and not from Berlin.
- (e) NAUJOCKS claims that the Copenhagen SIPO/S.D. were not really much concerned in the counter-sabotage and it was really purely a matter for SKORZENY's group. BOVENSIEPEN was however, fully in the know, but liked to keep "matters under his own hat".
- (f) Such discussions as took place in Denmark only occurred in a room on the second or third storey of the Vesterporthus, and took place between SCHWERDT, the leader of the saboteurs, together with HANSEN, GRUENWOLD, and two or three other persons whose names are unknown to NAUJOCKS.
- (g) Dr. BEST, the HSSUPF and the BDS. all interested themselves in the counter-sabotage measures. NAUJOCKS states that SCHWERDT, GRUENWOLD and HANSEN worked direct for SKORZENY in close liaison with BOVENSIEPEN, but not any other specific SIPO or S.D. authority in Denmark. NAUJOCKS has never heard of the saboteurs being referred to as "Umlegekommando".

J. V. Harston
Capt

20.4.45.
JSH/EB.

DESCRIPTION OF: Stubaf. HOFFMANN.

NATIONALITY: German

AGE: 38

BUILD: Medium; well-built.

HEIGHT: 1m. 73.

WEIGHT: 75 Kgs.

HAIR: Fair.

EYES: Blue; no spectacles.

FACE: Oval
Complexion: Ruddy
Nose: -
Chin: -
Cleanshaven: Yes.

CLOTHES: Stubaf. uniform.

PECUILIARITIES: A few duelling scars.

ADDRESS: Copenhagen.

Places where seen: Amt. IV, the Hague. Befehlshaber der SED. August 1940.
Copenhagen, Dagmarhus; February 1944.

Camp 020
20.4.45.
/EB.

SECRET

Ref: C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) G5/81, 7 Aug 45

SECRET

The following information has
been obtained from

PW CS/2315, Gen d Inf v FALKENHAUSEN (PW A)
and PW CS/2335, Mil Verw Chef SS Gruf
REEDER (PW B)

A = MB BELGIEN u NORDFRANKREICH,
captured at PRAGSER WILDSEE,
5 May 45
B = Chief of the Military Adm of
Army Gp B, captured at
WUPPERTHAL, 17 Apr 45.

THE ACTIVITIES OF NAUJOCKS IN BELGIUM

PREAMBLE

1. PW A was Mil Bef BELGIEN u NORD FRANKREICH May 40 -
Jul 44, when he was arrested. He is typical of the German Officer
Corps, anti-Nazi; after 12 months' imprisonment he is rather bitter.
2. PW B has been Regierungspräsident of COLOGNE since 1936.
In Nov 39 he was put in charge of the Military Administration of
Army Gp B. In May 40 he took over the military administration
under PW A. On PW A's arrest, he became deputy Reichskommissar
für BELGIEN u NORD FRANKREICH until Sep 44.

ARRIVAL AND TASK IN BELGIUM

3. At the beginning of 1943 NAUJOCKS arrived in BRUSSELS
to work, under Militär Abteilungschef Dr JÄCK, in the depot of the
military administration which dealt with the tracking down of
persons wanted for offences against the foreign currency
regulations. According to information given to PW B by the DdS,
SS Standaf CAWARIUS, NAUJOCKS also worked under the direct orders
of the Chef der Sipo und SD, SS Ogruf Dr Ernst KALTENBRUNNER.

ASSOCIATION WITH THE CORTIGLI GROUP

4. NAUJOCKS was closely associated with a group of Italian
Fascists in BRUSSELS, led by a certain CORTIGLI. CORTIGLI was an
official in the local Fascio, but had to resign that position on
account of his shady activities. He worked in close collaboration
with the Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP, at the head of which was
Landesgruppenführer SCHULZ. SCHULZ shot himself in Dec 43, as he
was involved in a charge of embezzlement.
5. The CORTIGLI group appeared to be acting as informers
for NAUJOCKS.
6. When MUSSOLINI fell, PW A ordered the Fascio to restrict
its activities to welfare work. The Italian Ambassador, Prince
del DRAGO, agreed to this.
7. According to information which reached PW A, CORTIGLI
was intriguing against del DRAGO, and the latter requested that
CORTIGLI be expelled or returned to ITALY. PW A ordered CORTIGLI
to be arrested by the Feldgendarmarie and sent to PARIS. PW A
was reprimanded for this action by Gen REINECKE, Chef Allgemeine
Wehrmachts Angelegenheiten and Chef NS Führungsstab. It was
reported to PW A that CORTIGLI had been sent to BERLIN, but he
returned to BRUSSELS shortly afterwards.

- 2 -

ASSOCIATION WITH 8.
THE CORTIGLI
GROUP (contd)

On his return to BRUSSELS a party of armed Italians, led by CORTIGLI and accompanied by NAUJOCKS, attempted to seize the Italian Embassy. On being informed of this incident by del DRAGO, PW A sent the police to the Embassy. NAUJOCKS and CORTIGLI, however, got away. Oberst v HARBOU, Chief of Staff to PW A, called NAUJOCKS to account for his actions. The latter reported that he had not really had anything to do with the incident, and had merely acted in the capacity of an observer.

CASE OF
PRINCESS
RUSPOLI

9. It was reported to PW A that NAUJOCKS had sworn to revenge himself on him and on Obst v HARBOU. This was to be effected through action against Princess RUSPOLI, a friend of PW A.

10. On 16 Nov 43 the Princess and her Belgian banker, VERMERSCH, were arrested. PW A reported the matter to Genfeldt KEITEL, who told him that Princess RUSPOLI had been arrested at the request of MUSSOLINI, and there was therefore nothing further to be done. A search of Princess RUSPOLI's house was carried out by NAUJOCKS and his deputy, a Kriminal Sekretär.

11. PW A instigated proceedings against VERMERSCH, knowing that he and therefore also the Princess would be cleared. NAUJOCKS was to be subpoenaed to give evidence. When NAUJOCKS heard of PW's intention he arranged for VERMERSCH to be removed to BERLIN, and the matter was thus taken out of PW A's hands.

CASE OF
HARBOU

12. As a result of a seventy-page report sent by NAUJOCKS to the RSHA, Oberst von HARBOU was relieved of his post on 11 Dec 43. His prosecution was undertaken by Oberstkriegsgerichtsrat MÖLLER, head of a Referat in the OKW dealing with cases of bribery and corruption. MÖLLER had also worked on the case of Princess RUSPOLI. In both cases he had worked closely together with NAUJOCKS.

13. PW A sent a senior officer to enquire into the reason of HARBOU's dismissal. This officer had a conference with KEITEL and KALTENBRUNNER, at which NAUJOCKS' part in the proceedings was disclosed. PW A saw KEITEL himself on this matter. He was simply told that HARBOU was suspected of illegal dealings in foreign currency and would be taken to BERLIN in order that the case could be investigated. HARBOU died in BERLIN on 22 Dec 43.

CASE OF PW A

14. On 14 Jul 44 PW A was relieved of his position as Mil Bef BELGIEN u NORDFRANKREICH. On 29 Jul 44 he spoke to del DRAGO, who had been informed by CORTIGLI that proceedings would be instigated against PW A, the events of 20 Jul 44 being used as a pretext.

REMOVAL OF
NAUJOCKS

15. PW B had in the meantime requested KALTENBRUNNER, in writing and by telephone, to have NAUJOCKS removed. This request was granted. NAUJOCKS reported to PW B, who reproached him for the painful position in which he had placed PW A and B. NAUJOCKS is said to have been sent to DENMARK on a special mission.

OPINIONS

16. The B&S, SS Standart AMARIS, informed PW B that NAUJOCKS was supposed to have been dismissed from or degraded in the SS. The B&S had a very poor opinion of NAUJOCKS, which PW B fully shares. He considers him deceitful and capable of any underhand activity.

C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.)
7 Aug 45

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M.I.19(a)	War Office	(10 copies)
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Case File		(1 ")

593

Secret.

In reply, state NUMBER and DATE.

CX 1523 of 21.4.45
V.F.

178a

Dear Milmo,

Please refer to your P.F. 600,485/B.1.B/HPM
of 14.4.45.

I agree that there is no objection to the information about NAUJOCKS' admitted part in the VENLO incident being passed to S.H.A.E.F. for the trial of NAUJOCKS' case as a war criminal. We were in the course of preparing a draft statement incorporating NAUJOCKS' more unpleasant confessions, with the idea that it might serve as useful ammunition for the B.B.C. or P.I.D. When it was ready I had hoped to discuss it with you, in the hope that we might arrange to have it released and printed. I suppose that for the time being this had better be held up, unless you think there is no objection to its publication independently of NAUJOCKS' future trial?

Yours sincerely,

P.G. MasonH.P. Milmo Esq.
M.I.5.

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P.F.600,485/B.1.B/HPM.


14th April 1945.

Dear Mason,

We have been asked by SHAEF G-2 Counter Intelligence to provide them as soon as possible with any information which we may have relevant to the issue as to whether there is or is not a case for treating NAUJOCKS as a war criminal. Some of the disreputable incidents in this gentleman's case, including at least one murder, occurred long before the outbreak of hostilities, one of the more revolting incidents occurred in the hours immediately preceding the attack upon Poland and some of them occurred in the course of the war. In the latter category falls the Venlo affair which was of course a flagrant breach of International Law, and did involve the murder of a neutral on neutral territory.

It appears to me that no report which we make to SHAEF can be regarded as satisfactory unless it gives an account of NAUJOCKS admitted part in the Venlo incident, and you may feel, as I do, that provided we confine ourselves to matters to which NAUJOCKS has confessed there is no very good reason why this information should be withheld. After all, this information is and has for years been available to the enemy, and if it is available to the enemy it is difficult to see on what ground we can refrain from passing it on to SHAEF in compliance with the request which they have made.

Yours sincerely,


H.P. Milmo.Major P. Mason,
S.I.S.

HPM/MH.

C.R. No.

MINUTE SHEET No.

W.R.C. (Mr. Milmo).

The following incidents in the life history of Alfred NAUJOCKS may furnish the necessary evidence for him to be regarded as a War criminal, though obviously the one occasion when there is no doubt that he was offending International Law (i.e. the Venlo incident) cannot be included in this survey for special reasons. It is also a moot point as to whether incidents happening in 1935 and in the few days immediately before the outbreak of war between Germany and Poland can be taken as evidence. These points, therefore, are put up to you with considerable reserve. All the attached information has been obtained from NAUJOCKS under interrogation at Camp 020, and there is no written evidence to support the statement made by him.

NAUJOCKS' long connection with the Nazi Party started in April 1931 when he voluntarily joined the party, and by 1934 he had obtained a position as driver in the Political Intelligence Department of the S.D. Shortly afterwards S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH, with certain members of the Bavarian Political Police, formed the Oberabschnitt Ost, and NAUJOCKS became a clerk in this department. In spite of his humble origin this man obtained some prominence in the party. In 1937 he was transferred to the S.D. Haupt Amt VI, Wilhelmstrasse 102, which brought him into direct contact with HIMMLER, GEORING etc. He was used by HEYDRICH for special jobs and became something of a specialist thug. This meant an intermittent rise and fall in his position in the party, and although demoted on occasions when he failed to please HEYDRICH, nevertheless by 1938 he was promoted Sturmbannfuehrer and made chief of the department dealing with South Eastern Europe.

1. Destruction of Illicit Wireless Transmitter in Czechoslovakia.

In January or February 1935 NAUJOCKS was ordered to report to HEYDRICH at 8, Prinz Albrechtstrasse, Berlin, and personally ordered by him to go to Czechoslovakia and locate and destroy an

ARMY FORM A 2007 (Ins. Sheet).

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[P.T.O.]

C.R. No.....

MINUTE SHEET No.....

95a

licit transmitter which was causing the Nazi Party great annoyance, and bring back the operator, FORMIS, alive to Germany.

NAUJOCKS located the set in a village inn and settled in the locality with his mistress and friend Werner GOETTSCH. Their plan was to make FORMIS unconscious with ether, tie him up and destroy the transmitting gear. The elaborate plans went awry, however, and in the resultant skirmish FORMIS was fatally wounded, and after destroying the set the trio fled for Germany.

(Proof: the official Czechoslovak records of this deliberately organised G.I.S. attach on an unofficial W/T set confirm that NAUJOCKS has spoken the truth, and the detailed descriptions he gives of the locality and of the murder itself establish that he played a principal part in the affair).

2. Polish Frontier Incidents.

On the 10th August 1939 NAUJOCKS was summoned into HEYDRICH's presence and told that, as the Fuehrer was determined to attack Poland within a month, it would be necessary to stage some "frontier incidents" which would lead the world to believe that the first aggressive move had been made by the Poles and not by the Germans. For this purpose, it was proposed to take selected life-term prisoners from the concentration camps, kill them by means of hypodermic injections, dress them in Polish army uniforms and, having riddled the bodies with bullets, place them in carefully chosen positions in German frontier villages of Upper Silesia, so that it would appear, to the casual observer, that small parties of Polish troops had been carrying out abortive raids on Reich territory.

This plan was immediately put into effect, and NAUJOCKS states that the bodies were forwarded to the villages where they were required in packing cases labelled "preserves". Some of the victims arrived at their destinations only half-dead, having been given inadequate injections, and these had to be put out of their misery

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1750

before they could be used. The part played by NAUJOCKS in the affair was as follows:- in order to lend colour to the "frontier incidents", HEYDRICH and his friends decided to publish a story to the effect that the Gleiwitz broadcasting station had been attacked by Polish insurgents, and he (NAUJOCKS) was accordingly sent to that town with five or six men to make the necessary arrangements. On his arrival there, he arranged for a Polish-speaking German to take possession of the microphone "by force" and to begin broadcasting an appeal to his "countrymen" urging them to rise against the Germans. The broadcast was then abruptly broken off, shots were fired in the studio, and finally a corpse, with which NAUJOCKS had previously been provided, was left lying on the floor close to the microphone, riddled with bullets.

NAUJOCKS remained for more than a fortnight in Gleiwitz before being ordered back to Berlin: it was only a matter of days before war broke out.

(Proof: Statement from the Polish Ministry of National Defence dated 8.12.44. states "the facts disclosed in NAUJOCKS' statement on the Polish frontier incidents are true. We have no information on whether or why NAUJOCKS took part in the incidents disclosed by him).

3. Reprisals Against Danish Patriots.

In February 1944 KALTENBRUNNER instructed NAUJOCKS to go to Denmark and organise reprisals against Danish patriots who were, for sabotage and other reasons, becoming a serious menace to the German administration. He was introduced to SKORZENY who appeared to regard him as a rival. Accordingly NAUJOCKS states that he confined himself to making arrangements in Copenhagen with Dr. BEST whereby counter sabotage acts would be carried out immediately, ~~when~~ *when* anti-Nazi demonstrations were made by the Danes. NAUJOCKS states that SKORZENY appears to have arranged the actual acts of sabotage, and for this reason he took no active part.

P.F. 600,485.

W.R.C. 4.D. / 12.4.45.

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Miss J. Chenhalls.

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Please card MEHLHORN

Please call
p. 1. — Drubut
S 3268.

REPORT dated.....2nd April 1945.

NAUJOCKS

I forward herewith a report by Capt. Beith which is the result of his interrogation of NAUJOCKS on the salient points of the comments made by DICTIONARY on the Interim Report, forwarded under W.R.C.1. (Mr. Wilson's) PF.600485 of 28.3.45.

Should a reaction be required on every point in these comments it will necessitate the reopening of NAUJOCKS' case.

DBS/MD:PAB.

Enc. Memorandum from Capt. Beith to
Colonel Stephens dated 2.4.45.

SECRET

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Stephens

From Capt. Beith

NAUJOCKS

NAUJOCKS has been interrogated in connection with salient points raised in the commentary on the Report in his case attached to W.R.C 1 (Mr. Wilson's) Memorandum of 28.3.45:-

1. On the subject of the Polish frontier incidents, NAUJOCKS cannot be sure from whom he received orders for his mission, but believes that it may have been Brigadef. JOST who ordered him to report at the Gleiwitz barracks to ~~Brigadef.~~ or Oberfuehrer MEHLHORN who was to be in charge of all incidents in the Gleiwitz area, including the radio coup; to this extent, therefore, he was not to act on his own initiative. The whole plan had been worked out by HEYDRICH and MULLER, and the latter was at Oppeln in charge of operations generally.

NAUJOCKS states that the small group of Unterscharfuehrers detailed to assist him could hardly be described as "specialists", although one of them was Polish-speaking. It was a part of NAUJOCKS' task to rush journalists to the various points at which "incidents" had been staged. He maintains that the reason for his 14 days' stay at Gleiwitz was the failure of the plot to provoke immediate conflict, as it had not been anticipated that the matter would pass into the hands of the diplomats.

The radio incident at Gleiwitz was certainly carried out, but HEYDRICH, in Berlin, had refused to believe NAUJOCKS' report as the Gleiwitz station had been swamped by Breslau, which was working at the time on approximately the same wavelength; confirmation was forthcoming later from listeners in the Gleiwitz area that the broadcast had been made.

2. NAUJOCKS now explains that he did not refer to any "Personnel Department of Hauptamt VI" (see page 15, para. 5, of Report) for technicians, but was put in touch with them after reference to Dr. LANGE, of Amt VI.

3. He confirms that his degradation, although confirmed by HIMMLER, was done illegally and that, therefore, he would have been justified in ignoring it - as, in fact, he did, but with a certain discretion. HEYDRICH had not dared to institute open proceedings against him because he (NAUJOCKS) "knew too much".

For all that, it was a fact that notice of degradation was sent by the S.D - Hauptamt to the S.S; further notice, signed by HEYDRICH, was sent down to the Waffen S.S. and read out to NAUJOCKS. As he was "anxious to re-establish his honour", NAUJOCKS demanded a copy of this last document, but although he was allowed to read it

* Description of ~~MEHLHORN~~ German; 43 years; small, medium build; height 1m68; weight 75 Kg; black hair; brown eyes, dark, horn-rimmed spectacles; oval face, pale; large, curved nose; clean-shaven; elegant, academic appearance; uniform of S.S. Oberfuehrer; soft voice, Saxon dialect. Head of Amt I of the S.D. Hauptamt. Had quarrelled with HEYDRICH and went in 1939 to Posen in an administrative capacity. Last seen at end of Oct. or beginning Nov. 1939

S said 48/109

- 2 -

for himself, his request was not met.

Because HIMMLER, who had approved the step, was "above the law", NAUJOCKS never took any steps to argue the legality of his degradation or to "re-establish his honour", even after confirming, from the black S.S.- Fuehrer book, that his name had been removed from the list.

4. Although posted to the Verlorener Haufen penal battalion, NAUJOCKS engineered escape from service in this unit by going sick and later obtaining from a doctor a document certifying him as fit for active service, with a recommendation that he be employed behind the fighting line. Armed with this document, NAUJOCKS promptly reported to Brigadefuehrer STRAUDINGER of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, spoke of his "ill-treatment by HEYDRICH" and asked whether he might stay with this unit. STRAUDINGER was sympathetic and must have done something about it, for NAUJOCKS remained with the unit and was even promoted by STRAUDINGER to the rank of corporal.

5. NAUJOCKS maintains that his posting through BERGER to the staff of Dr. JAECK was effected on a purely personal basis, and not officially as "an honorary representative of the S.S.". The Military Administration took him at his word, and with little interest, when he used the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer. NAUJOCKS insists that many of his moves and activities were not "strictly according to the book".

6. It is confirmed that MALETTE was not an official of the Foreign Office, but an Oberbereichsleiter of ROSENBERG's Ostministerium.

7. On the subject of the Ausweis obtained by him (page 27, para. 1, of Report), NAUJOCKS has now made the following explanation:-

"When at the beginning of 1944, I received an order by teleprinter through the Sicherheitspolizei in Brussels from the Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, ordering me to report at once to C.d.S KALTENBRUNNER, I did so. I received the mission already described to organise counter measures in Denmark against the partisans. When I emphasised, however, that I properly belonged to the Military Administration and proposed that I would start certain measures and then find somebody suitable to carry on, KALTENBRUNNER, at my request, abstained from putting through my release from the Military Administration in Belgium. I pointed out to him that I no longer belonged to the S.D. since February 1944, and requested some authority for the mission. He called his adjutant and ordered an Ausweis from the Sicherheitspolizei to be made out at once in the name of "NAUJOCKS". I obtained the address of the personnel branch in the Hermann Goeringstrasse 5, and the room number and went there after the adjutant, Sturmbannfuehrer WERTH, had promised to put the order through by telephone. This happened actually while I was leaving.

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"When I arrived in the Hermann Goeringstrasse I was treated with the usual official deference, probably because it was a direct order from the Chief. As the clerk had trouble in entering my somewhat difficult name I was obliged to spell it for him. The space for the rank or position comes before the space for the name and he asked me my rank. Through my previous work in offices, I knew that there would be no further control and the copy of the Ausweis would be filed. I answered, therefore, Sturmbannfuhrer, and received the Ausweis accordingly. The rank Sturmbannfuhrer is one of the most frequent amongst the higher employees of the Sicherheitspolizei. Usually the Ausweise are made out from the day of issue and are valid to the 31st December. For years they had always been a dark red colour. A photo of the bearer was in the top left hand corner and the shortened date of the year, e.g. 44, in thick type at the top right hand corner. At the bottom came:

Der Reichsfuhrer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei.
Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD
gez. Dr. KALTENBRUNNER
SS Obergruppenfuhrer.

Ausweise are issued with the signature of Dr. KALTENBRUNNER stamped on them

"I am not quite sure but I think I remember that Ausweise for 1944 were not called in at the end of the year but their validity was extended to 1945 because the security paper used for Ausweise was burnt during an air raid. I seem to remember that I heard about this from the Chief of the Staatspolizei in Nuremberg. I believe also that the figure 44 was on the first Ausweis with which I was issued; it was, therefore, made of paper from the previous year.

"On the occasion of my last journey but one from Vienna to Nuremberg, together with my friend KANNENBERG, when I wanted to obtain Emile LAUWERS' release from prison, I had the following trouble: I think it was somewhere about the 23rd to 25th July, 1944. I had with me a release order from the O.K.W. Court for LAUWERS, who should, according to the sentence, have remained $1\frac{1}{2}$ years longer in prison. With this authority I went, arriving from Vienna, and went straight to the Commandant of the prison to obtain LAUWERS' early release, because I wished, if possible, to go on the same day in my car to Kesternich in the Eifel, where KANNENBERG and I lived. Together with the authority, I proved my identity by means of the Sicherheitspolizei Ausweis; without knowing it, these Ausweise had been declared invalid and replaced by new ones. (The new Ausweise were no longer deep red but had red and white spots on them).

"The prison Commandant apparently noticed this since he must have known the Sipo Ausweise owing to the frequent visits of Sipo officials at the prison. He promised me to order the release at once and asked me to wait outside in the anteroom. While I was waiting there, he notified the Chief of the Sipo in Nuremberg that somebody was trying to obtain the release of a prisoner with an out-of-date Police Ausweis. After about 20 minutes,

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two officials of the Nuremberg Sipo came into the room and arrested me. We went then together to the Sipo building where I had to wait for a long time until I could have a word with the Chief who had already spoken of my presence to SS Polizeifuehrer NAUMANN. NAUMANN knew me from the time of my work with the SD. Oberabschnitt Ost and I was able to identify myself on the telephone with NAUMANN in the presence of the Nuremberg Sipo Chief. I explained to the Sipo Chief that the new Ausweise had not been distributed in Occupied Territories, in order to avoid a report being sent to the head office; he was extremely angry that a "member of the Sipo" should take official action in his area, without first reporting to him. He then telephoned to the prison Commandant giving instructions that the prisoner be released. When I arrived at the prison a message had been telephoned meantime, according to which I had to report at once to the Hoehere SS un Polizeifuehrer. I waited, however, until I had obtained LAUWERS' release and then went to NAUMANN who treated me very roughly and wanted to lodge a complaint against my undisciplined behaviour. He was, furthermore, excited because they had first thought that the release of the prisoner had something to do with the events of the 20th July because the release had been made out by the O.K.W. Any report to Berlin would have been very unpleasant for me because as far as I was concerned my conscience was not wholly clean vis a vis the Sipo in the LAUWERS matter; I took my dressing down without saying anything in order to avoid trouble from other directions. The above mentioned matters are certainly known to LAUWERS now in Antwerp.

"On my next visit to Berlin I went to the personnel branch of the Sipo and, with the help of a few cigarettes, exchanged my Ausweis for a valid one. That was easily done without questions or trouble. The Chief of the Sipo in Brussels, Dr. CANARIS, was not aware that I possessed a Sipo Ausweis. I purposely omitted to inform him, in spite of the fact that I was well in with him, because I was afraid that he would put me to work for the Sipo in case of necessity."

(Signed) Alfred NAUJOCKS.

8. The document which NAUJOCKS obtained from GOETTSCHE (page 31, para. 1, of Report) with the heading "Geheime Dienstsache" was not an official identity card of any kind, but in the form of a letter drawn up by GOETTSCHE for what was to be a decidedly unofficial arrangement. This "secret document" read:-

"TOP SECRET

Alfred NAUJOCKS has to carry out a mission for the Reichssicherheitshauptamt; this mission is highly secret. His assignment has to be carried out in the area Roetgen-Eupen. It is requested that all German civil and military authorities protect and assist NAUJOCKS while carrying out this mission.

(Signature illegible)
SS Obersturmbannfuehrer."

9. NAUJOCKS strenuously denies that he made any effort at any time to undermine the personal authority of Von FALKENHAUSEN in Belgium, although he acknowledges that it was his job to promote the ascendancy of the SD over the Militarverwaltung in the conflict which was already joined.

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Comments on statements made by Alfred NAUJOCKS.

Comments to discrepancies regarding matters of organisation.

Page 2, para 3. Report states: "As an SS-Mann, NAUJOCKS now automatically became a member of the Nazi Party, and it was in this month (August 1931) that the important phase of his life began."

Joining the N.S.D.A.P. is independent from joining one of the organisations of the Party. Right from the beginning a candidate had to fill in and sign independent forms in order to join.

Page 3, p.3. Report states: "This appointment carried with it promotion to the rank of Scharführer and....."

The employment as driver in an SS-Dienststelle does not necessarily carry the rank of a Scharführer with it.

Page 7, p.1. Report states: "....in the factories suspected of harbouring saboteurs."

The workers in the factories were Germans, and the task of the SS-Abwehr was to discover Germans which in the opinion of the SS were doubtful in their views (Weltanschauung). Consequently, the term "saboteur" should not be understood in the ordinary sense, but merely in the Party sense. That is to say, Sabotage-Abwehr did not mean the watching of foreigners, as at that time the military Abwehr in conjunction with the Gestapo was responsible for this, but to make sure of Germans who were in opposition to the Party.

Page 7, p.4. Reports states: "He maintains that, so far as he himself was concerned, these various trips abroad had nothing whatever to do with intelligence work, and says that he undertook them solely for pleasure."

An SS-leader is obliged to consider any journeys abroad which are in some way connected with the tasks of the SS as duty journeys. N. himself may possibly have looked upon the journey as a pleasure trip. This does not change the character of the journey, which furthermore (as is seen from other statements) had obviously been paid for with official money. In this connection he would not have been given leave by his Dienststelle for a pleasure trip.

Page 8, p.3. Report states: "This appointment greatly benefited NAUJOCKS enhanced his personal prestige, since he was brought into direct contact with such people as HIMMLER, GOERING, RIBBENTROP and GOERKE to whom HEYDRICH introduced him."

It is not clear why HEYDRICH introduced him to leading personalities. In Amt VI N. was for a time A.D.C. and FILBERT's right hand man and FILBERT frequently took him along to discussions with RSH. If he was introduced by HEYDRICH, this would mean that it was the action of a chief who was introducing the co-workers of his workers. There is no need to attach any special importance to this occurrence.

Page 9, p.2. Report states: "In this connection he relied on reports submitted by German business men who travelled extensively in the countries concerned. They were not paid, but were enthusiastic Nazis who prepared their reports on ideological grounds and expected no compensation for the."

The business men acting as agents did this partly voluntarily for business reasons, and partly because they were forced to do so by the difficulties of carrying on a business in view of the mass of regulations and controlling authorities were so great in Germany that a business man needed political support in order to carry on with any hope of profit. Amt VI offered business men willing to do so for it to support them in their business. It became soon apparent that these business men, which were working for the SD, were

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given preference, regardless of their economic capabilities, in the distribution of large business transactions. This fact explains the "idealism" and the reason why business men became agents of Amt VI.

Page 10, p.3.

Report states: "NAUJOCKS himself was concerned to some extent in this diplomatic activity, being deputed to meet the Slovak delegation....."

In 1939 the SD in a certain sense took over the control and police measures for accompanying foreign diplomats. The appearance of SD-members was therefore not a diplomatic but a police activity which because of the special situation of this case was carried out by a Secret Service man (Geheimdienstmann).

Page 10, p.3.

Report states: "NAUJOCKS states that the visit of these Slovak delegates to Berlin was arranged by his friend Werner GOETTSCHE, who was by this time working for the SD in Vienna. GOETTSCHE, it seems was also in close contact with Dr. TISO, and was assisting VEESEMEIER ... in negotiating with the Slovaks in their own capital, Bratislava."

At this time within the SD Amt III was responsible for the Balkans. GOETTSCHE, to whom the same applies as has been said about NAUJOCKS (see previous para.) was the representative of Amt III with VEESEMEIER.

Page 11, p.3/4.
Page 12, p.1/2.

Ref. THE POLISH FRONTIER INCIDENTS:

The preparation and the brain-work of the frontier incidents to be created was in the hands of Amt VI which was in the process of expansion, and which with the material support of specialists of Amt IV was responsible for the success of the plan.

NAUJOCKS, at the instigation of HEYDRICH, was appointed by the chief of Amt VI, Brigadef. JOST, as the most suitable man to be responsible for carrying out the task. His main task consisted of instructing the specialists of Amt IV where the incidents were to take place, to convince himself personally whether there was sufficient "material" to carry through the action and whether the action was carried out in accordance with instructions. This explain his long stay in Gleiwitz. According to a statement by Brigadef. Dr. JOST, NAUJOCKS at his own request wanted to carry out the "radio incident" in Gleiwitz. It is not known whether this was in fact carried out.

Page 12, p.5.

Report states: "Becoming more and more depressed at the way in which he was treated, NAUJOCKS approached HEYDRICH again towards the end of September and complaining that he had been passed over in promotion....."

Since the end of 1938 HEYDRICH had been pursuing a "policy of personalities" in the RSH and SD, which meant according to his conception of the "principles of selection" that as far as possible the higher SD ranks were to be filled with people with university education. Consequently, people who had not had a university education and who were already Hauptsturmführer- or Sturmbannführer could at the best still become Standartenführer. After that their career was usually finished. As people in the SD had a morbid desire to assert themselves and as every individual saw himself as a candidate for a "Gruppenführer", the reaction to HEYDRICH's intention, which became gradually known, and ~~thereby~~ to the obvious preference which was given to people with university education, was depression and annoyance amongst the old SS-members who were not university people. Most of them considered how they could make use of their possibilities as members of the SS somewhere else. Therefore, the step NAUJOCK took was in no way peculiar.

Page 12, p.7.

Report states: "During December, 1939, it suddenly occurred to him that there was little or no technical apparatus or material available for the use of SD-agents with missions abroad, that is to say, secret inks and developers, radio equipment, etc..... (to the end of paragraph)."

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The Reichskriminalinstitut, the Abwehr and the Reichsbank had for a long time had at their disposal excellent institutions of the type mentioned which received currently the latest known inventions in this sphere. Although suggestions for the collaboration of technicians of the various organisations had been made, mutual distrust and jealousy amongst the organisations prevented such collaboration; especially as every organisation endeavoured to establish everything they needed themselves without asking other organisations for their experiences or even impart their own experiences to them.

Page 13, p.5.

Report states: "... NAUJOCKS now conferred with the Personnel Department of Hauptamt VI...".

At that time Amt VI had no independent personnel department. Especially technical personnel had to be asked for through Amt I. As far as one could speak of a personnel department in Amt VI at all, its work consisted of looking after people sent to Amt VI by Amt IX I.

Page 16, p.2.

Report states: "In September, 1940, NAUJOCKS temporarily abandoned his work in the technical department and travelled with his friend SANNER to The Hague....."

Although NAUJOCKS worked more for the technical arrangements of Amt VI, he was nevertheless still interested in the work and was well acquainted with the work in Amt VI which had been started by him to the extent that he still took part in the carrying out of certain orders.

Page 17, p.3.

Report states: "... and ~~that~~ the upshot of the proceedings was that HEYDRICH, with HIMMLER's approval, degraded him to the rank of SS-Mann (Private) and freed him from detention on condition that he joined the penal battalion (Verlorener Haufen) of the Waffen-SS."

A reduction in rank in the SS and the SD was only possible after previous legal proceedings in which a sentence had been passed that there was no doubt about the guilt of the accused. Only on the basis of this sentence was it possible to start proceedings for the reduction in rank in which the dishonourable action, on which sentence had been passed, had to be established, which would be the reason for the reduction in rank. The reduction in rank was always handled openly within the SS and the SD and was published in the SS army list, if the man concerned had the rank of an Untersturmführer or upwards. (The principle of the SS is to safeguard the honour of a man under any circumstances as it is supposed to be the basis of the SS-moral. His honour is the highest thing an SS-Mann has, it is "his armoured shield" - see HIMMLER. If there is an attack on his honour, he has therefore the right to public proceedings and defence.

There are in the Waffen-SS penal battalions (Strafbattallione) and probationary battalions (Bewährungsbattallione). Only such SS-men who have been sentenced in public proceedings within the Waffen-SS or the police are sent to join penal battalions. Probationary battalions accept men against whom there have been no proceedings for an offence or behaviour and who by their membership of such a battalion want to prove during the course of a certain time that as regards their character they are suitable for the position or the rank they held outside the Waffen-SS.

SD-ranks and Waffen-SS-ranks are not connected with each other; an exception are the two or three initial training courses of the SS-Fahnenjunkerschule in Bad Tölz and Braunschweig. The SS-leaders trained on these courses receive simultaneously with the promotion in their SS-Dienststellen army list the promotion to the same rank in the Waffen-SS. All others are SS-Führer outside the Waffen-SS-army list. A higher SD-Führer is therefore just an SS-Schütze in the Waffen-SS the same as an SS-Private if he is drafted for army service from the SD into the Waffen-SS. (Quite a different arrangement has been made between the Waffen-SS and the "Ordnungspolizei" and the

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"Gesta" in so far as it provides commissars of the Feldgendarmarie).

Page 17, p.5.

Report states: "....., but instead of being incorporated in the Penal Battalion, he was, much to his astonishment, attached to the first company of the depot battalion of the elite Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler....."

With UK-Gestellten (?), who like NAUJOCKS had been in important war services, it was considered in lighter cases that the man had proved his worth, if such a proof was required, by volunteering for service in the army which in exceptional cases was permitted. Doubtless, this is what happened in the case of NAUJOCK.

Page 17,
Footnote.

Report states: "After NAUJOCK's degradation the technical department came under the control of Obersturmbf. RAUFF, who was himself succeeded by Stubaf. DOERNER and Stubaf. LASSIG.

As a fellow naval officer Obersturmbf. RAUFF was brought into the SD by HEYDRICH personally and was in charge of the group "Technik und Verkehr" (similar title of the group) in Amt I of the RSH and SD before he went to North Africa as Bds. Stubaf. DOERNER and Stubaf. LASSIG belonged to Amt VI and were entrusted in this Amt with special tasks (z.b.V.-Aufgaben). If RAUFF became chief of the Technical Department of NAUJOCKS, then Amt I must have taken over this department. As far as is known, RAUFF, who was a personal enemy of NAUJOCKS, merely took over the examination of the technical side of the sphere of work of which NAUJOCKS was in charge, without, however, managing it officially.

Page 19, p.3.

Report states: ".....he was transferred from the Leibstandarte to the SS-Hauptamt, whence he was discharged from the service. In the meantime, BERGER obtained a position for him as honorary SS-representative on the staff of Dr. JAECK...."

The discharging from the army service of the Waffen-SS is done directly by the Waffen-SS, the army at the front or the army at home. SS- and SD-Führer can also be discharged through the SS-Führungshauptamt. According to the findings of the report, NAUJOCKS was apparently not considered as degraded.

As regards his degradation NAUJOCKS seems to be under a personal misapprehension. His attachment to the staff of Dr. JAECKE in the Military ~~Administration~~ Administration of Belgium proves that his name was still in the army list of the SS and SD.

Page 19, p.4.

Report states: "On his arrival in Brussels, NAUJOCKS was told that he would be employed as a civil supervisor in a referat known as the Fahndungsdienst, which had its offices at rue aux Laine 40, and was itself subsidiary to the Wirtschaftsüberwachung (Economic Control Department), located at rue de la Loi 16."

Most of the people in the Fahndungsdienst were from Amt V. In due course, however, Amt IV pointed out that the enemy Intelligence Service worked together a great deal with the foreign currency smugglers and the Black Market in the occupied and unoccupied districts. Consequently Amt IV demanded, if not to take over the Fahndungsdienst in occupied countries and particularly Belgium, but at least the control over the service and to advise it politically and on counter-espionage subjects. In most cases an SD-Führer, who had been trained in counter-espionage (Abwehr) was put in charge of the service. Thus the real management was in the hands of Amt IV. It was a secret measure who was put in charge. For reasons to be given later (p) NAUJOCKS was chosen for Belgium.

Page 21, p.4.

Report states: ".....telling him to report immediately to Gruppenführer MÜLLER, Leiter IV of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin, who wished to see him at HIMMEER's personal request."

As chief of the Fahndungsdienst in Belgium NAUJOCKS was not directly under MÜLLER, but as a special representative of Amt IV, which he was secretly, MÜLLER could give him orders directly.

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Page 23, p. 5.

Report states: "In addition to these trips to Paris, NAUJOCKS also visited The Hague at about this time to consult with a German Foreign Office official named MALETTKE, who had asked his advice in connection with the recruitment of workers for the Russian front."

MALETTKE was not in the Foreign Office. At the time when he undertook the trip through Western Europe, he was chief of the Wirtschaftsabteilung (Economic Department) of the Ostministerium and ROSENBERG's right-hand man. MALETTKE is known as "President" or member of Vertrauensräte (Confidential Boards) with firms who dealt with the economic development of the East. He was especially interested in the Black Market in the occupied Western districts as he was able to work through the Black Market with money over which there was no control.

Page 27, p. 1.

Report states: ".....some four or five weeks after Easter (i.e. during May), he obtained through a minor official in the latter's office a new Ausweis on which he deliberately allowed himself to be falsely described as a Sturmbannführer..... The official who issued the Ausweis was not a party to the misrepresentation, since he did not know with whom he was dealing and was in consequence quite unaware that he (NAUJOCKS) had been degraded."

In 1944 the SS- and SD-Ausweise for the year were issued very late. The reason was probably that the printing-works which had completed the Ausweise or at least partly completed them, was bombed out. Consequently, to begin with, a note was made on the back of the old Ausweise of 1943, that the old Ausweis would continue to be valid from January until March 44. In March, for unknown reasons, the validity of the Ausweise was once more extended to June 44 by a note on the back of the Ausweis. However, in May SS- and SD-Führer received new Ausweise showing the year 44. During June new Ausweise showing the year 44 were issued to all members of the RSH. Honorary members of the SS also have to have Ausweise. (Honorary members of the SS can be appointed by the Reichsführer SS, or they are persons who are leaving the SS- and police services in order to take up more important work. They must have been SS-Führer and they either keep their rank or receive the next higher rank). In report, page 19, p. 3 NAUJOCKS states that he came to JAECK's staff "as honorary SS representative". If this is the case, his name must have continued to appear in the army list of the SS and the SD as SS-Führer. If he (NAUJOCKS) meant to say that he was attached to the Military Administration of Belgium as expert and adviser, he must at least have held the rank of a Sturmbannführer or the qualifications for such a rank, for administrative reasons. Consequently in any of these cases, he would have had to prove his qualifications as an SS-Führer, which was done by a valid pass of the SS-Führungshauptamt or the RSH.

Ausweise could be issued by the SS-Führungshauptamt or the personnel departments or "Referate" of the various Hauptämter who were responsible for the personnel of the individual Ämter detailed to them. As regards their personnel policy, the Hauptämter were independent within the sphere of the individual Hauptamt, but as regards the selection of the Führernachwuchs (new generation of leaders) and the Führerernennung (appointment of leaders) they worked together with the SS-Führungshauptamt in working out and advising on the general principles. The SS-Führungshauptamt kept a card-index of all SS-Führer in the whole SS and SD, every Hauptamt had a carefully kept card-index of the personal data of the SS-Führer, officials and employees working in its Ämter. Officials and employees could also be SS-members. The Ausweise had the same colour for the individual Ämter and only differed in unessentials, according to the rank or status. An exception to this was the Hausausweis which was issued to non-members of the SS and SD, who were employed in the SS-Dienststellen to allow them to pass to and fro without being stopped in the office building of the competent Hauptamt. Since April 1944 a special yellow Ausweis with a diagonal red line was required for entering Amt VI and its Nebenstellen, which was only issued to members of Amt VI. (In special cases some collaborators of this Amt also received the yellow Ausweis. Even bearers of the blue Zentral-

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Page 27, p.1.
Continued.

Ausweis in order to pass without being stopped needed the additional yellow Ausweis.).

In order to have a pass issued or renewed, a special application had to be made which in the RSH was addressed by all Ämter including the Chefbüro in the RSH and SD to Amt I. The Ausweise were issued by Amt I, and as far as they went to the various Ämter were signed by the Amtschef I; if they went to the Chefbüro they could also be signed by the chief of RSH and the SD after having been checked by Amt I. In deputising for him only the Amtschef I had the right to sign Ausweise.

During the course of time it became the usual practice when renewing Ausweise for the chief of the RSH and the Personalreferat of Amt I to sign new Ausweise with a rubber-stamp of the signature of Amtschef I, provided authorisation for the Ausweis was proved and the old Ausweis produced. Ausweise for SD-Führer had to be shown to the Amtschef I in every case. In view of the fact that all Stellen of the SD kept strictly to the administrative rules laid down for the issue or renewal of SD-Ausweise, NAUJOCKS' explanation that his Ausweis was issued by an employee in the Chefbüro of the RSH and SD, is incomprehensible.

Page 27, p.2.

Report states: "..... He did not know, however, that the colour of the official SS-passes had recently been altered in Germany, and to his consternation he was arrested by the Gestapo as soon as he set foot in NURENBERG"

As explained above (Page 27, p.1.) it was not the colour but the number of the year which was changed on the Ausweise. As regards his arrest it can be said, that if he has really been arrested, according to the regulations of the Gesta he would have been held until after inquiry in Berlin, which in his case would have been addressed to Amt I, Personnel Department, his case had been cleared up. In any case therefore, it would have been checked up in the personnel card-index whether he was entitled to have an Ausweis with the rank of Sturmbannführer. A verbal explanation by him would therefore not have been sufficient in an actual interrogation in view of the distinct rules and regulations laid down in cases of discrepancies in Ausweise.

Page 28, p.2.

Report states: ".....NAUJOCKS always used his former rank of Sturmbannführer..... He explains his ability to do this by pointing out that no one in Belgium knew of his degradation, as it had never been made public. There had been no trial of any description, and only HIMMLER and the late lamented HEYDRICH were aware of the facts."

On page 17, p.4. NAUJOCKS states that he had been officially degraded. The question of the degradation has already been dealt with in more detail on page 3 of the Commentary with reference to page 17, p.3. Further reference is now made to various places in the report which contain discrepancies regarding this question. These places are: Page 17, p.3.; Page 17, p.4; Page 17, Footnote; Page 19, p.3; Page 21, p.4; Page 22, p.2; Page 23, p.5; Page 24, p.3; Page 27, p.1 and 2.

Page 31, p.1.

Report states: ".....In addition, GOETTSCH obtained from him a military identity card signed by an Obersturmbannführer of the SS and bearing the heading "Geheime Dienstsache", which would enable him to pass without difficulty through the German front-lines."

It is not clear from the report what is meant by the term "military identity card". There are various possibilities. With regard to an "Identitätskarte", only a Sonderausweis of the Abwehr can be meant, which is only valid in connection with a pay-book. This card can be issued by an AST-Dienststelle. Since September 1944 the AST Vienna has been subordinated to Amt VI and Obersturmbannführer (a) DELIUS, (r) WAGNER were in charge. Consequently it is possible that this military identity card was signed by an SS-Führer. But this card without any additional Ausweise does not allow a person to pass through in front districts. Furthermore, this card never bears the heading "Geheime Dienstsache". It is merely an identity card

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Page 31, p. 1. for the person mentioned in it.
Continued

The heading "Geheime Dienstsache" seems to point to it that by the term "Identitätskarte" a D-Ausweis of the Waffen-SS is meant, which was usually issued in Vienna. A D-Ausweis with such a heading, however, contained furthermore the exact destination and if possible, exact details of the travelling route as well as the reason for the journey. These D-Ausweise had to be signed by a Wehrmacht- or SS-General, which, however, at that time was not known in all SD-circles.

It is known that the SD-Dienststellen in Vienna used D-Ausweise der Waffen-SS illegally for their people. They were generally signed by Obersturmführer FRÖHLICH, Amt VI, because the name of the commanding SS-General of the Waffen-SS units stationed in and around Vienna was also FRÖHLICH. It is possible that NAUJOCKS has mixed up Obersturmführer and Obersturmbannführer. It is immediately obvious that the SD Vienna handled such forgeries very carefully and only issued such papers in very rare cases.

It is furthermore possible that NAUJOCKS received a properly issued D-Ausweis, stating destination and reason of journey. The handing over of 100 Dollars, for which WANNECK's permission had to be obtained, points to this. That is to say, that NAUJOCKS acted in accordance with certain SD-instructions in travelling to the West German front district and, as mentioned on page 31, p.6., was given support and assistance by the German Militärstellen of the front district.

In order to legalise this journey, permission would have to be given by Amt IV or Amt VI and the competent Amt would also have to inform the OKH of it, which in its turn again would inform the commander of the divisional section concerned as well as the SS-security officer stationed there of the undertaking. According to SD, Waffen-SS, police and Wehrmacht regulations and stipulations it is out of the question, that a civilian or a member of the SS, police or Wehrmacht who cannot prove that he is entitled to be in a front sector in which he has no right to be and of whose presence there the sector commander has not been informed, can move about freely in the front district. An exception to this rule are people domiciled there, who because of the nearness of the front have been evacuated and who receive permission for two days to stay in the neighbourhood of their evacuated home-town in order to clear up their affairs.

Page 31, p.6.

Report states: "He found, as he has hoped, that his newly acquired identity card enabled him to obtain every facility from the German military commanders with the advanced forces, but he nevertheless....."

If NAUJOCKS was given assistance by the commanders at the front, then these must have been informed, as explained on Page 31, p.1. last section, that NAUJOCKS under official secret orders had to carry out a mission which had to be done from their sector. These facilities, which he mentions, are not to be obtained merely by being in possession of a Sonderausweis but require that the sector commander is in possession of further information. This information, however, cannot be given by an SD-Führer like GOETTSCH, but has to come from a higher authority.

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B. Comments to the factual contents.

Page 3, p.4. Report states: "The chief at this time was a certain Standartenführer KOBELINSKI, but NAUJOCKS did not have much to do with this officer."

After the action of June 30th, 1934, HEYDRICH planned a more far-reaching undertaking of a similar kind, in which persons were also to be included who were living outside Germany's frontiers. In order to carry out this planned undertaking, he was looking for specially suited men; he mainly asked the leading people of the action of June 30th, 1934, to give him the names of people who had particularly distinguished themselves on June 30th. As far as is known, one of those which KOBELINSKI praised to HEYDRICH as being particularly keen and suitable was NAUJOCKS. This is the reason why HEYDRICH, after having watched him for a bit, chose NAUJOCKS amongst other things as "personal hangman" and used him to carry out special tasks. (see Page 4, p.1,2,3).

Page 4, p.5.
Pages 5 & 6,
p.1.

Ref. THE MURDER OF RUDOLF FORMIS.

As is known, HEYDRICH in the years 35 and 36 repeatedly praised his people who, he said, had solved some tasks for him in Czechoslovakia and who were in a position to carry out everything that he asked them to do. As is generally known, NAUJOCKS was at that time a particular favorite of HEYDRICH's.

Page 6, p 2.

Report states: "He states that, at this time, Germany possessed no active intelligence service operating beyond her borders...."

NAUJOCKS had obviously no idea of the nature of a secret service and its organisation, otherwise he ought to have known that the Abwehr-OKW and the Gestapo were in the process of expanding such a service. Para. 2 also shows that NAUJOCKS never thought about differentiating between internal political opponents and foreign organisations. At the time mentioned the work of the service which was later called SD consisted exclusively of the destruction, called Abwehr, of opponents to their Weltanschauung. Para. 2 also contains as an example a psychologically interesting point which explains the later development of the SD and the GESTA as well as the German propaganda. The Party considers every individual and every community which did not share its Weltanschauung as opponents which had to be fought with various weapons; it did not matter whether the opponent was a German citizen or a foreigner. The Party, and as its executive tool the SS, wanted to rule and conquer, not out of conviction but out of a desire for power. The means by which it intended to reach its goal, were propaganda and arms. This principle was clear to every member of the Party whose thinking powers were limited, and everybody else with a sense of responsibility considered that in its destructive extent it seemed improbable and need not be taken serious. This explains in a certain sense why it was possible that during the war the Party and SS were able to suppress any opposition, and also in this particular case NAUJOCKS' opinion that political powers, or so-called political powers like Catholicism, Jewry and Free Masonry, which the Party in internal political arguments felt to be dangerous opponents, are the real enemies in this war, and that therefore a man, who is a Free Mason or something else, which has ~~has~~ not been organised by the Party, out of conviction, is being considered as a suffering ally by the Allies. It is a very good test whether a man, although he refuses to be National-socialist out of conviction, thinks along these lines of Weltanschauung or not, if one can find out in how far he confuses the principles with the methods. NAUJOCKS' remarks about his friend GOETTSCH's Free Masonry must be understood in this connection (see Page 22, p.3; Page 28, p.3).

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Page 7, p.2.

Report states: "..... Through NAUJOCKS, SANNER now joined the Allgemeine SS, and a month or two later was transferred to the SD where he came under the orders of Brgdf. JOST and Oberstbf. FILBERT."

It was quite usual in 1936 for the SD to take over people from the Allgemeine SS. NAUJOCKS brought SANNER into the SS with the intention to build up together with him an intelligence service of a general nature, similar to the one Brgdf. JOST had been instructed to establish in the economic field. NAUJOCKS and SANNER played to each other. Assisted by NAUJOCKS, who was concerned with the weltanschauliche supervision of the factories, SANNER succeeded in getting a very strong position in the AEG, the possibilities of which he put at the disposal of the SD, by which doubtless the ambitious NAUJOCKS again profited. The journey which the two of them made through various countries in Europe, was officially undertaken to check up on the weltanschauliche reliability of the German employees of the AEG abroad, which NAUJOCKS had to look after. At the same time both of them wanted to establish an SD intelligence service in the representations of the AEG abroad. This journey, as far as NAUJOCKS was concerned, was officially financed and reports were accepted from both SANNER and NAUJOCKS. As far as is known, NAUJOCKS even tried to represent the journey as a complete success of his checking- and organising capabilities and in view of this success to take over the department Wirtschafts (Economics) in the future (1936) SS-Intelligence Service.

In view of the above, it is superfluous to go further into the matters on Page 7, p.3,4,5.

Page 10, p.2.

Ref. ACTIVITIES DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1939.

With reference to the remarks made in A.P.2 regarding Page 10, p.3 of the report, it should be mentioned that people like NAUJOCKS without any previous training for responsible positions frequently held very important positions in the SD. The reason for this was more the fear of the qualified man who was not a member of the SS than the desire to give good jobs to old fighters. The SD preferred to put up with this deficiency rather than to carry out a change in good time. The result was an organisation which never got past the puberty stage. HEYDRICH recognised, as the organisation grew larger and larger, that, to say nothing of the failure of the SD as regards the work, the prospects and the vitality of the SD were in danger. He tried to overcome this difficulty by disassociating himself from the Party views that an old fighter is an expert on any subject, and by getting hold of as ~~xx~~ large a number of people with university education as was possible for the SD, in order to give it a sounder foundation. War broke out too prematurely for this change-over and prevented the quiet development, and the SD more a passive, destructive than a constructive element in the policy of the Party organisations during this war.

The incredible using up of personnel of the organisation which had grown much too rapidly caused to an extent already at the beginning of the war a new demand for people, which increased during the war. Never used to any serious work, a man fairly rapidly became an expert in the SD on a particular question or country of which he had knowledge, if he managed to achieve the exceptional thing of holding on ~~x~~ to a Referat or department for more than six months, or, as happened frequently, to travel for a week or a fortnight in a country of which he later on as "expert" composed reports or criticised.

In spite of all these obvious mistakes which were made in the SD, the leading authorities did not desist from the ideas of SS-power politics, which among other things were based on the belief that the most important step of an action consisted in obtaining first of all the position planned. It then became merely a matter of ~~hangings on and expanding~~ learning and organisation to hang on and expand such a position of power. Although this was the usual Party attitude, it was particularly pronounced in the SS. It is therefore understandable that the audacity, with which people like NAUJOCKS called themselves experts and talked about having taken a decisive part in diplomatic actions, was believed by themselves and

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Page 10, p.2.
Continued

others; particularly as on the other hand - and this was really the case - the really responsible people, for personal reasons affecting their power, complied with the requests of the "SD-experts", which may lead to the wrong conclusion that during the time before 1943 the SD already had a decisive influence on politics and economics.

Page 10, p.6.

Report states:".....HIMMLER, however, liked him, and insisted on his being chosen to replace HEYDRICH when the latter was eventually assassinated by the Czech Patriots."

Since the founding of the SS HIMMLER and KALTENBRUNNER were considered to have been enemies. Contrary to NAUJOCKS' statement HIMMLER could not prevent it that KALTENBRUNNER as the only suitable man was chosen by important Party men as HEYDRICH's successor and therefore became HEYDRICH's successor. The chief of the RSH and SD as chief of the Partei- and Reichs-Sicherheitspolizei is not appointed by HIMMLER but is chosen by the highest Party staff.

Page 12, p.3.

Report states:"..... When HITLER made his radio speech on first September 1939, in which he expressed his anger at the "Polish frontier outrages" and assured his listeners that such insults could only be answered by the sword, he (NAUJOCKS) began for the first time to loose faith in the Führer."

The SS-Führer, who took part in the Polish action - in the same way as those who took part in the Czech action - had the probable course of the action and the intention, which led to the action, explained to them. NAUJOCKS, as "expert" in Czech questions, was fully aware from the previous action, described by HIMMLER in a public speech as successful, about the intention and the possibilities for exploitation which had been attained, as JOST and FILBERT with their people were responsible for the success of this action which was more or less along the same lines as the Polish one. As far as is known, NAUJOCKS with great zeal helped in carrying out the Polish action, as he thought that he would be able to give proof of his ambition to serve his chief ~~XXXXXX~~ HEYDRICH.

Page 12, p.5.

Report states:".....Becoming more and more depressed at the way in which he was treated, NAUJOCKS approached HEYDRICH again, towards the end of September, and complaining that he had been passed over in promotion, begged to be allowed to transfer to the Luftwaffe, where, he felt, his chance of success would be better."

As regards the question of promotion, please refer to A.P.3., Page 12, p.5. At the beginning of the war it was the fashion amongst ambitious SD-Führer, who were close to HEYDRICH in some way, to volunteer for the Luftwaffe. HEYDRICH's connections with the Luftwaffe were very good. He himself served for a time pro forma in a fighter squadron. As his people knew how much he appreciated anybody volunteering for the Luftwaffe and as his general reaction was a dramatic refusal of such a request, they fell over each other in applying for permission to serve in the Luftwaffe, so as to be in HEYDRICH's good books and remind him of their existence. If NAUJOCKS had really wanted to join the Luftwaffe, he would have had to start as a private in spite of the chance which he had had as SD-Führer, which would have set him back in his ambitious plans for some time. As things were at the beginning of 1939, it was ~~clear~~ obvious that NAUJOCKS for reasons, which are not quite clear, was not only HEYDRICH's favorite but also MÜLLER's. At the beginning of the war NAUJOCKS was in close contact with Amt IV, in fact his contact was so close that his chief Dr. JOST seriously considered to remove him as soon as possible from his sphere, because at this time MÜLLER was already JOST's enemy and, together with HEYDRICH, was thinking of removing JOST. The general assumption was that NAUJOCKS was spying on ~~MÜLLER~~ JOST for MÜLLER. It was, therefore, quite out of the question that HEYDRICH and MÜLLER would release their man (NAUJOCKS) for the Luftwaffe and his volunteering, when it became known, was considered a farce.

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Page 16, p.2.

Ref. JOURNEY TO THE HAGUE WITH WOLFGANG SANNER.

NAUJOCKS always remained in close contact with SANNER. The chief of Amt VI suspected for some time that SANNER was behind NAUJOCKS' plan of a technical department and that NAUJOCKS, on the other hand, knew something against SANNER so that SANNER had to do what NAUJOCKS wanted.

Very soon after these two had gone to Holland, a report came in through the Abwehr and the Dienststelle of the Reichskommissar that SANNER and NAUJOCKS had attempted to blackmail Jews who represented valuable agents for the German Reich. HEYDRICH who was having difficulties with SEYS-INQUART regarding police policy in the Netherlands, instructed JOST to recall the two accused at once. In the meantime, however, SANNER was held in the Netherlands for the clearing of another affair which had been discovered. HEYDRICH tried to treat the matter as a bagatelle. As far as the Reichskommissar was concerned, the matter seemed to have arisen at a very suitable moment. The Reichskommissar insisted on following the matter up which was assuming steadily increasing proportions. The result of the first cursory investigation was the official arrest of SANNER and leave of absence being given to NAUJOCKS against whom USCHLA-proceedings were to be instituted. During the course of the investigation, so much material was collected against NAUJOCKS that HEYDRICH saw no other way out than to let NAUJOCKS be sentenced as requested by JOST who saw a good opportunity of getting rid of NAUJOCKS in this. Before official proceedings could be started against NAUJOCKS, HEYDRICH, contrary to all regulations and customs, ordered the accused to come and see him. In order to comply with the regulation introduced by himself, he explained that he would personally carry out the preliminary inquiry against NAUJOCKS. To everybody's astonishment, nothing further was done than that NAUJOCKS was sent to the front. Thus he was removed from any threatening criminal proceedings, and as HEYDRICH himself had taken charge of the case nobody knew the result of the preliminary inquiry and how to go on with the case. In time the rumour went around that NAUJOCKS knew too much ~~of~~ about HEYDRICH so that HEYDRICH could not afford to hand him over to public justice. Neither could he use his pet-method of letting the accused commit suicide, as HEYDRICH did not know whether NAUJOCKS had not re-insured himself by depositing things abroad. Furthermore, HEYDRICH probably needed his trusted collaborator for further special tasks. It was generally assumed that MULLER had interceded with HEYDRICH for NAUJOCKS, who, after a short service with the Waffen-SS, appeared in the working sphere of Amt IV. As is usual in such cases, there was a rumour about the intended degradation of NAUJOCKS, which, however, did not take place. On the contrary, after his re-appearance he was again listed in Berlin as Sturmbannführer.

Page 17, p.6.

Report states: ".....On his arrival there, however, a routine medical examination revealed the fact that he was suffering from a stomach ulcer, and he was accordingly instructed to report to the military hospital in Prague for treatment....."

Complaints of the stomach are very frequent with SD-Führer, who ~~xxx~~ after a short time of service at the front are to return again into the services of the SD. The usual comment is that when an SD-Führer is supposed to do some service at the front, he suddenly produces a stomach-complaint as per certain instructions. On the other hand, this particular complaint seems in fact to be prevalent in the circles of leaders of certain Party organisations. The reason for this is possible a too rapid re-adjustment in their mode of living and in their efforts to enjoy life to the fullest too much strain is put on the stomach.

Page 19, p. 3,4.

Report states: ".....BERGER obtained a position for him as honorary SS representative on the staff of Dr. JAECK....."

On his arrival in Brussels, NAUJOCKS was told that he would be employed as a civil supervisor in a referat known as the Fahndungsdienst....."

At the time when NAUJOCKS took up his job in Brussels, the

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Page 19, p. 3, 4.

Continued.

the fight between Partei and Wehrmacht and Militärverwaltung and SD in particular regarding the policy of the German occupying powers in Belgium had reached its climax. FALKENHAUSEN with his Chinese experience found in Belgium a country, whose population, as he once said himself, thought and acted surprisingly like that of some of the broad masses in China. His personal attitude was to act as if he had to deal with Chinese people. His intention was not to deprive Belgium of the possibility to trade. He recognised that the German administration could publish any number of police decrees but that they would not be in a position to enforce these decrees, and that it is not possible to change a people's mentality fundamentally. In order to hide the weakness of the German position he suggested collaboration with the legal and illegal establishments of the social life in Belgium. The result was that even his enemies had to admit that Belgium could be considered as the quietest of all occupied countries, and that most of the goods which Germany needed urgently for its industries came from Belgium. This latter fact was a great source of worry to the enemies of the military and FALKENHAUSEN in particular.

~~In view of the~~ With regard to the administration in Belgium the SD proceeded on the principle, which was shared by RIBBENTROP, of divide et impera. The idea was to have the Flamands in Belgium watched by the Walloons and vice versa and play them out against each other. It worried these routinists of a so-called single-minded European organisation, that theories and police measures in Belgium were complete failures, without it being possible, as had been done everywhere else, to create destruction and as a result of this destruction internal unrest. It was the view of the SD, if there was no apparent resistance movement, it meant that the German occupation administration was not set up in conformity with the weltanschauliche principles of the Parteiprogramm. The real reason was probably that the SD had gradually worked out a method of how to make use of the resistance movements in the occupied countries in order to extend the possibilities of its own political influence in such countries. This is fundamentally the same method which was used inside Germany before the war and with the creation of the Polish frontier incidents at the beginning of the war, i.e. to work destructively through opposition.

FALKENHAUSEN personally was not in HITLER's good books as he was related to a Jewish family. His work against Japan had prejudiced RIBBENTROP against him. He furthermore surrounded himself in Belgium with people which the SD did not consider to be suitable representatives of German interests. It was therefore decided in SD circles, in spite of misgivings in economic circles which were in touch with the SD, to undertake an action against v. FALKENHAUSEN and his circle. For this purpose "specialists" were sent to Belgium and NAUJOCKS was one of them.

A particularly difficult sphere ~~xxxxxxx~~ of the administration from the police point of view was the Black Market in Belgium. On the one hand, the Black Market was strongly supported by German Wirtschaftsstellen, headed by the Wirtschaftsministerium. On the other hand, there were such a mass of decrees regarding the Black Market, that very nearly every German official and business man, without knowing it, had laid himself open to punishment even after the first negotiations which he had carried on in Belgium. The consequence of this discrepancy in handling Belgium business life was that everybody took a chance and did as he pleased. As time went on, differences arose between the Militärverwaltung and the Reich authorities, as well as between military and SS-authorities, Parteistellen and Belgian Stellen. Every Stelle, independently from the others, issued decrees, so that finally in 1942 the phenomenal position was reached that things which were carried out by Germans in Belgium were considered as punishable offences against German interests by the German authorities in the Reich, whereas German Stellen in Belgium supported such actions. Vice versa too, authorities in the Reich supported actions which the German and Belgian authorities in Belgium considered punishable. It speaks for v. FALKENHAUSEN's wisdom that in spite of this confusion he prevented chaos breaking out in the administration and in politics.

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Page 19, p. 3, 4.
Continued.

A consequence of the situation in Belgium was, that all business men who wanted to do big business collected in this country and working together obtained the support of all possible Partei-, Militär- and Verwaltungsstellen. Especially on the Black Market the close collaboration between business men and official Stellen had an unpleasant effect. The SD had gradually evolved a system of ruling the Black Market in Belgium through its Black Market agents by deeds of violence against agents of other Parteistellen and Reich authorities, in order to gain through the business underworld the control over conditions in Belgium. An incident^{al} result of this was the growing interest which the big noises in the SD who dealt with the Black Market showed in personal gains which, not controlled by other Stellen, could be very big. ~~In order to avoid control by military Stellen, the SD-Stellen turned their agents on the Black Market into political agents, who were supposed to have good connections to England, were double-agents or discovered English agents. In view of the attitude of the Belgian population to seize even the smallest chance at once, the SD-Stellen were soon surrounded by a large number of Belgians and also foreigners, who all, without any fear of being arrested, stated that they were English agents who, if the SD-Führer would do business with them, might be able to be useful later on to the SD-Führer with their English connections.~~ In order to avoid control by military Stellen, the SD-Stellen turned their agents on the Black Market into political agents, who were supposed to have good connections to England, were double-agents or discovered English agents. In view of the attitude of the Belgian population to seize even the smallest chance at once, the SD-Stellen were soon surrounded by a large number of Belgians and also foreigners, who all, without any fear of being arrested, stated that they were English agents who, if the SD-Führer would do business with them, might be able to be useful later on to the SD-Führer with their English connections.

The inflationary growth of the Black Market agents received a set-back through a measure taken by Oberst v. HARBOU, v. FALKENHAUSEN's chief-of-staff. HARBOU tried, at least along the lines worked out by FALKENHAUSEN, to keep the control over the Black Market, in order to prevent that instead of political unrest and resistance movements, which thanks to clever administration had never arisen, gangster-fights amongst Black Marketeers from breaking out. The Militärverwaltung reinforced the position of the referat Black Market, which was attached more closely to the Fahndungsdienst. Both referat Schwarzhandel (Black Market) and Fahndungsdienst, the latter being an establishment by Amt V in Belgium subordinated to the Militärverwaltung, requested from the BdS-Brussels a list of Black Market agents who were to be treated as political agents. The SD refused to comply with such a request and treated the matter in a dilatory way. The consequence was a fight between the Wirtschaftsstellen of the SD, Amt IV and VI, on the one side, and the Militärverwaltung, on the other side and guided by the SD, it degenerated into a fight for power. One of the first measures of the SD was to take over the Fahndungsdienst. As regards organisation, the Fahndungsdienst remained under the control of the Military Commander, but, but for political as well as technical reasons in the administration of the police the important and essential positions were filled with members of Amt IV or with SD-Führer chosen by them. One of the first men to take up such a position was NAUJOCKS.

Soon after NAUJOCKS had taken up his position, the close connection of the Fahndungsdienst with the SD became apparent. The SD enlarged its circles of agents on the Black Market, and it was soon obvious that NAUJOCKS kept a private circle of agents who, as suspected by people in the Militärverwaltung, had official orders to collect material against any German military dealing with the Black Market and particularly against v. FALKENHAUSEN and v. HARBOU. Some reports of this kind were received from counter-agents, but the steps which the Militärverwaltung took had no positive results.

On the contrary, it soon became apparent that NAUJOCKS meant to make use of his powerful position. He surrounded himself with a circle of particularly notorious Black Marketeers of German and foreign origin. It was apparently the intention of this circle to get the most profitable sources of income of the Black Market into their hands and as far as possible cut out any other influence. Anybody who proved obstructive to this was first warned, then if he caused further difficulties, the Fahndungsdienst opened proceedings

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against him, which generally ended with the accused being condemned. As long as this underground fight was confined to the underworld of the Black Market, NAUJOCKS' desire for power remained bearable. However it was assumed that, when NAUJOCKS had sufficient material against certain important men in the Militärverwaltung, he tried to get the official support of the Militärstellen for his friends. He accompanied these attempts by indirect threats. When the Militärstellen openly exposed this and proved that NAUJOCKS was considered a good profiteer amongst Black Marketeers, NAUJOCKS replied suddenly with measures which were more of a political than business nature. It became apparent that he had the full support of MÜLLER, chief of Amt IV, and of OHLENDORF, chief of Amt III. At the last moment OHLENDORF stopped a request by the Wirtschaftsministerium and the OKW to the SD, to have NAUJOCKS removed from his post. Apparently OHLENDORF and MÜLLER saw in NAUJOCKS' work a chance to revenge themselves against FALKENHAUSEN for the superiority with which he had faced them. NAUJOCKS himself, who since the beginning of the fight had been travelling continually, gradually began to throw his weight about. He had more and more influential and important men arrested. As seen above, it was not difficult to find reasons for an arrest. It was noticed everywhere in Germany that people, who in everybody's opinion had nothing to fear, after having been arrested at NAUJOCKS' instigation, committed suicide without having settled their last affairs. These men generally had influential positions. It was noticeable that the actions undertaken by NAUJOCKS in Belgium since the beginning of 1944 were running parallel to actions, which were carried out in other occupied and neutral countries by Amt IV against Wehrmacht and Foreign Office members. Particularly noticeable was the case of Oberst v. HARBOU, who was arrested for political reasons, but whose arrest was officially explained on the basis of material supplied by NAUJOCKS.

The case of Militärverwaltungsrat Dr. Wolff DOHMKE, who as manager of the referat Schwarzhandel in the Militärverwaltung Brussels was NAUJOCKS' opponent and most dangerous enemy, shows clearly that NAUJOCKS, under the cover of looking after SD-interests and increasing the SD power in the German spheres of influence, pursued his personal interests to the widest extent. DOHMKE had a mass of material against NAUJOCK and his friends, but nothing was done against him and his circle. However, when his people began to blackmail others by threatening them with their SD connections, and when it became apparent that NAUJOCKS not only supported his friends but to a certain extent also acted as adviser in their undertakings, DOHMKE showed all the material to v. HARBOU, who handed it on to v. FALKENHAUSEN for his decision. The Military Commander decided that the case should be followed up and be shown to Berlin for instructions. During the preliminary work, which was necessary to prepare the case for decision in Berlin, two of NAUJOCKS' friends (as far as can be recalled these were SCHMIDT and LEUFELD?) informed DOHMKE, that it would be better for him (DOHMKE) not to go on with the case, as Berlin would in any case decide in favour of NAUJOCKS. Furthermore, they advised DOHMKE urgently, for his personal safety's sake, to let the whole case vanish and to work together with NAUJOCKS in future, which would result in a closed supervision and regulation of the Black Market. He would not be able to rely on v. HARBOU's and FALKENHAUSEN's support as their political position in Berlin was already so undermined that measures would probably very soon be taken against them.

From this it can be concluded that this affair, which had been kept secret, was betrayed through one of NAUJOCKS' channels or by one of his closer friends. DOHMKE went to Berlin to find out what the actual situation in Berlin was and to ask the Berichter(?) for advice what he was to do in his situation. He informed the Berichter in broad outlines of the facts in Belgium and of NAUJOCKS' position, as stated above. After inquiries had been made in authoritative circles of the OKW and the SD, it seemed advisable to do nothing further in the matter, as the amalgamation with political questions and the growing strength of the SD in Belgium gave NAUJOCKS and his friends right from the start superiority over

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Contd.

von FALKENHAUSE and his circles who in fact were no longer in favour since March 1944. It was quite obvious in Berlin that NAUJOCKS was in closest personal contact with MÜLLER. This meant for everybody who got up against NAUJOCKS and who had no extraordinary, powerful connections, danger to position and life.

It therefore appeared advisable to let things slide and do nothing. DOHMKE, however, who was one of the few really decent men in Belgium, decided out of a sense of duty, not to let things slide but to fight them. He returned to Brussels with this decision in order to take the preliminary steps required. A week later he sent a note written in pencil to the Berichter, asking to let the courier who brought the note know, whether he could come to Brussels, as he needed urgently personal advice, things having progressed to such an extent that he (DOHMKE) was unable to leave Brussels at the moment. The Berichter who was away, only got this note a day after DOHMKE's death. It was being said that DOHMKE HAD COMMITTED suicide in his room in the Hotel Cecil, Brussels. The Kriminalpolizei and the Fahndungsdienst confiscated all files and notes on which DOHMKE had been working during the last few months before his death, in order to find reasons for his sudden suicide. DOHMKE was known everywhere as being exceedingly correct and conscientious. It was therefore surprising that, before shooting himself, he did not write to his wife, who a few months previously had had a second child, regarding his estates, nor that there had been any signs that DOHMKE had been thinking of suicide. It is also peculiar, that neither the Gesta nor the Kripo took any steps to follow up the case but that it petered out very soon.

Independent of the action taken by the SD about the Black Market, it became apparent during the late spring and summer 1944, that NAUJOCKS obviously had special orders from MÜLLER regarding von FALKENHAUSEN. NAUJOCKS personally undertook journeys with the object of collecting information about people in close contact with the General. As soon as action was taken against one of these people it started by their being suspected of having been in touch with the Black Market. This purpose of this, as far as the general public was concerned, was to discredit the General and his circle, who were considered highly in Germany. During the course of the proceedings against such a person, it usually came out that the Gesta was interested in the case. For instance, after a trip by NAUJOCKS and with one of his agents to Italy, Princess RISPOLI (s.p. 28, p. 1 of report) was suddenly arrested and officially accused of having been in touch with the Black Market. In reality it came out that the Gesta was interested in her and took her into protective custody, as there was a suspicion that she was in touch with anti-Fascist circles in Italy, and it was thought that she was a valuable hostage. If one also takes the trouble to draw approximate comparisons between the time, which NAUJOCKS states to have been in Brussels and the time, which he spent travelling around for the SD on MÜLLER's instructions and, as stated, KALTENBRUNNER's, although he maintains to have had nothing more to do with the SD, it will be found that he spent two-fifths of the time, while he was in charge of the Fahndungsdienst in Brussels, to look after SD interests or negotiate with SD people.

Page 22, p. 3.

Report states: ".....These included Werner GOETTSCH, who despite his membership of the SD, had become an enthusiastic freemason..."

As stated on Page Page 8, Page 6, p. 2, special importance was attached by the lower SD circles to the so-called international powers, in particularly Free Masonry. NAUJOCKS is sure to believe that to belong to the Free Masons meant that the Allies would put special trust in such a man.

Neither NAUJOCKS nor GOETTSCH can have had any idea of the nature of Free Masonry and that GOETTSCH's change of opinion was for propaganda reasons. This is clear from NAUJOCKS' hint regarding the political attitude of his friend on Page 31, p. 3., from which it is obvious, that, if his opinion is in accordance with the facts, GOETTSCH cannot have been a Freemason.

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Page 29, p.7.

Report states: ".....GOETTSCH and a man named Dr. SPAHN called for him in a car, and NAUJOCKS followed this car in his own automobile to a house in Wienzeile where GOETTSCH introduced him to a certain Prof. HEINRICH, who, he said, was the leader of the Austrian Resistance Movement."

In towns like Prague and Vienna the connections of the SD with resistance movements is usually a matter for discussion in bars. Amt IV is particularly proud to be able to say of itself that it has the many-sided "resistance movements" in Bohemia as well as in Austria not only well in hand, but even controls some.

If the Dr. SPAHN mentioned in the report is the Professor SPAHN or a relation of this Professor, then NAUJOCKS ought to know that this man in 1938 was the topic of the day in Partei and SS circles, that he was arrested, taken into protective custody and that he is probably now being held under strict supervision. As regards Prof. HEINRICH, approximately the same applies. The only question as regards HEINRICH is whether he has become agent provocateur for the SD.

In this connection it must be pointed out that the preparation of the action by NAUJOCKS is very like the undertaking, which at the beginning of the war, was carried out by Amt IV, of which MÜLLER is the chief, and which led to the capture of BEST and STEVENS. The start is made from the weltanschauliche angle; GOETTSCH, who has become Freemason, leads the action. Support is asked for for a resistance movement which must be of Catholic origin. A WT-connection with the resistance movement is suggested to the English side. The technical nature of the enterprise is the same as carried through in Holland previously. It is left open whether, after contact has been established, other men might not appear who are powerful men behind GOETTSCH. It is not clear from the report, whether NAUJOCKS wants to hint that WANNECK supports the action on the quiet; this would mean that possibly KALTENBRUNNER and thus also MÜLLER are, to a certain extent, behind the action. In principle all these possibilities also existed with the Holland action at the beginning of the war. There is only one difference in this affair of NAUJOCKS: it is not only directed against National Socialism, but also against Russia. This opens up various aspects of the whole matter and various possibilities of the circles round KALTENBRUNNER, who generally speaking are counting on a German-Russian compromise.

As is obvious from NAUJOCKS report, it can be assumed that he had received an SD-order. Otherwise, when carrying through his action, as mentioned several times (Page 8 and 9), he could not have been acting the way he did. The method of his action showed that he acted on information, i.e. he acted in accordance with what Amt VI and Amt IV in 1944 imagined to be the reaction of an English service to NAUJOCKS. In this connection it is worth mentioning, that as early as 1940 Stubaf. Hans DAUFELDT, at that time leader of Gruppe D Amt VI, made inquiries whether the name of the chief of Department II in the English service, CHRISTI, was a cover-name or a real name. NAUJOCKS mentions Col. CHRISTI as chief of the European department of the English service. He states, that this Colonel is supposed to have been in contact with Prof. HEINRICH.

If NAUJOCKS personally perhaps had the intention to ~~be~~ get personal gain out of his action, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that he obviously could only carry through the action, in the way he did, with the assistance of a powerful organisation such as the SD. It should also be mentioned that for his own purposes he did not have to mention things which kept him in touch with this organisation by WT-transmissions from England, if he did not want to have anything further to do with the SD. His protection in Germany, see Page 30, p3, 5,6; P.31, p.1., is of such official nature that he could not have received it from people who are in fact enemies of the system in Germany.

NAUJOCKS in the course of his story shows that he has very little knowledge of organisation. As far as is known, it is believed in the SD, that foreign services have very little knowledge about the security measures in the SD. These two facts perhaps explain why NAUJOCKS thinks that he has explained sufficiently with his story that this action was undertaken by an opposition in Germany. In reality, it would

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Page 29, p. 7.
Contd.

be impossible to carry through his action with the means of assistance which he mentions, without support from the highest quarters, as without this the connections which are to be kept up would very soon be discovered and broken into. Besides the opposition inside the SD is so great, that risks of the nature taken by GOETTSCHE and his friends, would not be possible without official protection.

Final Remark:

The comments made to the report, as regards NAUJOCKS and his actions, are mainly based on reports by the following people:

Brigadf. JOST, whose opinion about NAUJOCKS can be given in one sentence as expressed to the Berichter and his chief. He said: "NAUJOCKS is capable, if necessary, to sell his own mother."

Brigadf. SCHELLENBERG who was very cautious when expressing his opinion about NAUJOCKS. His idea was that NAUJOCKS was MÜLLER's favorite, whom MÜLLER could use at any time for things for which it would not be so easy to find another man. SCHE. stresses the "robustness" with which NAUJOCKS used to carry out his tasks. He speaks of a certain slyness which, coupled with ambition, got NAUJOCKS the rank of a Stubaf. Otherwise, SCHE. considers that he has the mentality of a driver whose rough qualities are predominating.

Ostuf. RAUFF, who knew NAUJOCKS from his connection with HEYDRICH describes NAUJOCKS as a Killer (Schläger), whom HEYDRICH could use for everything, and who even had the nerve to bring system into matters which one certainly does not like to discuss and far less carry out. He defended him to the extent when considering the Sanner affair that he pointed out, that NAUJOCKS was of low-class origin, had no idea of money and that it was made easy for him to rule with SD powers. Rank and position went to his head, and he had been unable to distinguish between right and wrong. RAUFF's idea, of course, is that Jews are outlaws and that therefore their fortune can be used by anybody. During the course of 1943 RAUFF must have changed his opinion about NAUJOCKS slightly; he suddenly thought that NAUJOCKS might come to a sticky end if he gets hold of the wrong man. He thought NAUJOCKS took too many risks.

Stubaf. DAUFELDT, Hans, called NAUJOCKS, before the Sanner affair and before the differences between JOST and NAUJOCKS, a good and "cheerful" comrade who risked everything and who proved a particularly keen SS-Führer as regards the Jewish questions and any weltanschauliche enemies. As DAUFELDT was on JOST's side, he changed his opinion of NAUJOCKS in time and considered him a bad type of SD-Führer, originating from the old SS.

Hstf. KRAFFT, who is a good-natured and faithful boy, has little idea of politics and Weltanschauung. He is mainly an expert on motorcars and has no other ambitions than to open his motorcar workshop again after the war. He praised NAUJOCKS' technical understanding, but did not think he knew much about motorcars. He thought that NAUJOCKS had very great influence on HEYDRICH and concluded from this that NAUJOCKS must have special qualifications. He considered NAUJOCKS a good drinking-companion. He knew from NAUJOCKS' time as a driver that NAUJOCKS exploited his comrades and was very ambitious. In 1943 KRAFFT thought that his position must have gone to NAUJOCKS' head and that he did not much like to be reminded of the start of his career.

Kriegsverwltgsrt. Dr. DOHMKE, who thought that NAUJOCKS was capable of anything, held him for morbidly greedy after money and power. He also thought that he had noticed during the course of his observations that NAUJOCKS showed sadistic traces of an almost pathological type.

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NAUJOCKS declared categorically that apart from this, he had no dealings with anyone on Czecho-Slovakian soil.

Final Judgment on NAUJOCKS.

Alfred NAUJOCKS is an interesting person. A psychological analysis of his character reveals a criminal and fanatical tendency, which conflicts with a sentimental streak and hysterical outbursts.

There is no doubt that NAUJOCKS' statements have been made spontaneously, willingly and truthfully, in so far as the examining authorities have been able to check them and in regard to what they know of the FORMIS case.

The injury to his right hand and right foot and the burning of the wound on his hand by acid, received in carrying this out, are still visible. NAUJOCKS also drew a small sketch of the hotel, the main road and the Moldau (Vltava), which is quite correct, and would prove that he did actually take part in this event.

NAUJOCKS makes a good impression and behaves well. His answers are given willingly and he even corrects the examining authorities on points which reflect to his disadvantage, as for instance, his reply to the critical question whether FORMIS was shot by GÖTTSCHE, that he could not be sure whether the shots fired by himself or GÖTTSCHE had brought about the death of FORMIS.

Throughout his whole description of the incident, it was not perceptible that NAUJOCKS ever put forward any line of defence as a means of concealing anything. NAUJOCKS is also quite willing to take all the consequences for what he has done.

It also appeared to the examining authorities that whenever possible, NAUJOCKS endeavoured in a quiet way to shield Edith KISBACH.


Camp 020.
20.3.45.
JCSH/AN:JFH:MEB.

168b

W.R.C.(3).

For any action that may be necessary. I have
passed one copy to Miss Stiebel, B.I.B/M.I.5.

W.R.C.
22.3.45.



H.P. Milmo.

1690
1084
ke.
Miss Chenhalls

I attach herewith DICTIONARY's comments on NAUJOCKS, together with five copies of a translation as asked.

The translator draws my attention to the word "berichter" which occurs on page 19 of DICTIONARY's original comments and on several occasions later in the report. The word "berichter" apparently means "reporter" and the translator suggests that in the context it probably refers to DICTIONARY himself. The equivalent reference in the translation is towards the bottom of page 14.

J.H. Marriott
J.H. Marriott

B.l.a.
26.3.45.

Interrogation
Original at 168B (1)

168B
London 6.3.45

INTERROGATION

of the German National, Alfred NAUJOCKS, carried out on 5.3.45 at the
Central Oratory School in London

Personal Particulars:

Alfred NAUJOCKS, a German national, born 20.9.1911 in Kiel, single; profession medical apprentice. Instruments mechanic. (Precision instruments). Member of the Allgemeine S.S., Waffen S.S. and S.D.

Relations:

Father - Richard NAUJOCKS, aged 62 years, proprietor of a Druggist business (also dealer in technical oils) in 64 Plenburger Strasse, now living with his daughter, Anni KLAUSER, in Bad Segeberg, 13 Molke Strasse.

Mother - Terese (nee LANGE) 60 years, with father.

Sisters + Anni KLAUSER address as above.

Herta NAUJOCKS, 36 years old, single, steno-typist in Oberschlesien.

NAUJOCKS' Fiancee:

Klare BONSET, 33 years old, living in Brussels, 18 Rue de Luxemburg (previously married to a Dutchman.)

Education:

No Kindergarten but 8 years in the Ober-Realschule up to Tertia standard at Kiel. Left school in 1925 and studied precision tool manufacture.

Languages:

Only German.

Party Membership:

From 1.8.1931. Party number about 700,000.

Allgemeine S.S. Membership:

Similarly from 1.8.1931. S.S. number 26,240.

Entry into the S.D.

In the Spring of 1934 with the rank of Scharführer. During the course of the following years promoted to rank of Sturmbannführer (Major) in the Allgemeine S.S. At the beginning of January 1941, on account of differences of opinion with HEYDRICH, and false accusations of embezzlement, cowardice and disobedience, was degraded and transferred as an ordinary S.S. Mann to the "S.S. Adolf Hitler Leibstandarte" Artillery regiment on the Eastern Front.

Additional proof of NAUJOCKS' membership to the S.S.:

NAUJOCKS is tattooed on his left upper arm with an "A" in blue colouring, signifying his blood group.

Note

Most of the adherents of the Allgemeine S.S. and the Waffen S.S., as also members of the S.D. and the Gestapo are tattooed on their upper left arm with their relevant blood group. The Germans distinguish between the different blood groups as follows: A, B, AB, and O. The members of the

- 2 -

S.S., etc. are now marked with letters in blue ink to show their blood group, i.e. A, dimensions about 8 to 10 mm are tattooed on the inner side of the upper arm just below the hair of the armpit. The earliest members of the S.S. sometimes have their entire S.S. no. tattooed on them.

This tattooing is a secret sign of their membership of the S.S. and serves, for example, in the event of a successful flight as an identification mark, when the refugee crosses the German lines again. In addition those belonging to the S.S. enjoy precedence in medical treatment following a wound.

It often happens, that members of the S.S. put on the uniform of a Wehrmacht Amt before being taken prisoner in order not to be recognized as S.S. men. Such prisoners, needless to say, also destroy their pay books, but are recognizable owing to the tattoo marks on their left upper arms.

Cover Names used by NAUJOCKS during the course of his activities for the S.D.

Hans MUELLER: NAUJOCKS travelled under this name with a Reisepass also in this name to CSR.

Alfred BOISEN: The name of his fiancée in Brussels.

Rudolf MOEBERT: NAUJOCKS used this name as a signature for correspondence from the address: Berlin, No. 41 (?) Jerusalemstrasse.

NAUJOCKS' Activities with the CSR

1. The planned murder of Otto STRASSER in Prague towards the end of 1934

About three months prior to the murder of the engineer FORNIS in Zahori, NAUJOCKS was ordered to report to the S.S. Obergruppenführer HEYDRICH at the offices of the S.S. (S.D.) at 8 Prinz Albrechtsstrasse, Berlin, where HEYDRICH personally gave him the order to travel to Prague and there to shoot STRASSER. As a reason for this, HEYDRICH gave that of treachery against HITLER and the Party. For further details concerning the murder, HEYDRICH referred NAUJOCKS to HUBER, who at that time was Abteilungsleiter of the Gestapo. HUBER is a Bavarian by birth, and is now Leiter of the Stapo in Vienna.

HUBER, HEYDRICH, HIMMLER and MÜLLER had formerly served together in the Bavarian Political Police and were friendly with one another.

NAUJOCKS sought out HUBER who gave him information regarding Otto STRASSER's activities in Prague as well as those of the "Black Front", and also named members of STRASSER's immediate circle, including those of MAHR and ADAM. (NAUJOCKS learned later that MAHR and ADAM worked for HUBER and had infiltrated the "Black Front"). NAUJOCKS was also informed as regards STRASSER's habits and finally sent to one of HUBER's own agents who lived in the Hotel Julis in Prague. HUBER gave NAUJOCKS the name of this agent, but the latter has forgotten this name. This agent was in direct contact with STRASSER, on which point HUBER was at pains to lay emphasis.

NAUJOCKS describes this agent as follows:-

Personal Description: About 1.65m in height, longish oval face, with prominent nose (Jewish type), strikingly pale complexion, horn-rimmed spectacles, long, black hair combed backwards, long thick black moustache with drooping ends, small build, with shoulders well padded, soft voice and poor carriage (stoops), speaks with Bavarian dialect, thinks a lot of himself, talks a lot and has the bearing of a spy in a film.

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HUBER gave NAUJOCKS STRASSER's home address also the name of the cafe which STRASSER frequented. NAUJOCKS asked HUBER's permission to take his friend Werner GÜTTSCH with him on this mission, also a member of the S.D. He is a fellow countryman of NAUJOCKS, six months younger than the latter and is also from Kiel.

NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCH travelled together at once to Prague, NAUJOCKS travelling with a false travel permit in the name of Hans MÜLLER, Commercial traveller, and GÜTTSCH also with a false permit. NAUJOCKS has forgotten GÜTTSCH's cover name but thinks it is identical with the one mentioned in the Czech Police Report drawn up after the murder of FORMIS had taken place. NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCH put up at the Hotel Wilson next door to the Wilson railway station and stayed three or four days in Prague.

NAUJOCKS possessed a so-called pocket pistol, 6.55mm calibre, with which he intended to do the deed, and GÜTTSCH carried a similar weapon.

NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCH next visited the above-mentioned German agent of HUBER's in the Julis Hotel at the Wenzelplatz, but had to wait about ten minutes as the latter had a girl with him. This anonymous agent appears to have lived in the old, back part of the hotel, as NAUJOCKS described his room as dark and gloomy.

This man now described both STRASSER's habits and entourage as well as meeting places of the Black Front, disclosing the names of its members.

NAUJOCKS visited this man about five times in the room in the hotel, but each time this agent gave other opinions, that is to say he contradicted himself at each interview with regard to his earlier statements, excused himself profusely and behaved like a spy in a film, making out to the two men that the shooting was a simple affair. This agent always stressed the point that he was in direct contact with STRASSER.

GÜTTSCH and NAUJOCKS mistrusted this agent and decided to get out of the mission of STRASSER's murder and rather return empty handed to Berlin. During the course of their stay in Prague, NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCH only saw STRASSER once, and that was as the latter went into a cafe in one of the side streets off the Wenzelplatz, but they did not follow him.

NAUJOCKS stated that both he and GÜTTSCH were strengthened in their decision not to carry out the murder of STRASSER by the fact that STRASSER was a decent man, a good German, and for both of them an ideal and a personality. They had known STRASSER earlier when he was the speaker at public gatherings.

NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCH returned to Berlin without having fulfilled their mission. The next day, NAUJOCKS called on HEYDRICH and explained to him that he had renounced the idea of murdering STRASSER, as it had not been possible to carry out this mission, in the way suggested by the anonymous agent in Prague. Further that the information supplied by the agent in Prague did not tally, and that at each meeting he had contradicted himself, so that NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCH lost confidence in him.

HEYDRICH reprimanded NAUJOCKS, calling him a coward and "Schweinhund", and stated that he would report the matter to HIMMLER and that NAUJOCKS would soon learn what happened when one did not obey orders.

2. The Murder of the Engineer Rudolf FORMIS at the Hotel in Zahori

At the end of January or beginning of February 1935, NAUJOCKS was again summoned to HEYDRICH's office, where he was told by the latter that he had been chosen to carry out a mission which would give him his last chance

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of rehabilitating himself, after his failure in the case of Otto STRASSER.

HEYDRICH then informed NAUJOCKS that there was an illicit transmitter in Czechoslovakia which caused the Party great annoyance. The Reich Government had already repeatedly told the Czech Government through the channel of the Post Ministerium of the approximate position of this illicit transmitter, with a view to getting it closed down, as it openly incited attempts against Adolf HITLER and disseminated anti-Nazi propaganda. These representations to the Czech authorities were without any effect.

HEYDRICH further informed NAUJOCKS that as a result of his own investigations the broadcaster on this illicit transmitter was a certain Engineer Rudolf FORMIS who had formerly been in charge of broadcasting at Stuttgart and now belonged to Otto STRASSER's "Black Front."

HEYDRICH now informed NAUJOCKS to get in touch with HUBER who would give him all the requisite instructions and who would be fully conversant with all the investigations as to the position of this transmitter.

HEYDRICH now remarked that he had received repeated reprimands from both HIMMLER and GOERING on the subject of this transmitter and ordered NAUJOCKS to travel immediately to Czechoslovakia to locate and destroy the transmitter, and if possible, to bring FORMIS back alive to Germany. HEYDRICH did not give the order to "bump off" i.e. to shoot FORMIS.

NAUJOCKS then asked HEYDRICH whether as better cover for his mission, he might be allowed to take his girl-friend with him, the latter being completely trustworthy, but HEYDRICH forbade this categorically saying that he would not tolerate any women becoming involved in this mission.

HEYDRICH clearly warned NAUJOCKS once again to carry out his orders, as otherwise he would be punished on a charge of cowardice. NAUJOCKS then took his leave of HEYDRICH.

During the two days that followed NAUJOCKS had two interviews with HUBER, in the same building in which HEYDRICH's office was situated, when HUBER instructed NAUJOCKS in the matter, showing him a magic lantern slide of FORMIS and indicating on a map two places in Czechoslovakia where the transmitter was thought to be located. The name of one place was Zahori and NAUJOCKS has forgotten the other. HUBER then repeated HEYDRICH's order to destroy the transmitter and if possible to bring FORMIS back to Germany. NAUJOCKS then begged HUBER for permission to take his girl-friend with him as better cover (a harmless pair of lovers). HUBER did not expressly forbid it, and NAUJOCKS perceived that HUBER was not really against it.

The girl-friend concerned was a certain Edith KESBACH, then single, a gymnastics teacher (giving private lessons) living in the corner house of the Radesheimer Platz, Berlin (entrance to the house on the corner of the Wiesbadnerstrasse.) Fräulein Edith KESBACH was an ardent Catholic and not a Nazi. She was carrying on a love affair with NAUJOCKS and only knew him under his cover name of Hans MÜLLER, an independant salesman of technical articles. KESBACH obeyed NAUJOCKS absolutely and he was at this time living with her at her residence given above. Fräulein KESBACH was the daughter of an artist and ultra eccentric and artistic in temperament.

After the murder of FORMIS, Edith KESBACH had a complete nervous breakdown, and suffered from very severe nervous shock. She was treated for a long time by the nerve specialist, Dr. MÜLLER, a pschy-analyst in Berlin. NAUJOCKS then broke off relations with Edith KESBACH and she later married a Swiss citizen with whom she is now living in Switzerland. Her present name and whereabouts are not known to NAUJOCKS. NAUJOCKS gives KESBACH's present age as between 35 and 36 years.

- 5 -

NAUJOCKS states here that the investigations of the Czech police, in connection with the shooting of FORMIS as published in the Czech newspapers are correct. The Czech police, however, supposed that Edith KMSBACH was severely wounded during the course of the incident and died of such wounds on the flight into German territory. In addition, the Czech police made a spelling error and gave the name of Edith as KERSBACH!

Preparations for carrying out the mission

In connection with HUBER's mission, the Berlin Secret Police put a car of theirs at NAUJOCK's disposal. This was a Mercedes car, dark blue in colour, four seater, complete with a Kiel Index No.

NAUJOCKS provided himself with a bottle of ether for the purpose of doping FORMIS. Further, NAUJOCKS got himself an automatic Walter pistol, 7.65mm calibre together with seven rounds of ammunition.

Then NAUJOCKS invited Edith KMSBACH on a skiing expedition in the Czechoslovakian mountains near Irague, which she gladly accepted.

Journey and Investigations as to the place and location in Zahori

NAUJOCKS then drove with Edith KMSBACH in the blue Mercedes car, with her belongings in ruck-sacks together with skis from Berlin through Dresden and via the Schneeberg to Prague, where they put up at the Wilson Hotel (near the Wilson railway station) duly registering themselves for police purposes. NAUJOCKS registered himself as "Hans MÜLLER" (his travel permit being also made out in this name), while Edith registered under her own name "KMSBACH."

On being asked in interrogation whether there was not a danger in Edith KMSBACH using her own name, since the Czech Police could easily find out who NAUJOCKS was, NAUJOCKS replied that there was no danger, as Edith KMSBACH always knew him as Hans MÜLLER.

NAUJOCKS and Edith KMSBACH spent the night at the Wilson Hotel, and the next day they left Prague and drove in the direction of Stehovice to a village, the name of which NAUJOCKS has forgotten. In this case it must either be the village of "Slaty" or the village of "Zahori".

It is note-worthy that NAUJOCKS was told by HUBER of two places in which to look for the transmitter. It is possible that both places were called Zahori, since there is another Zahori near Pisek.

NAUJOCKS intended looking first in the nearest place suggested to him, and this was Zahori on the Vltava (Moldau). The village of Slaty, as well as the village of Zahori lie in the mountains, (Roter Berg). The Zahori Hotel in which FORMIS was murdered, a solitary building towards the mountain, stood quite on its own, some 50 metres away from the Morava, where that river forms the famous St. Johannes rapids. At the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935, a new road was made which led direct from the main road to the Hotel, where it came to an end.

NAUJOCKS and Edith then reached the village in the mountains, and lodged at the country Inn as skiers. The next morning they both went on a skiing trip, descending the mountain, arriving towards noon at the isolated Hotel.

HUBER then warned NAUJOCKS that he would easily recognise the hotel from its transmitter type aerial. When they had both removed their skis, NAUJOCKS went round the house, noticing a "long single wire aerial" which led from the mountain side to the hotel, and then turned diagonally into the house. NAUJOCKS remarked that he was surprised by this aerial, as he was only familiar with the usual type consisting of two parallel wires running close together side by side.

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NAUJOCKS and Edith KESBACH entered the dining-room of the hotel and ordered lunch. Shortly before they had finished this meal FORMIS entered the dining-room and ordered lunch. NAUJOCKS and Edith KESBACH conversed in loud tones so that FORMIS could hear them talking German. NAUJOCKS had recognised FORMIS as soon as he entered the dining-room, from the photograph of FORMIS which HUBER had shown him.

When FORMIS had finished eating, he came over to the table where NAUJOCKS and Edith KESBACH were sitting. FORMIS introduced himself to them under a false name (forgotten by NAUJOCKS), and remarked that he was a Czech citizen of German parents. NAUJOCKS and Edith represented themselves as being on holiday and conversed with FORMIS who proved to be very pleasant company. FORMIS said that he was an inventor and that, among other things, he had invented an automatic salt cellar. FORMIS said nothing about radio.

In the afternoon they both went a walk with FORMIS, who pointed out to them the St. Johannes rapids. In order that they might have a reason for returning to this hotel, NAUJOCKS asked FORMIS about the possibilities of making future trips, over which FORMIS readily supplied information.

NAUJOCKS also ascertained that the Hotel staff consisted only of the Hotel proprietor, his wife, the waiter, the porter and two maids, FORMIS being the only guest in the hotel.

In the evening FORMIS joined them both at dinner and then retired to his own room on the first floor. The two of them occupied one room quite close to that of FORMIS, though separated by one or two guest rooms.

NAUJOCKS had been informed by HUBER that the illicit transmitter began to function towards 9.0 (perhaps 10.0) in the evening, and NAUJOCKS therefore decided to watch out to check whether FORMIS would leave his room at this time, where he would go and when he would hear the sound of transmissions.

NAUJOCKS heard FORMIS leave his room towards 9.0 in the evening and go up to the second floor (attic.) Soon afterwards NAUJOCKS heard a humming noise, from which he gathered that FORMIS had started up a motor on the second floor, and begun transmission.

In the evening before leaving the dining-room, NAUJOCKS enquired about the source of the Morava, announcing that in a few days time he would return to the hotel and drive over to these springs.

At night, NAUJOCKS admitted to Edith KESBACH that he had recognised FORMIS as a very dangerous enemy of Hitler, of the whole regime and of the Third Reich, declaring that he had to return at once to Germany to report the whereabouts of FORMIS to the German authorities.

Early the next morning, when NAUJOCKS was about to go down to breakfast, he tried first to learn where the transmitter was located. In passing the door of FORMIS' room, he noticed that it was open. NAUJOCKS saw a radio transmitter and gramophone in FORMIS' room. While a maid was cleaning the room, NAUJOCKS managed to remove unnoticed the key from the door of FORMIS' room and to take a wax impression. (NAUJOCKS had brought some wax with him for this express purpose.)

After this, NAUJOCKS and Edith KESBACH went down to breakfast, but meanwhile FORMIS had left the hotel, so that the two of them did not see him again.

Towards noon, NAUJOCKS and Edith KESBACH skied back to the Inn in the mountain village.

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At night, NAUJOCKS admitted to Edith KASBACH in the village inn, that he was in the service of the S.D. that he had been sent out to find out the location of FORMIS' transmitter, and that he must at once return to Berlin in order to deliver there the report mentioned above.

Edith KASBACH was very upset and excited, and wanted to return to Berlin on the spot, and NAUJOCKS managed to persuade her not to do this; she finally agreed to stay on at the village inn and there await NAUJOCKS' return, the latter promising that he would do so as soon as possible. NAUJOCKS is not sure whether he also admitted to Edith KASBACH on this occasion that his real name was not Hans MÜLLER but Alfred NAUJOCKS. NAUJOCKS however says that later, after the murder of FORMIS, Edith KASBACH had learned his true identity.

Journey to Berlin and back

Early next morning, NAUJOCKS drove to Prague alone in his Mercedes car, which he parked in the garage of the Alcron Hotel near the Wenzel Square. He then bought a ticket and took the next plane to Berlin.

Arriving at Berlin, NAUJOCKS at once went to see HUBER in the 8 Prinz Albrechtsstrasse office, describing to the latter in detail exactly how and where he had found FORMIS and located the transmitter.

NAUJOCKS also told HUBER that FORMIS was the only guest in the hotel, but that the Hotel staff consisted of several people and that he would therefore need help for the completion of his mission, and suggested enlisting the assistance of his friend Werner GÜTTSCHE. HUBER agreed to GÜTTSCHE but GÜTTSCHE was not in Berlin at the time, but had first to be brought back to Berlin on HUBER's orders. NAUJOCKS then asked HUBER to direct GÜTTSCHE to Prague, as soon as he returned to Berlin, and he would then call for him at the Wilson Hotel, in his Mercedes car. HUBER promised to arrange this.

NAUJOCKS stayed on another day in Berlin. During this time he had the key to the hotel room door of FORMIS made from the wax impression at the Secret Police office, and an acid solution prepared in the Secret Police laboratory, capable of corroding wires. This he intended pouring over the transmitter set in order to destroy completely its wires individually.

On the following day, NAUJOCKS flew back to Prague, collected his car from the Alcron garage and returned to the village inn to Edith KASBACH.

When he had come back to Edith KASBACH, he told her that he would have to go to the Wilson Hotel in Prague on the following day to fetch his friend from there, who would help him to destroy the V/T station. When asked whether he might not expect betrayal through KASBACH, NAUJOCKS replied Edith KASBACH belonged to him utterly and that he therefore was quite sure of her.

On the following morning, NAUJOCKS took Edith KASBACH in his Mercedes car to Prague, and there they met Werner GÜTTSCHE in the Wilson Hotel. Werner GÜTTSCHE had come to the Wilson Hotel, again, with his old pass and alias as he used before in the intended murder of Otto STRASSER. NAUJOCKS can no longer remember GÜTTSCHE's cover name, but says that it was set out in the Czech Police report.

NAUJOCKS, GÜTTSCHE and Edith KASBACH amused themselves in Prague on this day, but NAUJOCKS does not remember whether they spent the night in the Wilson Hotel or whether they returned late to the village Inn in the Roter Berg.

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On the second day of their stay at the village inn, NAUJOCKS drove with GÜTTSCHE in the Mercedes car up to the hill above the isolated hotel in which FORMIS was living. From there they both had a good view of the whole landscape, and NAUJOCKS made GÜTTSCHE familiar with the general layout of the place.

When they returned to the village, NAUJOCKS prepared an exact plan of the hotel, indicating FORMIS' room. At the same time, NAUJOCKS mentioned, however, that he could not find out where the manager and his staff slept. NAUJOCKS further told GÜTTSCHE all about the staff of the hotel and mentioned that FORMIS was the only person staying there.

NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCHE then formed the following plan, in the presence of Edith KÄSBACH for the destruction of the transmitter:

NAUJOCKS and Edith KÄSBACH should go on a trip and put up at the hotel again. As soon as darkness fell, GÜTTSCHE was to climb up by a rope into NAUJOCKS' room, in order not to be seen by anyone. GÜTTSCHE was to remain outside until NAUJOCKS gave him a signal by switching the electric light on and off quickly. To enter the hotel without being seen by the staff was out of the question as the main door of the hotel was fitted with an electrically operated bell. NAUJOCKS decided to buy a rope for this purpose the following morning in the village, and he did in fact buy a rope, which was a little stronger than a clothes line.

To carry out the plan, it was also decided to make Ing. FORMIS unconscious with the ether they had brought with them, tie him up, destroy the transmitting gear, leave Ing. FORMIS bound and unconscious in his room and not remove him to Germany, as, to kidnap him, would be too dangerous and impossible to carry out.

NAUJOCKS emphasized explicitly that he had not been ordered by HEYDRICH to murder FORMIS, but simply to put the transmitter out of action and bring FORMIS to Germany if this last should prove to be possible.

Execution of the Plan.

The next day NAUJOCKS procured the rope in the village, and towards dusk of the same day NAUJOCKS, GÜTTSCHE and Edith KÄSBACH drove away from the village inn.

NAUJOCKS took with him his German Walter pistol, 7.65 mm. calibre, loaded with 7 rounds of ammunition, the bottle of ether, and a tin of acid for melting the wires of the radio. GÜTTSCHE was not armed.

As darkness fell, the three of them drove along the new road leading down from the mountain to the isolated hotel. This road came to an end about 50 metres from the hotel. At the end of the road was a workmen's caravan for men engaged in building the road, in which roadmenders used to live. NAUJOCKS stopped the Mercedes outside the caravan, picked up his rucksack and got out of the car with Edith KÄSBACH. GÜTTSCHE also got out of the car and remained in the open.

NAUJOCKS and Edith KÄSBACH went into the hotel and were given their old room back again. As they did not see FORMIS on the way up

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to their room, they asked where he was and were told that he was not there. NAUJOCKS then remarked that he was glad that he would be able to carry out his orders to destroy the transmitter without any difficulty and that it would not be necessary to drug FORMIS.

Afterwards NAUJOCKS and Edith KASBACH went down into the dining room for dinner. A little later, however, FORMIS also came into the dining room. He greeted them both and shook hands, but behaved in a very reserved manner and sat at another table. NAUJOCKS explains that he felt very dismayed when FORMIS came in and he had a feeling that FORMIS was suspicious of him. This feeling was increased by the fact that FORMIS, who had been very taken with Edith KASBACH at their first meeting, now remained silent and made no attempt at conversation.

NAUJOCKS remarks here that what was about to happen proved his surmise to be true.

After the meal, NAUJOCKS and Edith KASBACH retired to their room and later they heard FORMIS also go into his room. About 10.30 p.m. NAUJOCKS opened the window and let down the rope, which he had attached to the window. Then NAUJOCKS gave the agreed signal with the lights and GÖTTSCHE climbed up the rope into the hotel room.

NAUJOCKS announced to GÖTTSCHE excitedly that there were difficulties in the way of the plan, as FORMIS was in the hotel. They both deliberated on the position in the presence of Edith KASBACH and then drew up the following plan:

NAUJOCKS had a duplicate key to the room of FORMIS. They were both to wait until FORMIS had left his room and gone up to the second floor. NAUJOCKS was then to open the door of FORMIS' room on the first floor with the duplicate key, have the handkerchief soaked in ether ready, and just as FORMIS came into the room, press it to his face so as to render him unconscious. In order that FORMIS could not put up any resistance, GÖTTSCHE, armed with NAUJOCKS' Walter pistol, was to wait in NAUJOCKS' room until FORMIS passed the door of NAUJOCKS' room on the way back to his own room from the second floor. Then GÖTTSCHE, holding the pistol in FORMIS' back, would force him to go into his own room without making any noise, so that NAUJOCKS could dope him. After that FORMIS was to be bound up and the transmitter completely destroyed. As in the previous plan, however, FORMIS was only to be made unconscious and left tied up in his room. NAUJOCKS and GÖTTSCHE agreed on the execution of this plan and NAUJOCKS handed his 7.65 mm Walter pistol over to GÖTTSCHE. Edith KASBACH, who was present while all this discussion was going on, appeared very nervous and was most depressed.

About 11 p.m. the three of them heard someone go up the stairs to the second floor, and presumed that this must be FORMIS going up to the second floor to switch on the power motor. The moment had then arrived to carry out their plan.

NAUJOCKS got the ether ready, put the bottle in his pocket, then went to the door of FORMIS' room. He then tried to open the door with the duplicate key, but could feel at once that FORMIS had left the real key of his room in the lock on the inside.

NAUJOCKS, after a quick decision, opened the door to find himself facing FORMIS, who was sitting in an armchair dressed in a smoking

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jacket. At that moment FORMIS drew a pistol from his jacket and fired at NAUJOCKS. The shot wounded NAUJOCKS in the right hand and the bullet went through his hand above his finger, entering above the little finger and coming out by the lowest joint of the third finger.

NAUJOCKS was unarmed and threw himself straight at FORMIS, grabbing his hand. As NAUJOCKS was trying to wrest the pistol from his hand, FORMIS shot a second time, but because his hand was being held tightly, the shot went downwards and grazed the big toe of NAUJOCKS' right foot. NAUJOCKS was wearing strong skiing boots, which lessened the effect of the shot. NAUJOCKS then tried with all his might to get FORMIS down on to the ground. As he fell, FORMIS shot a third time, but the bullet went past NAUJOCKS' head towards the ceiling. As FORMIS was now on the ground, NAUJOCKS lay on top of him and was able to grasp the pistol with which he shot at FORMIS.

NAUJOCKS explains that he does not know where he hit FORMIS. At that moment GÜTTSCHE rushed up and shot twice at FORMIS with the 7.65 mm. Walther Pistol, one bullet apparently hitting him in the head.

A trap was then set for NAUJOCKS and he was told that the post-mortem examination of the body of FORMIS had revealed that FORMIS was shot in the back, though not mortally wounded, the fatal shots then being fired from the front.

NAUJOCKS denied this emphatically and maintained that it was quite impossible as he had been face to face with FORMIS when struggling with him. He had thrown him to the ground; FORMIS lay on his back with NAUJOCKS on top of him covering FORMIS with his body. NAUJOCKS continued and said that it was not clear to him how GÜTTSCHE could have fired at FORMIS while they were in this position without wounding him (NAUJOCKS), and NAUJOCKS presumes that GÜTTSCHE shot from the side. NAUJOCKS emphasized that he could not say whether his shot or the shots fired by GÜTTSCHE had killed FORMIS.

By the time NAUJOCKS stood up, FORMIS was already dead. NAUJOCKS ran at once into his room and fetched the tin containing the acid, which he poured on to the transmitter and the gramophone. He noticed Edith KASBACH lying unconscious on the bed in his room. In order to destroy the transmitter completely, NAUJOCKS poured the ether he had with him on to the transmitter and threw a lighted match on top of it, whereupon there was an explosion.

At that moment, NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCHE heard the manager and staff coming up the stairs to the first floor. NAUJOCKS took up FORMIS' pistol and went towards them. In the meantime, the porter and the waiter had arrived at the first floor and NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCHE had forced them as well as the manager and his wife, who had rushed along, at the point of a pistol into the cellar.

NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCHE ordered everyone to remain in the cellar and not to put their heads out of the cellar window, to escape or call for help. If they failed to do this, they would all be shot. In addition, he warned the manager and his staff that the whole house was surrounded and they might all be shot.

NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCHE told the manager and staff that they still wished to make an examination on the first floor and that they would know by the automatic electric bell on the front door when they had both left the house.

Flight.

In the meantime, the apparatus and the gramophone had burnt out. NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCHE then tried to get away as quickly as

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possible and did not bother to go through FORMIS' effects.

NAUJOCKS took the pistol of Ing. FORMIS in order, as he expresses it, "to keep it as a souvenir". It was a 7.65 mm. Mauser.

They both went up to their hotel room from the cellar without going into FORMIS' room. There they found Edith KASBACH still in a dead faint, and had to shake her to revive her. NAUJOCKS was bleeding badly, moreover he had burnt his hands and the bullet wound on his right hand severely with the acid from the tin container. (Scars on his hand are still visible today).

Then the three made their getaway. NAUJOCKS threw the rucksack out of the window and they let themselves down the rope. The rope was left behind. They all got into the Mercedes-car and drove off in the direction of Prague as quickly as possible.

NAUJOCKS cannot remember exactly whether he bandaged his hand in the hotel bedroom or in the car, but he is certain he used a lady's handkerchief to bind it up, which he threw into the Moldau during the journey, as it was soaked with blood. He then bound it up again using cleaning rags.

NAUJOCKS, GÜTTSCHE and Edith KASBACH then drove on to Prague without a stop. On the way NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCHE discussed the possibilities of escape. They were well aware of the danger of their position, but they did not wish to expose Edith KASBACH to the possibility of arrest by the Czech police and therefore decided to set her down at Prague and send her back to Berlin by express train. Edith KASBACH's nerves had completely gone to pieces, but it was impossible for one of them to accompany her to Berlin because they had to get the Mercedes car into Germany. Another point was that only NAUJOCKS could drive and he was in great pain caused by his wound and the acid burns.

The three reached Prague and drove straight to the station, where they arrived about 20 minutes before the express train left for Berlin. NAUJOCKS can no longer remember the name of the station, nor whether Edith bought the ticket herself or whether GÜTTSCHE did it for her. He is certain, however, that he remained in the car because his wound was bleeding profusely.

Then NAUJOCKS and GÜTTSCHE drove on to Schneeberg on the German border, by the same route as NAUJOCKS had used on the inward journey.

NAUJOCKS remembers that in Teplice Sanov (Teplitz Schönan) at about 3 o'clock in the morning the petrol ran out. They met a policeman in the town, who helped them to get petrol and himself woke up the owner of the petrol station.

NAUJOCKS had arranged with EDITH that he would come and see her as soon as he got to Berlin. If he did not come, she could take it as a sign that he had not succeeded in escaping.

The two of them drove on to the border without a stop and reached the Czech frontier control at Schneeberg at about 4 o'clock. The customs house was not lit up and the street was blocked by customs barriers. NAUJOCKS switched off the engine and drove down to the customs barrier, where he stopped the car. They both got out of the car, took their luggage and crossed the Czech-German border on foot without being seen by the Czech frontier control.

Continuation of Journey to Berlin and Report to HEYDRICH.

When they reached the customs house on the German side, they both produced their passports and NAUJOCKS explained that he needed

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a doctor at once as he had hurt his hand while repairing his car. NAUJOCKS adds that neither he nor GÖTTSCHE said they were members of the SD, but just ordinary tourists. NAUJOCKS at once rang up the hospital in the next village and reported that he had been injured, whereupon the hospital immediately sent an ambulance to the frontier post. In the meantime NAUJOCKS ordered the Mercedes car to be brought over the frontier first thing in the morning (while the barrier was open) and he requested the frontier station to provide a skilled driver from the village for this purpose.

NAUJOCKS and GÖTTSCHE then drove to hospital in the ambulance and NAUJOCKS' wounds were treated and bandaged. By this time it was morning, and between 7 and 8 o'clock they were both taken back to the frontier control station in the ambulance, where the Mercedes car was already standing on the German side.

NAUJOCKS and GÖTTSCHE then drove straight to Berlin, where NAUJOCKS went first to Edith KÄSBACH's house. Edith KÄSBACH was in a state of complete nervous collapse, but she was pleased that NAUJOCKS had managed to escape.

Afterwards NAUJOCKS drove to 8 Prinz Albrechtstrasse, where he immediately reported to HEYDRICH personally. NAUJOCKS announced the execution of his orders, that he had destroyed the transmitter completely, and that in the course of this, FORMIS had been shot. HEYDRICH was very pleased that his plan had been thoroughly successful and remarked that the fact that FORMIS had been shot was not a serious matter. NAUJOCKS also told HEYDRICH that, in spite of the fact that he had forbidden him to do so, he had taken Edith KÄSBACH with him to afford better camouflage, but HEYDRICH was so pleased at the good results of the plot, that he did not object.

Reward.

When questioned about the reward he received from HEYDRICH for carrying out this task, NAUJOCKS explained that he did not receive monetary compensation, but that he and GÖTTSCHE were given the rank of Unter- or Obersturmführer.

NAUJOCKS and GÖTTSCHE received allowances and travelling expenses for confidential missions, and they reckoned up how much money they had actually paid out. The remainder of the money they had taken with them they then handed back.

Motive for carrying out HEYDRICH's Mission.

Questioned as to what Ing. Rudolf FORMIS had done to NAUJOCKS, the more so since NAUJOCKS had not known him personally, and what occasioned NAUJOCKS to carry out this mission without question and thereby expose himself to danger, NAUJOCKS replied that he was a convinced and absolutely fanatical National Socialist who obeyed blindly the orders of his superiors and that the idea of an attack on Adolf HITLER or treason against him appeared to him as an unforgivable crime.

NAUJOCKS, however, does not forget here to stress the fact that he did not murder FORMIS, but that he acted in self defence and that he does not know who actually shot FORMIS, himself or GÖTTSCHE.

The Motive for NAUJOCKS' Change of Views.

Asked for the reason why he had freely admitted here in England to carrying out the deed in question, NAUJOCKS volunteered the following:

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- a) At the end of 1940 or beginning of 1941 when NAUJOCKS was demoted to an SS Mann, he felt the effect of the Nazi regime on himself, and this caused him to reflect on it, and then to abhor the whole Nazi regime.
- b) Then when NAUJOCKS was sent to the Russian Front with the "Adolf Hitler Leibstandarte" artillery regiment, he went through a time of great suffering there, and this served to increase his loathing for the regime.

After being questioned on the reasons which led to his being demoted, NAUJOCKS declared that he loathed HEYDRICH's deeds and remarked that HEYDRICH had become far worse than HIMMLER, that he was a genius among criminals and a devil in human form, and planned unendingly, in the manner of a genius, the most unbelievable crimes right down to the smallest detail, with a cold, sneering and cynical smile and then handed over the carrying out of his plans to members of the SD, who were forced to carry out their orders, or were otherwise subjected to the severest punishments.

NAUJOCKS also stated that once a person became involved with SD services, he was lost for ever, was always called upon to carry out fresh duties, and must always obey if he wanted to save his life.

NAUJOCKS also explained that he had fallen out with HEYDRICH, because in 1940, while he (NAUJOCKS) was still Leiter of the "Technical Department" of the SD Amt VI B (later VI) he refused to obey HEYDRICH's order to set up a "bacteriological breeding department" because in a devilish manner HEYDRICH had informed him that he intended to infect various people with these bacteria.

Further HEYDRICH had ordered NAUJOCKS to liquidate two other people for him in Berlin; these were BERNDT, of the Propaganda Ministry and another official from Gau Berlin (name forgotten), who worked for GOEBBELS' information service. These two men stood in HEYDRICH's way and were his personal enemies. NAUJOCKS declined to undertake the mission, though not directly, but by stating that at the time he was indisposed and therefore not in a position to carry out this mission.

NAUJOCKS stated that his own conscience made him wish to stand aside and this same conscience had forced him to reveal all he knew, even though he was aware that he himself was in danger of being tried and sentenced. Therefore, he confessed to the part he took in the FORMIS affair, which deed, however, his conscience did not view as murder, but only as an act of self-defence.

Further, NAUJOCKS touches lightly on having carried out the staging of the frontier incidents on the German-Polish border which, immediately prior to the outbreak of war in the year 1939, had been ordered by HEYDRICH, in which a doctor of the Adolf Hitler Leibstandarte murdered the inmates of concentration camps by means of injections, then dressed the corpses up in German uniforms and laid them about in various positions on the Polish frontier. The corpses were then fired on, thus enabling the blame for Polish frontier incidents to be laid on the Poles.

NAUJOCKS also mentioned that he had arranged and carried out the kidnapping of the two British Secret Service officers at Venlo in Holland. Here NAUJOCKS was asked how it happened that the German newspapers and propaganda could accuse these two British officers of planning and executing the "Munich Bierkeller Plot", when NAUJOCKS himself was in a position to know that these two officers at the time of the plot had languished in prison for a long time. NAUJOCKS

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explained that he had learnt from the SD that the perpetrator of the Bierkeller plot had been a mad Swabian technician, who had invented a bomb with a clockwork delay action fuse and that he assumed this attempt would be laid at the door of the two British officers, in order to intensify the hate against the British.

NAUJOCKS was then questioned about the ROEHM affair and stated that at that time he was only an SS man and chauffeur. On that particular day he drove a car in which the arrested persons were taken first to the police station in Berlin and later to the Lichtenfeld barracks, where they were mown down by machine guns.

When questioned about the Reichstag fire, NAUJOCKS said he had had nothing to do with it, but he must certainly possess some information about it which he learnt from his colleagues in the SS.

NAUJOCKS will be examined on the details of the foregoing crimes separately.

NAUJOCKS added that his loathing for the regime and the SD became stronger and stronger. At the beginning of 1942 when he was released from the Waffen SS on account of stomach ulcers, he was afraid he would be called up again into the SD. He therefore tried to get away from the SD altogether and start a new life.

For this purpose he went to Prague in April 1942, about a week before the murder of HEYDRICH. He stayed in a hotel in the Wenzelplatz and tried to see HEYDRICH at the Town Hall. HEYDRICH made him wait for three days in vain and was unwilling to see him. Only through the assistance of HEYDRICH's adjutant was he able to see HEYDRICH. NAUJOCKS asked HEYDRICH to release him from the SD and to allow him to work for the Organisation TODT. He stated that his reason for wishing this was that he was ill, that he was suffering from chronic stomach ulcers and that he had become embittered through having been demoted. He therefore wanted to begin a new life and have nothing to do with politics in the future.

HEYDRICH was furious. At first he reprimanded NAUJOCKS, but finally promised that he would release him.

NAUJOCKS here explained that his demotion had been quite unjustified and had been carried out by HEYDRICH for revenge. False accusations had been made against him such as various failures, embezzlement, acts of disobedience, etc. which had led finally to his loss of rank.

NAUJOCKS also stated that HEYDRICH was trying to get rid of him. When it was suggested that HEYDRICH could easily have had him killed in Berlin, or even had him shot in his own (HEYDRICH's) office, NAUJOCKS replied that this could not have been done because he (NAUJOCKS) was far too well known in Berlin.

When a week later HEYDRICH was shot in Prague, NAUJOCKS and many of his colleagues in the SD were glad that HEYDRICH had got what he deserved and "they all breathed again", as NAUJOCKS expressed it.

NAUJOCKS also mentioned that his friend Werner GÜTTSCHE, a Sturm-bannführer in the SD, who latterly worked for the SD in Vienna, gradually came round to the same opinion as himself and is now very anti-Nazi, although he still belongs to the SD.

NAUJOCKS stated that his last service was with the military administration in Brussels, where he had to combat the Black Market as

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as a civilian, although, as he himself admits, he was himself obliged to buy in the Black Market to supply his own necessities.

After the invasion of France and Belgium, NAUJOCKS took his Dienststelle to Berlin. He got leave and drove to Vienna, where he got in touch with Werner GÜTTSCH. Afterwards he carried out the previously prepared plan for coming over to the Allies.

Visit of the Slovak Delegation to GOERING.

A few days before Czecho-Slovakia was occupied by the Germans (before the 15th March 1939) NAUJOCKS was ordered by the SD to meet a Slovak delegation at Tempelhof aerodrome and take them to see GOERING.

NAUJOCKS received this delegation, which consisted of 5 or 6 people. NAUJOCKS remembers the following names of persons taking part therein:-

TUKA, Bela
KARMASIN
KIRCHBAUM
MACH Sano
DURCANSKY.

NAUJOCKS first took the delegation to the SD and then accompanied them to the Air Ministry to be received by GOERING.

NAUJOCKS was present throughout the interview. The Slovak Delegation were requesting GOERING to grant them "Protection, support and economic help for an independent Slovak State". GOERING hardly let the Delegation say a word and spoke during the whole of the interview, which lasted between half an hour and an hour. He continually tried to put the Delegation off and explained that the time was not yet ripe.

It was clear from the faces of the delegates that they were not in agreement with GOERING's declarations and were not satisfied with the results of their discussion.

NAUJOCKS adds that this was particularly obvious in the case of DURCANSKY, who later on, as a result, resigned from the Government.

Possible SD Contacts in Czecho-Slovakia.

NAUJOCKS was asked whether the SD had ever in the course of his missions in Czecho-Slovakia given him the names of any contacts, either private individuals or official German representatives. (Legation, Consulate, etc.)

NAUJOCKS stated that he never went into the German Legation nor the German Consulate, nor did he have anything to do with any German official representatives in Czecho-Slovakia. NAUJOCKS added that the missions assigned to him had to remain absolutely secret and were of such a nature that he could not expose any German official representatives to possible compromise.

In the case of FORMIS, only those taking part knew about it, while in the plan for the murder of Otto STRASSER, the German agent of HUBER, who lived in the Hotel Julis, was given instructions and therefore knew of the plan.

SECRET.

TOP SECRET

CAMP 020.

10 MAR 1945

REPORT dated.....9.3.45.....

165a

NAUJOCKS

1. Will you please refer to the interrogation of NAUJOCKS by the Czech authorities, at Camp 001, on 5.3.45. and to W.R. C. (Captain Noakes') memorandum of 7.3.45. on this subject.

2. NAUJOCKS has now submitted a statement covering the points on which the Czech officer who examined him requested he should write. A translation of this document is attached hereto.

Also attached is a specimen of NAUJOCKS' handwriting, in the form of a poem by him found among his property.

3. It is understood that the interrogating officer, Captain Wiesner, will send a summary of the interrogation to W.R.C. in due course.

Forwell.

For Colonel Stephens.

Enclosure:

1. Translation of statement by NAUJOCKS on 8.3.45.
2. Paper taken from NAUJOCKS' Intelligence Dossier.

/MR.

SECRET.

CAMP 020.

168 b
796

REPORT dated.....21st.March.1945.....

NAUJOCKS

Will you please refer to B.I.B.
(Mr. Milmo's) memorandum of 15.3.45, enclosing
a copy of the report of the Czech interrogation
of NAUJOCKS dated 5.3.45. This is returned
herewith together with five copies of the
translation as requested.

With reference to paragraph 2 of
Mr. Milmo's memorandum a specimen of NAUJOCK's
handwriting was forwarded with our Y.P. dated
9.3.45.

M. Dandison
For Colonel Stephens.

PAB.

✓
5/16/45

For Mr. ROBSON-SCOTT:London, 6.3.1945.V e r h ö r

168B(1)

des reichsdeutschen Staatsangehörigen Alfred NAUJOCKS, durchgeführt
am 5.3.1945 in der Central Oratory School in London.

Personaldaten:

Alfred NAUJOCKS, reichsdeutscher Staatsangehöriger,
geb. 20.9.1911 in Kiel, ledig, von Beruf ausgebildeter
medizin. Instrumenten Mechaniker (Feinmechaniker),
Angehöriger der Allgemeinen SS, Waffen SS und des SD.

Anverwandte: Vater: Richard NAUJOCKS, 62 Jahre alt, Besitzer eines
Drogistengeschäftes (auch technische Gele) in
Kiel, Flensburger Strasse No. 64, jetzt wohnhaft
bei seiner Tochter Anni KLAUSEN in Bad Segeberg,
Moltke Strasse 13.
Mutter: Terese geborene PAHLKE, 60 Jahre alt, mit Vater.
Schwestern: Anni KLAUSEN, Adresse vorstehend.
Herta NAUJOCKS, 36 Jahre alt, ledig, Steno-
typistin in Oberschlesien.

Naujocks Braut: Klara BONSEN, 33 Jahre alt, wohnhaft Bruxelles, Rue de
Luxembourg No. 18, (war mit einem Hollän-
der verheiratet.)

Schulbildung: keine Vorschule, sondern 8 Jahre Ober-Realschule bis
zur Tertia in Kiel. Trat 1925 aus der Schule aus und
lernte das Feinmechaniker-Handwerk.

Sprachenkenntnisse: nur deutsch.

Parteilzugehörigkeit: seit 1.8.1931, Partei Nummer um 700.000 herum.
Zugehörigkeit zur Allgem. SS gleichfalls seit 1.8.1931:
SS No. 26.240.

Eintritt in den SD: im Frühjahr 1934 mit dem Range eines Scharführers.
Im Laufe der Zeit zum Sturmbannführer (Major) der
Allgemeinen SS befördert und anfangs Jänner 1941
wegen Zwistigkeiten mit Heydrich und falschen
Anschuldigungen wegen Unterschlagungen, Feigheit,
Befehlsverweigerung degradiert und als einfacher
SS Mann zur "SS Adolf Hitler Leibstandarte,
Artillerie Regiment" an die Ostfront transferiert.

Ueberprüfung NAUJOCKS Zugehörigkeit zur SS:

NAUJOCKS ist am linkem Oberarm mit seiner Blutgruppen-
Zugehörigkeit "A" in blauer Farbe tätowiert.

Anmerkung: Sämtliche Angehörige der Allgemeinen SS und der Waffen SS,
demzufolge auch Angehörige des SD und der Gestapo sind am linkem
Oberarm mit ihrer zugehörigen Blutgruppe tätowiert. - Die Deutschen
unterscheiden folgende Blutgruppen: A, B, AB und O. //.

2.

Die Angehörigen der SS, etc. werden nun mit blauer Farbe mit den betreffenden Blutgruppen Buchstaben z.B. A in Grösse von etwa 8 bis 10 mm an der Innenseite des linken Oberarmes, vor dem Haarsatz der Achselhöhle tätowiert. Die ganz alten, bezw. ersten Angehörigen der SS haben manchmal auch ihre ganze SS No. tätowiert.

Diese Tätowierung ist ein geheimes Abzeichen ihrer Zugehörigkeit zur SS und dient bei einer geglückten Flucht z.B. als Legitimation, wenn der Betreffende wieder in den deutschen Linien eintrifft. Ausserdem geniessen diese Angehörigen der SS den Vorrang bei ärztlicher Behandlung bei einer Verwundung.

Es kommt oft vor, dass Angehörige der SS vor ihrer Gefangennahme Uniformen einer Wehrmachts Einheit anziehen, um nicht als SS erkannt zu werden. Solche Gefangene haben selbstverständlich auch ihre Soldbücher vernichtet, können aber leicht auf Grund der Tätowierung am linkem Oberarm überführt werden.

Decknamen, welche NAUJOCKS im Laufe seiner SD Tätigkeit benützte:

Hans MÜLLER : Unter diesem Namen reiste Naujocks mit auf diesen Namen ausgestellten Reisepass nach der CSR.

alias

Alfred BONSEN (Namen seiner Braut in Bruxelles).

alias

Rudolf MÖBERT. Diesen Namen verwendete Naujocks als Briefanschrift für Korrespondenz unter der Adresse: Berlin, No. 41 (?) Jerusalemer Strasse.

Naujocks Tätigkeiten in der CSR:

1.) Geplante Ermordung Otto STRASSER's in Prag gegen Ende 1934.

Etwa 3 Monate vor der Ermordung des Ing. Formis in Záhřeb wurde NAUJOCKS zu SS-Obergruppenführer HEYDRICH in die Geschäftsstelle des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS (SD) in Berlin, Prinz Albrechtsstrasse No. 8 beordert, wo ihm HEYDRICH persönlich den Auftrag gab nach Prag zu reisen und dort Otto STRASSER zu erschiessen. Als Grund hiefür gab Heydrich den Verrat Otto Strasser's an Hitler und der Partei an. HEYDRICH verwies NAUJOCKS wegen weiterer Details zur Durchführung des Mordes an HUBER, welcher damals Abteilungsleiter der Gestapo war. HUBER ist ein gebürtiger Bayer und ist jetzt Inspekteur und Leiter der Stapo Wien.

HUBER, HEYDRICH, HIMMLER und MÜLLER dienten vorher gemeinsam bei der "Bayrischen politischen Polizei" und waren miteinander befreundet.

Naujocks suchte nun HUBER auf, welcher ihn über die Tätigkeit Otto STRASSER's in Prag, sowie über die "Schwarze Front" unterrichtete und ihm auch die Personen aus der Umgebung STRASSER's nannte, wobei die Namen MAHR und ADAM fielen. (Später erfuhr Naujocks dass MAHR und ADAM im Dienste HUBERs standen und in die "Schwarze Front" eingeschmuggelt wurden. -- HUBER unterrichtete auch Naujocks

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über die Lebensgewohnheiten Otto STRASSER's und verwies schliesslich Naujocks an einen seiner Agenten in Prag, welcher im Hotel Julis in Prag wohnte. Huber gab Naujocks den Namen dieses Agenten, doch hat Naujocks diesen Namen vergessen. Dieser Agent stand in direkter Verbindung mit Otto Strasser, was Huber ausdrücklich betonte.

Naujocks beschreibt diesen Agenten, wie folgt:

Personalbeschreibung: etwa 163 cm hoch, längliches ovales Gesicht, mit hervorspringender Nase (jüdischer Art), auffallend weisse, bleiche Gesichtsfarbe, Hornbrille, lange schwarze Haare nach rückwärts gekämmt, langen starken schwarzen Schnurrbart mit herunterhängenden Spitzen, schmale Figur, die Schultern sehr stark ausgepolstert, leiser Stimme und schlechter Körperhaltung (nach vorn gebeugt), mit bayrischem Dialekte sprechend, wichtig tuend, sehr viel sprechend und sich, wie ein Film Spion benehmend.

Huber gab auch Naujocks die Wohnungsadresse STRASSER's, sowie das Cafehaus bekannt, wo STRASSER zu verkehren pflegte. Naujocks ersuchte Huber um Erlaubnis zu dieser Aktion seinen Freund Werner GÖTTSCHE (Götttsch), gleichfalls Angehöriger des SD mitzunehmen, welcher ein Landsmann Naujocks ist, ein halbes Jahr jünger als Naujocks und gleichfalls aus Kiel stammt.

Naujocks und Götttsch fuhren sofort nach Prag ab. Naujocks mit einem falschem Reisepass auf den Namen Hans Müller, Kaufmann und Götttsche, gleichfalls auf falschen Pass. - Naujocks hat den Decknamen Götttsch es vergessen, doch meint er, dieser Name sei derselbe der im cs. Polizeibericht nach der Ermordung Ing. Formis angeführt wurde. Naujocks und Götttsche stiegen im Hotel Wilson neben dem Wilson Bahnhof ab und blieben etwa 3 bis 4 Tage in Prag.

Naujocks hatte eine sogenannte Vestentaschenpistole, Kaliber 6,35 mm mit, mit welcher er die Tat auszuführen gedachte. Götttsche hatte dieselbe Waffe.

Naujocks und Götttsche besuchten nun diesen vorbeschriebenen deutschen Agenten Huber's im Julis Hotel am Wenzelsplatz, doch mussten sie etwa 10 Minuten warten, weil dieser gerade ein Mädchen bei sich hatte. Dieser unbekannte Agent scheint im alten rückwärtigen Trakte des Hotel Julis gewohnt zu haben, weil Naujocks das Hotelzimmer als dunkel, bezw. düster beschreibt.

Dieser unbekannte Agent schilderte nun Beiden die Lebensgewohnheiten Strassers und seiner Umgebung, sowie die Treffpunkte der Schwarzen Front und nannte auch die Namen deren Mitglieder.

Naujocks besuchten nun diesen Mann etwa 5 mal im Hotelzimmer, doch gab dieser Agent stets andere Mitteilungen, das heisst er widersprach sich bei jeder Unterredung mit seinen vorherigen Angaben, tat sehr überhebend und benahm sich wie ein Filmspion, den Beiden die Erschiessung als einfache Sache vorstellend. Dieser Agent betonte auch stets, dass er mit Strasser in direktem Kontakt stehe.

Naujocks und Götttsche misstrauten nun diesem Agenten und beschlossen von der Durchführung der Ermordung Strasser's abzukommen und lieber unverrichteter Dinge nach Berlin zurückzukehren. Naujocks und Götttsche sahen bei diesem Aufenthalte in Prag Otto Strasser nur einmal, als dieser gerade ein Cafehaus in einer Seitenstrasse des Wenzelsplatzes betrat, doch gingen sie ihm nicht nach.

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Naujocks bemerkt, dass er und Göttisch in ihrem Entschluss Strasser nicht zu ermorden auch dadurch bestärkt wurden, dass Strasser ein anständiger Mensch, ein guter Deutscher und für sie Beide auch ein Begriff und eine Persönlichkeit war. Sie kannten Strasser seit früher, als noch Strasser in öffentlichen Versammlungen als Redner auftrat.

Naujocks und Göttisch fuhren nun unverrichteter Dinge nach Berlin zurück. Am nächsten Tage meldete sich Naujocks bei Heydrich und meldete, dass er von der Erschiessung Strasser's Abstand genommen habe, weil dieser Auftrag nicht so ausgeführt werden konnte, wie sich ihn der Prager unbekannte Agent vortstellte. Ausserdem hätten die Informationen des Prager Agenten nicht gestimmt und habe dieser Agent sich bei jeder Zusammenkunft widersprochen, sodass er und Göttisch diesem Manne misstraut haben.

Heydrich beschimpfte Naujocks, nannte ihn einen Feigling und Schweinehund und sagte, er werde dies Himmler melden und werde Naujocks bald zu fühlen bekommen, was es heisse, wenn man empfangene Befehle nicht ausführe.

2.) Ermordung des Ing. Rudolf FORMIS im Hotel in Záhřeb:

Ende Jänner oder anfangs Februar 1935 wurde Naujocks abermals in die Kanzlei Heydrich's befohlen, wo ihm Heydrich mitteilte, dass er ihn zur Durchführung einer Aktion bestimmt habe, durch welche Aktion er ihm die letzte Chance gebe sich zu rehabilitieren, nachdem er im Falle Otto Strasser's so versagt habe.

Heydrich teilte nun Naujocks mit, dass sich in der ČSR ein Schwarzsender befinde, welcher der Partei grosse Unannehmlichkeiten bereite. Die Reichsregierung habe über das Post Ministerium bereits wiederholt die cs. Regierung unter Angabe des beiläufigen Standortes dieses Schwarzsenders ersucht, diesen Sender ausser Betrieb zu setzen, weil dieser Sender offen zu Attentaten gegen Adolf Hitler auffordere und gegen die Nazipartei Propaganda betreibe. - Diese Interventionen bei den cs. Behörden seien jedoch ohne jeden Erfolg geblieben.

Heydrich teilte Naujocks auch weiters mit, dass seine Nachforschungen ergeben haben, dass der Sprecher in diesem Schwarzsender ein gewisser Ing. Rudolf FORMIS sei, welcher ursprünglich Sendeleiter beim Stuttgarter Sender gewesen war und jetzt zur "Schwarzen Front" Otto Strasser's gehöre.

Heydrich befahl nun ausdrücklich Naujocks sich mit HUBER in Verbindung zu setzen, welcher ihm alle erforderlichen Instruktionen erteilen werde und welcher mit allen Nachforschungen nach dem Standorte dieses Senders betraut sei.

Heydrich bemerkte noch, dass er wiederholt wegen dieses Senders von Himmler und Goering Anpiffe (Auschimpfe) erhalten habe und befahl nun Heydrich dem Naujocks nach der ČSR zu reisen, den Sender ausfindig zu machen, ihn vollständig zu zerstören und wenn möglich Ing. FORMIS lebend nach Deutschland zu verschleppen, bzw. mitzubringen. Den Befehl Ing. FORMIS umzulegen, bzw. zu erschiessen, gab Heydrich nicht.

Naujocks fragte nun Heydrich, ob er der besseren Tarnung halber seine Freundin, welche vollkommen verlässlich sei mitnehmen

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durfe, doch verbot ihm dies Heydrich ausdrücklich mit der Bemerkung, dass er keine Weibergeschichten in einer solchen Aktion dulde.

Heydrich verwarnte Naujocks nochmals ausdrücklich diesmal seinen Befehl auszuführen, widrigenfalls er ihn wegen Feigheit bestrafen werde. Sodann entliess Heydrich Naujocks.

Naujocks hatte nun in den nächsten Tagen 2 Unterredungen mit Huber, beide im Gebäude, wo Heydrich seine Kanzlei hatte und unterrichtete Naujocks dahin, dass er ihm ein Lichtbild des Ing. FORMIS zeigte und ihm 2 Orte in der CSR auf der Mappe zeigte, welche als Standort in Betracht kamen. Der eine Ort war Zahori, den Namen des anderen Ortes hat Naujocks vergessen. Huber wiederholte nun den Befehl Heydrichs den Sender zu zerstören und nach Möglichkeit Ing. Formis nach Deutschland mitzubringen. Naujocks ersuchte nun Huber um die Bewilligung seine Freundin zwecks besserer Tarnung (harmloses Liebespaar) mitnehmen zu dürfen. Huber widersprach nicht, woran Naujock ersah, dass Huber nichts dagegen habe.

Es handelte sich bei dieser Freundin um Edith Käsbach, damals ledig, von Beruf Gymnastik-Lehrerin (erteilte Privatstunden), wohnhaft im Eckhaus, Berlin, Rüdeshheimer Platz - Eingang ins Haus von der Ecke Wiesbadenerstrasse. - Frl. Edith Käsbach war streng katholisch und keine Nazistin. -- Sie unterhielt ein Liebesverhältnis zu Naujock, welchen sie jedoch nur unter seinem Decknamen Hans Müller, selbstständiger Kaufmann in technischen Artikeln, kannte. Frl. Käsbach war Naujock absolut hörig und wohnte Naujock auch zu dieser Zeit mit der Käsbach in ihrer vorgenannten Wohnung. Frl. Käsbach war die Tochter eines Künstlers und war sie sehr exzentrisch und künstlerisch veranlagt.

Nach dem Morde an Formis brach Frl. Edith Käsbach nervlich vollkommen zusammen, bekam einen kompletten Nervenschock und wurde lange Zeit vom Nervenarzt Dr. Müller, Psychoanalytiker in Berlin behandelt. Naujocks löste dann seine Beziehungen zu Edith Käsbach und heiratete später Edith Käsbach einen Schweizer Staatsbürger, mit welchem sie jetzt in der Schweiz lebt. Ihren heutigen Namen und ihren Aufenthalt kennt Naujocks nicht. Das Alter der Käsbach gibt Naujock heute mit etwa 35 bis 36 Jahren an.

Naujocks bemerkt hierzu, dass die in den cs. Tageszeitungen veröffentlichten Nachforschungen der cs. Polizei über die durchgeführte Erschiessung des Ing. Formis zum Grossteile stimmten. Jedoch habe die cs. Polizei angenommen, dass Edith Käsbach hierbei schwer verwundet wurde und diesen Verwundungen auf der Flucht auf deutschem Boden erlegen sei. Ausserdem sei der cs. Polizei ein Lesefehler unterlaufen und habe sie den Namen der Edith mit KERSBACH angegeben.

6.

Vorbereitungen zur Ausführung der Tat:

Ueber Auftrag HUBER's wurde Naujocks von der Geheimen Staatspolizei Berlin ein diesem Amte gehörendes Auto zur Verfügung gestellt. Es war dies ein Mercedes Wagen, dunkelblauer Farbe, Viersitzer, mit einer Kieler Auto Nummer versehen.

Naujocks besorgte sich eine Flasche Aether, um damit Ing. Formis zu betäuben. Ferner vorbereitete sich Naujocks eine automatische Walter Pistole Kaliber 7,65 mm, mit 7 Schuss.

Sodann lud Naujocks Edith Käsbach zu einer Ski-Partie in die cs. Berge in der Umgebung von Prag ein, was diese mit Freuden annahm.

Abreise und Nachforschungen an Ort und Stelle in Záhoří:

Naujocks fuhr nun mit Edith Käsbach im blauen Mercedes Wagen mit ihrem Gepäck in Rucksäcken und Skiern von Berlin über Dresden und den Schneeberg nach Prag, wo Beide im Wilson Hotel (neben Wilson Bahnhof) abstiegen und sich dort polizeilich anmeldeten. Naujocks trug sich als Hans Müller ein, auf diesen Namen lautete auch sein Reisepass, während sich Edith mit ihrem richtigen Namen Käsbach eintrug.

Auf die Zwischenfrage, ob durch die richtige Namengeintragung der Edith Käsbach nicht eine Gefahr bestand, dass die cs. Polizei leicht die Person Naujocks ermitteln könnte, erwiderte Naujocks, dass keine Gefahr bestand, da Edith Käsbach ihn stets nur unter dem Namen Hans Müller kannte.

Naujocks und Edith Käsbach übernachteten nun im Wilson Hotel und fuhren am nächsten Tage von Praha in der Richtung Stehčovice nach einem Dorfe, dessen Namen Naujocks vergessen hat. Es kann sich in diesem Falle nur um die Ortschaft "Slaty" oder die Ortschaft "Zahorí" handeln.

Hiebei ist zu bemerken, dass Naujocks von Huber 2 Orte angegeben erhielt, in welchen er den Sender zu suchen hatte. - Es ist anzunehmen, dass beide Ortschaften Zahorí hiessen, weil es noch ein zweites Zahorí in der Nähe von Pisek gibt.

Naujocks hatte die Absicht vorerst in der ihm angegebene n am nächsten liegenden Ortschaft zu suchen und dies war eben Zahorí an der Vltava (Moldau). -- Sowohl die Ortschaft Slaty, als auch das Dorf Zahorí liegen am Berge (Roter Berg). -- Das Hotel Zahorí, in welchem Formis ermordet wurde, ein einzelstehendes Gebäude an den Berg gelehnt, liegt ganz in der Einöde, etwa 50 Meter von der Moldau entfernt, an der Stelle wo die Moldau die bekannten "St. Johannis Stromschnellen" bildet. Ende 1934 und anfangs 1935 wurde eine neue Strasse gebaut, welche von der Landstrasse direkt zum Hotel führt und dort endet.

Naujocks und Edith kamen nun in dem Dorfe am Berge an und quartierten sich als Ski-Touristen im Dorfwirtshaus ein. Am nächsten Morgen machten Beide eine Skitour, wobei sie den Berg herunter fuhren und gegen Mittag in das einzelstehende Hotel kamen.

Naujocks war von Huber aufmerksam gemacht worden, dass er das Hotel leicht an der Antenne (Sender) erkennen werde. Als nun Beide die Skier abgenommen hatten, ging Naujocks um das Haus herum

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und bemerkte eine " lange Eindraht-Antenne ", welche vom Berge zum Hotel führte und dann schräg ins Haus abzweigte.--Naujocks bemerkte hiezu, dass ihm diese Antenne auffiel, weil er nur normale Antennen aus 2 in kurzer Entfernung parallel laufenden Drähten kannte.

Naujocks und Edith Käsbach betraten das Speisezimmer des Hotels und bestellten Mittagessen.--Kurz bevor sie ihr Mittagessen beendeten, betrat Ing. Formis das Speisezimmer und bestellte sein Mittagessen.---Naujocks und Edith Käsbach unterhielten sich laut, sodass Formis sie deutsch sprechen hörte.--Naujocks hatte Formis bei seinem Betreten des Speisezimmers, nach der ihm von Huber gezeigten Photographie des Formis sofort erkannt.

Nachdem Formis sein Essen beendet hatte, kam er an den Tisch, an welchem Naujocks und Edith Käsbach saßen.--Formis stellte sich unter einem falschem Namen vor (Naujocks hat diesen Namen vergessen) und bemerkte, dass er cs. Staatsbürger von deutschen Eltern sei.--Naujocks und Edith gaben sich als Ausflügler aus und unterhielten sich mit Formis, welcher ein sehr angenehmer Gesellschafter war.--Formis erzählte, dass er Erfinder sei und dass er unter anderen auch ein selbsttätiges Salzfläschchen erfunden habe.--Ueber Radio-Sachen sprach Formis nicht.

Am Nachmittage machten die Beiden einen gemeinsamen Spaziergang mit Formis, welcher ihnen auch die St. Johannes Stromschnellen zeigte.--Um einen Grund für ein Wiederkommen nach diesem Hotele zu haben, erkundigte sich Naujocks bei Formis über die eventuellen Ausflugsmöglichkeiten und gab ihm Formis bereitwillig Auskunft.

Naujocks stellte auch fest, dass das ganze Hotelpersonal aus dem Wirten, seiner Gattin, dem Kellner, einem Hausknecht und 2 Dienstmädchen bestand und dass Ing. Formis der einzige Gast im Hotel war.

Am Abend nahm Formis das Abendessen gemeinsam mit den Beiden ein und zog sich auf sein Zimmer im ersten Stock zurück. Die Beiden hatten ein gemeinsames Zimmer, ganz in der Nähe von Formis Zimmer, etwa durch ein oder zwei Gastzimmer getrennt.

Naujocks war durch Huber informiert, dass der Schwarzsender gegen 9 (vielleicht 10 Uhr abends) Uhr abends zu arbeiten beginne und so beschloss Naujocks nun anzupassen, ob Ing. Formis sein Zimmer zu dieser Zeit verlassen werde, wohin er sich begeben und wann er eventuelle Sendegeräusche höre.

Naujocks hörte Formis gegen 9 Uhr abends sein Zimmer verlassen und in den 2. Stock (Dachmansarde) hinaufgehen. Bald darauf hörte auch Naujocks ein Summen, woraus er entnahm, dass Formis im 2. Stock einen Motor angelassen habe und mit der Sendung begonnen hatte.

Am Abend vor dem Verlassen des Speisezimmers erkundigte sich noch Naujocks über die Moldauquellen und meinte dann, dass er in einigen Tagen wieder nach dem Hotel kommen und dann auch zu diesen Quellen fahren werde.

~~Am nächsten Morgen~~ ^{Naujocks} In der Nacht gestand ~~er~~ nun Edith Käsbach, dass ~~er~~ in Formis einen sehr gefährlichen Feind Hitlers und des ganzen Regimes

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und des Dritten Reiches erkannt habe und dass er nach Deutschland zurückgekehrt sofort den deutschen Behörden den Aufenthalt des Ing. Formis melden müsse.

Am nächsten Tage in der Früh, als Naujocks zum Frühstück heruntergehen wollte, trachtete er vorerst festzustellen, wo sich der Sender befinde. - Als er an der Türe von Formis Zimmer vorbei ging, bemerkte er, dass diese Türe offen war. - Naujocks sah in Formis Zimmer einen Radiosender und ein Grammophon. Während ein Dienstmädchen im Zimmer Ordnung machte, gelang es Naujocks unbemerkt den Schlüssel von Formis Zimmertüre herauszuziehen und einen Wachsabdruck zu machen. Naujocks hatte sich zu diesem Zwecke auch Wachs mitgenommen.

Nachher ging Naujocks mit Edith Käsbach zum Frühstück, doch hatte Formis inzwischen bereits das Hotel verlassen, sodass die Beiden Formis nicht mehr zu Gesicht bekamen.

Gegen Mittags kehrten Naujocks und Edith Käsbach auf ihren Skiern nun nach dem Wirtshause in das Dorf am Berge zurück.

In der Nacht gestand Naujocks der Edith Käsbach im Dorfwirtshaus, dass er im Dienste des SD stehe und ausgeschiedt war den Standort des Formis Senders festzustellen und dass er sofort nach Berlin zurückkehren müsse, um dort seinen Vorgesetzten Meldung zu erstatten.

Edith Käsbach war völlig perplex und sehr aufgeregt und wollte gleichfalls sofort nach Berlin heimkehren, doch gelang es Naujocks ihr dies auszureden und war sie dann schliesslich bereit im Dorfwirtshaus zu verbleiben und dort die Rückkehr Naujocks abzuwarten, welcher ihr versprach sofort zurückzukommen. Naujocks weiss nicht, ob er in dieser Nacht der Edith Käsbach auch eingestand, dass er mit richtigem Namen nicht Hans Müller, sondern Alfred Naujocks heisse. Naujocks bemerkt aber, dass Edith Käsbach später, nach erfolgter Ermordung des Ing. Formis seinen richtigen Namen erfahren habe.

Reise nach Berlin und zurück:

Am nächsten Tage früh morgens fuhr nun Naujocks allein mit seinem Mercedeswagen nach Prag und stellte sein Auto in der Garage des Hotel Alcron in der Nähe des Wenzelsplatzes ein. Hierauf löste er sich eine Flugkarte nach Berlin und flog mit dem nächsten Flugzeuge von Prag nach Berlin ab.

In Berlin eingetroffen begab sich Naujocks sofort zu HUBER ins Amtsgebäude Prinz Albrechtsstrasse 8, wo er HUBER genau referierte, wie und wo er Formis gefunden und die Sendestation festgestellt habe.

Naujocks sagte auch HUBER, dass Formis der einzige Hotelgast sei, dass aber im Hotel verschiedenes Hotelpersonal sei, weshalb er für die Durchführung seiner Aufgabe einer Assistenz benötige und schlug Naujocks für diese Assistenz seinen Freund Werner GÖTTSCHE vor. HUBER war mit Göttsch einverstanden, doch befand sich Göttsch augenblicklich nicht in Berlin und musste erst über Hubers Befehl nach Berlin zurückgeholt werden. Naujocks ersuchte nun Huber den Göttsch nach seiner Rückkehr nach Berlin, sofort nach Prag zu dirigieren, wo er ihn dann im Hotel Wilson mit seinem Mercedeswagen abholen werde. Huber versprach dies zu arrangieren.

Naujocks blieb noch einen Tag in Berlin. Während dieser Zeit

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liess er sich bei der Geheimen Staatspolizei nach dem Wachsabdruck den Schlüssel zur Hotelzimmertür des Ing. Formis anfertigen und im Laboratorium der Geh. Staatspolizei eine Flüssigkeit (Säure) zum zusammenschmelzen von Drähten, mit welcher er den Sender begiessen wollte um die einzelnen Drähte des Sender-Apparates vollständig zu zerstören.

Am nächsten Tage flog nun Naujocks wieder nach Prag zurück, holte sein Auto in der Alcron Garage ab und kehrte nach dem Dorfwirtshaus zu Edith Käsbach zurück.

Bei Edith Käsbach eingetroffen, sagte er ihr, dass er am kommenden Tage nach Prag ins Hotel Wilson fahren müsse um dort seinen Freund abzuholen, welcher ihm bei der Zerstörung der Sendestation behilflich sein werde. Naujocks bemerkt auf die ihm gestellte Frage, ob er nicht einen Verrat der Käsbach zu fürchten hatte, dass Edith Käsbach ihm völlig hörig war und dass er demzufolge ihrer vollkommen sicher war.

Am nächsten Tage vormittags fuhr nun Naujocks mit Edith Käsbach im Mercedeswagen nach Prag, wo sie Werner Götttsch bereits im Hotel Wilson antrafen. -- Werner Götttsch war im Hotel Wilson wieder auf seinen alten Pass mit demselben Decknamen abgestiegen, welchen er seinerzeit bei der geplanten Ermordung Otto Strassers verwendete. -- Naujocks kann sich an den Decknamen des Götttsch heute nicht mehr erinnern, bemerkt aber, dass dieser Deckname im cs. Polizeibericht angeführt war.

Naujocks, Götttsch und Edith Käsbach bummelten an diesem Tage zusammen in Prag, doch weiss Naujocks nicht mehr, ob sie die Nacht im Hotel Wilson verbrachten oder ob sie noch in der Nacht nach dem Dorfwirtshause am Rotem Berg zurückkehrten.

Vorbereitungen für die Ausführung der Tat:

Am nächsten Tage waren Naujocks, Edith Käsbach und Götttsch nach dem Dorfwirtshaus zurückgekehrt. Dort verblieben alle Drei etwa 2 bis 3 Tage. -- Naujocks erinnert sich, dass in der Nähe dieser Ortschaft ein grosser Einbruch verübt wurde und dass sie daher eines dieser Tage von 2 cs. Gendarmen zur Identifizierung aufgefordert wurden und ihre Reisepässe vorweisen mussten.

Am 2. Tage des Aufenthaltes im Dorfwirtshaus fuhr nun Naujocks mit Götttsch im Mercedeswagen bis zur Anhöhe überhalb des alleinstehenden Hotels, in welchem Formis wohnte. Von dort aus hatten Beide eine gute Uebersicht des ganzen Terrains und machte nun Naujocks Götttsch mit der ganzen Ortslage bekannt.

Ins Dorf zurückgekehrt zeichnete Naujock einen genauen Plan des Hotels und bezeichnete das Hotelzimmer des Formis. Hierbei erwähnte Naujocks, dass er nicht feststellen konnte, wo der Wirt und sein Personal schlafen. Naujocks instruierte Götttsch auch über das Hotelpersonal und darüber, dass Formis der einzige Gast im Hotel sei.

Naujocks und Götttsch fassten nun in Anwesenheit der Edith Käsbach folgenden Plan für die Zerstörung des Senders:

Naujocks und Edith Käsbach sollten auf einem Ausfluge wieder im Hotel einkehren. Götttsch sollte sodann nach Einbruch der Dunkelheit auf einem Seil ins Hotelzimmer Naujocks hinaufsteigen, um von Niemandem gesehen zu werden. -- Götttsch sollte draussen im

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Freiem warten, bis Naujocks ihm ein Lichtzeichen durch kurzes Ein- und Abschalten der elektrischen Zimmerbeleuchtung gebe.--XXX
 Ein Betreten des Hotels, ungesehen vom Personal war ausgeschlossen, weil die Haustüre des Hotels eine automatisch arbeitende elektrische Glocke hatte. Naujocks beschloss am nächsten Morgen für diesen Zweck im Dorfe ein Seil einzukaufen und kaufte er auch tatsächlich ein Seil, welches etwas stärker war, als eine Wäscheleine.

Für die Ausführung der Tat wurde weiters geplant, Ing. Formis mit dem mitgebrachten Aether zu betäuben, ihn dann zu fesseln, die Sendeanlage zu zerstören, Ing. Formis betäubt und gefesselt in seinem Zimmer liegen zu lassen und ihn nicht nach Deutschland zu verschleppen, weil ihnen eine Entführung zu gefährlich und unausführbar erschien.

Naujocks betont ausdrücklich, dass er von Heydrich nicht den Befehl zur Ermordung Formis erhalten hatte, sondern nur die Anweisung den Sender zu zerstören und Formis nach Möglichkeit nach Deutschland mitzunehmen.

Durchführung der Tat:

Am nächsten Tage besorgte Naujocks im Dorfe das Seil und fuhr an diesem Tage Naujocks, Göttisch und Edith Käsbach gegen Einbruch der Abenddämmerung vom Dorfwirtshaus ab.

Naujocks hatte seine deutsche Walterpistole Kaliber 7,65 mm mit 7 Schuss bei sich, sowie die Flasche Aether und eine Blechbüchse mit der Säure zum Verschmelzen der Radiodrähte. Göttisch besass keine Waffe.

Bei stärker einsetzender Abenddämmerung fuhr nun die Drei auf der neuen vom Berge zum einzelstehendem Hotel führenden Landstrasse herunter. Diese Landstrasse endete etwa 50 Meter vor dem Hotel. Am Ende der Strasse stand ein Strassenbau-Wohnwagen, in welchem Strassenarbeiter zu wohnen pflegen. Naujocks hielt seinen Mercedes Wagen vor dem Wohnwagen an, nahm seinen Rucksack und stieg mit Edith Käsbach aus. Göttisch verliess gleichfalls den Wagen und verblieb im Freiem.

Naujocks und Edith Käsbach begaben sich ins Hotel und bekamen wieder ihr altes Zimmer zugewiesen. Als sie ins Zimmer hinaufgingen, ohne Formis gesehen zu haben, fragten sie nach dessen Verbleib und wurde ihnen gesagt, dass Ing. Formis nichts anwesend sei.-- Naujocks bemerkt hiezu, dass er sich nun sehr freute, dass er seinen Befehl den Sender zu zerstören ohne jede Schwierigkeiten ausführen und nicht gezwungen sein werde Formis zu betäuben.

Nachher gingen Naujocks und Edith Käsbach herunter ins Gastzimmer zum Abendessen. Später aber erschien Formis gleichfalls im Gstzimmer, begrüßte die Beiden, reichte ihnen die Hand, benahm sich jedoch sehr reserviert und setzte sich an einen anderen Tisch. Naujocks erklärt, dass er durch das Eintreffen des Formis sehr bestürzt war und dass er auch ein Gefühl hatte, als ob Ing. Formis gegen ihn einen Verdacht gefasst hatte. Bestärkt wurde er in diesem Gefühl noch dadurch, dass Formis, welchem Edith Käsbach bei der ersten Zusammenkunft sehr gut gefallen hatte nun schweigsam blieb und kein Gespräch anknüpfte.

Naujocks bemerkt hiezu, dass die kommenden Ereignisse

dies beweisen.

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Nach dem Abendessen zogen sich Naujocks und Edith Käsbach auf ihr Hotelzimmer zurück und hörten später auch Ing. Formis sein Zimmer betreten. Gegen 20 Uhr 30 abends öffnete Naujocks das Fenster und liess das Seil zum Fenster herunter, welches er am Fenster befestigt hatte. Hierauf gab Naujocks das vereinbarte Lichtsignal und Göttsch kletterte am Strick ins Hotelzimmer hinauf.

Naujocks berichtete sofort Göttsch aufgeregt, dass sich dem Plane Schwierigkeiten entgegensetzen werden, da Formis im Hotel anwesend sei. Die Beiden berieten nun die Sachlage in Anwesenheit der Edith Käsbach und fassten nun folgenden Plan:

Naujocks besass den Nachschlüssel zum Zimmer des Ing. Formis. Beide wollten abwarten, bis Ing. Formis sein Zimmer verlassen und sich nach dem 2. Stockwerke begeben werde. Sodann sollte Naujocks mit dem Nachschlüssel die Zimmertür des Formis im 1. Stock öffnen, sich sein Taschentuch mit dem Aether bereit halten, um im Momente wenn Formis in sein Zimmer komme, ihm das Tuch auf das Gesicht zu pressen um ihn zu betäuben. -- Damit aber Formis keinen Widerstand leiste, sollte Göttsch bewaffnet mit der Walterpistole Naujocks in Naujocks Hotelzimmer warten, bis Formis auf dem Rückwege vom 2. Stock nach seinem Zimmer das Hotelzimmer Naujocks passiere. Sodann sollte Göttsch im Rücken des Formis mit vorgehaltener Pistole Formis zwingen ohne Lärm sein eigenes Hotelzimmer zu betreten, wo ihn Naujocks betäuben sollte. -- Nachher sollte Formis gefesselt werden, der Sender vollkommen zerstört, jedoch sollte Formis wie beim vorhergehenden Plane nur betäubt und gefesselt in seinem Zimmer gelassen werden. Naujocks und Göttsch einigten sich auf die Durchführung dieses Planes und Naujocks übergab nun Göttsch seine Walterpistole 7,65 mm. -- Edith Käsbach, welche bei der ganzen Verhandlung zugegen war, zeigte sich furchtbar nervös und war vollkommen niedergeschlagen.

Gegen 21 Uhr abends hörten nun die Drei Jemanden die Treppen zum 2. Stockwerke hinaufgehen und nahmen mit Gewissheit an, dass dies Formis sei, welcher den Motor im 2. Stocke anlassen wolle. Jetzt war also der Zeitpunkt zur Ausführung der geplanten Tat gekommen.

Naujocks vorbereitete den Aether und steckte die Flasche in die Tasche, worauf er sich zu Formis Zimmertür begab. Naujocks versuchte nun mit dem Nachschlüssel die Tür zu öffnen, spürte aber sofort, dass Formis seinen Zimmerschlüssel von innen stecken gelassen hatte.

Naujocks öffnete kurz entschlossen die Tür und sah sich plötzlich Formis gegenüber, welcher imit einer Hausjacke bekleidet am Sessel sass. Ing. Formis zog in diesem Moment aus seiner Hausjacke eine Pistole heraus und feuerte momentan auf Naujocks. Dieser Schuss verletzte Naujocks an der rechten Hand so, dass das Geschoss oberhalb der Finger durch die Hand durchging. Einschuss oberhalb des kleinen Fingers und Ausschuss vor dem letztem Gelenk des 3. Fingers.

Naujocks hatte keine Waffe bei sich und warf sich sofort auf Formis, dessen Hand ergreifend. Formis schoss trotzdem Naujocks ihm die Pistole aus der Hand zu entwenden suchte ein zweitesmal, jedoch ging dieser Schuss zufolge der festgehaltenen Hand nach unten und traf als Streifschuss Naujocks an der grossen Zehe des rechten Fusses. Naujocks hatte starke Skischuhe an, sodass diese die Schusswirkung abschwächten. Naujocks trachtete nun mit ganzer Kraft den Formis zur Erde niederzu-

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ringen. Im Fallen schoss Formis zum dritten Male, jedoch ging das Geschoss am Kopfe des Naujocks vorbei gegen die Zimmerdecke. Als nun Formis zu Falle gebracht war, gelang es Naujocks auf Formis liegend diesem die Pistole zu entreissen und gab sodann Naujocks mit Formis Pistole einen Schuss auf Formis ab.

Naujocks bemerkte weiter, dass er nicht wisse, wo er Formis getroffen habe. - In diesem Momente stürzte Göttisch herbei und gab auf Formis mit der Walterpistole 7,65 mm etwa 2 Schüsse ab, von welchen scheinbar einer den Kopf des Ing. Formis traf.

Es wird nun Naujocks eine Falle gestellt und ihm erklärt, dass die ärztliche Obduktion der Leiche des Ing. Formis ergeben habe, dass Formis von rückwärts angeschossen wurde, jedoch nicht tödlich und dass aber die tödlichen Schüsse dann erst von vorn abgefeuert wurden.

Naujocks verwehrt sich ganz entschieden dagegen und bemerkt fest, dass dies einfach unmöglich gewesen sei, weil er Gesicht zu Gesicht mit Formis rang, diesen zu Boden drückte, Formis auf dem Rücken lag und er selbst auf Formis liegend den Körper des Formis bedeckte. Naujocks fährt fort und bemerkt, dass es ihm eigentlich unklar sei, wie Göttisch auf Formis in dieser Situation schiessen konnte, ohne ihn (Naujocks) zu verletzen und nimmt Naujocks an, dass Göttisch von der Seite auf Formis schoss. Naujocks betont auch, dass er nicht sagen könne, ob sein Schuss oder die von Göttisch abgefeuerten Schüsse den Formis getötet haben.

Als dann Naujocks aufstand war Ing. Formis bereits tot. Naujocks lief nun sofort in sein Zimmer und holte die Blechbüchse mit der Säure, welche er auf den Sender und das Grammophon ausgoss. In seinem Zimmer bemerkte er Edith Käsbach ohnmächtig auf dem Bette liegend. -- Um aber eine vollständige Zerstörung des Senders zu erzielen, goss Naujocks den mitgebrachten Aether auf den Sender und warf ein brennendes Zündholz darauf, worauf eine Explosion entstand.

In diesem Augenblick hörten Naujocks und Göttisch den Wirt und sein Personal die Treppen in den ersten Stock hinaufkommen. Naujocks nahm die Pistole des Formis und rannte sich und ging diesen Leuten entgegen. -- Inzwischen waren der Hausknecht und der Kellner im 1. Stock angelangt und Naujocks, sowie Göttisch zwangen nun den Kellner, den Hausknecht und den inzwischen herbeigeeilten Wirt mit seiner Frau mit vorgehaltenen Pistolen in den Keller hinunter.

Naujocks und Göttisch befahlen allen Personen im Keller zu bleiben und weder den Kopf aus einem Kellerfenster herauszustecken, noch zu entfliehen oder um Hilfe zu rufen, widrigenfalls sie Alle erschossen werden. Ausserdem warnten sie den Wirt und sein Personal, dass das ganze Haus umstellt sei und Jeder erschossen werde.

Naujocks und Göttisch sagten noch dem Wirt und dem Personal, dass sie noch im 1. Stockwerke eine Durchsuchung machen werden und dass der Wirt und sein Personal an dem automatischem Glockensignal der Haustüre ersehen werden, wann die Beiden das Haus verlassen werden.

Flucht:

Inzwischen war der Apparat und das Grammophon verbrannt. Naujocks und Göttisch trachteten nun so rasch, als möglich wegzukommen und nahmen sich nicht mehr die Mühe die Sachen des Ing. Formis durchzusuchen.

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Formis nahm die Pistole des Ing. Formis an sich, um wie er sich ausdrückte "sie als Andenken aufzubewahren". Es war dies eine "Mauserpistole-Kaliber 7,65 mm."

Die Beiden kehrten also vom Keller ohne das Zimmer Formis zu betreten in ihr Hotelzimmer zurück, wo sie Edith Käsbach noch in tiefer Ohnmacht vorfanden. Sie mussten Edith rütteln, um sie wieder zu sich zu bringen. Naujocks blutete stark, ausserdem hatte er seine Hände und auch die Schusswunde an der rechten Hand mit der Säure aus der Blechbüchse stark verätzt. (Spuren an der Hand noch heute sichtbar.)

Nun machten sich die Drei auf die Flucht. Naujocks warf den Rucksack zum Fenster hinaus und liessen sich dann alle Drei auf dem Seil hinunter. Das Seil blieb zurück. -- Sodann bestiegen sie den Mercedeswagen und fuhren raschest in der Richtung auf Prag.

Naujocks erinnert sich nicht mehr genau, ob er seine Wunden an der Hand noch im Hotelzimmer oder bereits im Auto verbunden habe, doch weiss er genau, dass er zum Verband ein Damentaschentuch benützte, welches er dann auf der Flucht an der Moldau wegwarf, weil das Taschentuch ganz von Blut durchtränkt war. Naujocks machte sich einen neuen Verband, wozu er Putzklappen verwendete.

Naujocks, Göttisch und Edith Käsbach fuhren nun ohne Unterbrechung nach Prag. -- Unterwegs besprachen Naujocks und Göttisch ihre Fluchtmöglichkeiten. Sie waren sich der Gefährlichkeit ihrer Situation bewusst, doch wollten sie Edith Käsbach der Gefahr einer Verhaftung durch die cs. Polizei nicht aussetzen und beschlossen sie Edith in Prag abzusetzen und sie mit dem Eilzuge nach Berlin fahren zu lassen. Edith Käsbach war nervlich völlig zusammengebrochen, doch war es nicht möglich, dass Einer der Beiden sie nach Berlin begleite, weil sie den Mercedeswagen unbedingt nach Deutschland schaffen mussten. Dazu kam noch, dass nur Naujocks chauffieren konnte und infolge seiner Verwundung und Verätzung schwere Schmerzen hatte.

Die Drei trafen in Prag ein und fuhren sofort zum Bahnhofe, wo sie nachts etwa 20 Minuten vor Abgang des Schnellzuges nach Berlin eintrafen. An den Namen des Bahnhofes erinnert sich Naujocks nicht mehr, ebenso nicht ob Edith sich alleine die Fahrkarte löste oder ob dies von Göttisch besorgt wurde. Naujocks weiss jedoch genau, dass er im Auto verblieb, weil seine Wunde stark blutete.

Sodann fuhren Naujocks und Göttisch wieder, ~~weiter~~ nach derselben Route, welche Naujocks auf seiner Hinfahrt benützte, zur deutschen Grenze am Schneeberg.

Naujocks erinnert sich, dass ihnen in Teplice Šanov (Teplitz Schöna) gegen 3 Uhr morgens das Benzin ausging. Sie trafen in Teplice Šanov und diese Zeit einen Polizeimann, welcher ihnen bei der Benzinbeschaffung behilflich war und selbst den Besitzer der Tankstelle aufweckte.

Naujocks hatte mit Edith abgesprochen, dass er sie sofort nach seinem Eintreffen in Berlin besuchen werde. Sollte er aber nicht eintreffen, so wäre dies das Zeichen, dass die Flucht nicht geglückt sei.

Die Beiden fuhren nun ohne weiteren Aufenthalt an die Grenze und trafen gegen 4 Uhr früh bei der cs. Grenzkontrolle am Schneeberg ein. Das Zollhaus war nicht beleuchtet, die Strasse durch

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Zollschranken gesperrt. Naujocks stellte den Motor ein und fuhr die Strasse herunter bis knapp vor die Zollschranken, wo er das Auto anhielt. Dort liessen die Beiden den Wagen stehen, nahmen ihr Gepäck und überschritten zu Fuss die cs.-deutsche Grenze, ohne vom cs. Grenzorgan gesehen zu werden.

Weiterreise nach Berlin und Berichterstattung bei Heydrich:

Auf deutscher Seite im Zollhaus angelangt wiesen Beide ihre Pässe vor und erklärte Naujocks, dass er sofort einen Arzt benötige, da er sich bei der Reparatur seines Autos verletzt habe. Naujocks bemerkt, dass weder er, noch ~~Mar~~ Göttisch sich als Organe des SD zu erkennen gaben, sondern nur als einfache Touristen.--Naujocks rief sofort das Hospital in der ~~Nähe~~ nächsten Ortschaft an, meldete dass er verwundet sei, worauf das Hospital sogleich einen Sanitätswagen zur Grenzstation entsandte.--Inzwischen gab Naujocks den Auftrag frühmorgens ~~am~~ einen Mercedeswagen über die Grenze zu holen (bis Schranken geöffnet) und ersuchte, dass die deutsche Zollstation einen fahrkundigen Mann aus dem Dorfe zu diesem Zwecke auswähle und dirigiere.

Naujocks und Göttisch fuhren sodann mit dem Sanitätswagen in das Hospital, wo Naujocks Wunden behandelt und verbunden wurden.--Inzwischen war es früh geworden und wurden Beide zwischen 7 und 8 Uhr früh wieder vom Sanitätswagen zur Grenz-Zollstation gebracht, wo sie den Mercedeswagen bereits auf deutscher Seite vorfanden.

Naujocks und Göttisch fuhren sodann direkt mit ihrem Wagen nach Berlin, wo Naujocks zuerst nach der Wohnung der Edith Käsbach fuhr. Edith Käsbach befand sich in einer völligen Nervenzerrüttung, doch war sie sehr froh und glücklich über die geglückte Flucht Naujocks.

Nachher fuhr Naujocks nach der Prinz Albrechtstrasse 8, wo er Heydrich sofort persönlich Bericht erstattete. Naujocks meldete die Durchführung seines Auftrages, dass er den Schwarzsender völlig zerstört und dabei aber Formis erschossen worden sei.--Heydrich war sehr erfreut, dass seine Aktion völlig gelungen sei und bemerkte, dass Formis erschossen worden sei "wäre nicht schlimm". Naujocks meldete auch Heydrich, dass er zwecks besserer Camouflage Edith Käsbach, trotz des Verbotes Heydrichs mitgenommen habe, doch wendete Heydrich zufolge des guten Ausganges der Aktion dagegen nichts ein.

Belohnung:

Ueber die Belohnung ~~Heydrichs~~ durch Heydrich für die ausgeführte Tat befragt, erklärt Naujocks, dass er keine geldliche Belohnung erhalten habe, dass er und Göttisch jedoch damals zu Unter- oder Obersturmführer befördert wurden.

Naujocks und Göttisch hatten Vertrauensdiäten bei ihren Aufträgen und Reisen und verrechneten was sie tatsächlich an Geld ausgaben. Den Rest des mitgenommenen Geldes gaben sie sodann ab.

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Motivierung der Uebernahme des Auftrages Heydrich's:

Befragt, was Ing. Rüdolf Formis Naujocks angetan habe, umsomehr als Naujocks ihn persönlich nicht gekannt hatte und was Naujocks dazu veranlasste diesen Auftrag ohne weiters auszuführen und sich dabei einer Gefahr auszusetzen, antwortet Naujocks: dass er ein wirklich überzeugter und rein fanatischer Nationalsozialist war, der allen Befehlen seiner Vorgesetzten blindlings gehorchte und dem der Gedanke eines Attentates auf Adolf Hitler oder der Gedanke eines an Hitler begangenen Verrates das unglaublichste Verbrechen erschien.

Naujocks vergisst hier aber nicht zu betonen, dass er Formis nicht ermordet habe, sondern dass er nur in Notwehr gehandelt habe und nicht wisse, wer eigentlich Formis erschossen habe, ob er oder Göttisch.

Motivierung der Selbstanzeige Naujocks:

Nach dem Grunde befragt, warum Naujocks die Durchführung gegenständlicher Tat hier in England freiwillig eingestanden habe, gibt Naujocks hierfür folgende Motive an:

a.) Als Naujocks Ende 1940, bzw. 1941 vom Sturmbannführer zum SS Mann degradiert wurde, bekam er am eigenem Leibe das Naziregime zu spüren, was ihn veranlasste über das Regime nachzudenken und das ganze Nazi-Regime zu verabscheuen.

b.) Als dann Naujocks als SS Mann zum "Artillerie Regiment der Adolf Hitler Leibstandarte" an die russische Front versetzt wurde, begann für ihn eine schwere Leidenszeit, welche seine Verabscheuung des Regimes noch bestärkte.

Nach den Gründen befragt, welche zu seiner Degradierung führten, erklärt Naujocks, dass er die Taten Heydrichs verabscheute und bemerkt er, dass Heydrich viel ärger gewesen sei, als selbst Himmler es sei und dass Heydrich der genialste Verbrecher und ein Teufel in Menschengestalt gewesen sei, welcher die unglaublichsten Verbrechen lückenlos bis ins kleinste Detail in genialster Weise planmässig entwarf, dabei ein kaltes, höhnisches und zynisches Lächeln hatte und dann die Durchführung seiner Verbrechen den einzelnen Angehörigen des SD Dienstes übertrug, welche diese Aufträge unbedingt durchführen musste, widrigenfalls sie die schwersten Bestrafungen zu erwarten hatten.

Naujocks bemerkt auch, dass eine jede Person, welche einmal mit dem SD Dienste verknüpft war, unbedingt auf alle Fälle verloren war, immer wieder zu neuen Aufträgen herangeholt wurde und immer gehorchen musste, falls sie ihr Leben retten wollte.

Naujocks erklärt auch, dass er sich mit Heydrich zerworfen hatte, weil er im Jahre 1940 als er (Naujocks) noch Leiter der "Technischen Abteilung des SD Amtes VI B (später VI)" war, das Verlangen Heydrichs in seinem Amte "Bakterien zu züchten" abgelehnt habe, weil Heydrich in teuflischer Weise erklärte, er gedenke mit diesen Bakterien verschiedene Leute zu infizieren.

Weiters habe Heydrich auch von Naujock verlangt, dass er in Berlin für Heydrich zwei Personen umlege (ermorde) und zwar

BERNDT

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BERNDT vom Propaganda Ministerium und einen anderen Funktionär vom Gau Berlin (Namen vergessen), welcher für Goebbels Nachrichtendienst machte. - Diese beiden Nazis standen Heydrich im Wege und stand er mit ihnen in persönlicher Feindschaft. - - - - Naujocks lehnte die Durchführung dieser Ermordungen nicht direkt ab, sondern erklärte zu Heydrich, dass er im Augenblicke krank und nicht in der Lage sei diesen Auftrag durchzuführen.

Naujocks bemerkt, dass er vor seinem eigenem Gewissen frei dastehen wolle und dass ihn sein Gewissen dazu zwingt Alles anzugeben, was er wisse, selbst auf die Gefahr hin, dass er verurteilt werde. Deshalb habe er seine Teilnahme an der Formis Tat eingestanden, bei welcher Tat er aber vor seinem Gewissen nicht das Gefühl eines Mordes, sondern nur einer Selbstwehr habe.

Weiters streift Naujocks, dass er die Arrangierung der polnisch-deutschen Grenzzwischenfälle durchgeführt habe, welche knapp vor Kriegsausbruch im Jahre 1939 von Heydrich anbefohlen wurden und wobei ein Arzt der Adolf Hitler Leibstandarte Konzentrationslager - Insassen durch Injektionen tötete und diese Leichen sodann in deutsche Uniformen gekleidet an der polnischen Grenze in verschiedenen Positionen niedergelegt wurden, worauf auf diese Leichen geschossen wurde und so den Polen Grenzzwischenfälle zur Last gelegt wurden.

Naujocks erwähnt auch, dass er die gewaltsame Entführung der beiden britischen Nachrichtensoffiziere in Venlo in Holland arrangiert und durchgeführt habe. Hier wird Naujocks befragt, wieso es komme, dass die deutschen Tageszeitungen und die deutsche Propaganda die Durchführung und Planung des "Münchener Bierkeller Attentates" diesen beiden britischen Offizieren in die Schuhe schieben konnte, wo Naujocks doch selbst am besten wisse, dass diese beiden Offiziere zur Zeit des Attentates längst im deutschen Gefängnis weilten. - - - - - Naujocks erklärt hiezu, dass er vom SD Dienst erfahren habe, dass der Täter beim Bierkeller Attentat ein verrückter schwäbischer Techniker gewesen sei, der eine Bombe mit einer sehr lange Zeit arbeitenden Uhr erfunden hatte und dass er annehme, dass dieses Attentat den britischen Offizieren zugeschoben wurde, um den Hass der Deutschen gegen England zu steigern. //

Naujocks wird hier auch über die ROEHM Affaire befragt und erklärt er, dass er zu dieser Zeit nur SS Mann und Chauffeur gewesen sei und an diesem Tage ein Auto gefahren habe, mit welchem die verhafteten Personen vorerst nach dem Polizeigefängnis in Berlin gebracht wurden, von wo sie sodann in die Lichtenfelder Kaserne gebracht wurden, wo sie dann von Maschinengewehren niedergemäht wurden.

Ueber den Reichstagsbrand befragt, erklärt Naujocks daran nicht beteiligt gewesen zu sein, doch wird Naujocks ganz gewiss verschiedene Informationen besitzen, welche er von seinen SS Kolenen erfahren hatte.

Naujocks wird über die Details der vorangeführten Verbrechen separat verhört werden.

Naujocks bemerkt sodann weiters, dass sein Abscheu

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vor dem Regime und dem SD Dienste immer stärker wurde und als er dann anfangs 1942 wegen Magengeschwüren aus der Waffen SS in Civil entlassen wurde, er eine Wiedereinberufung in den SD befürchtete und deshalb trachtete vom SD ganz freizukommen und ein neues Leben aufzubauen.

Zu diesem Zwecke fuhr er etwa eine Woche vor der Erschiessung Heydrichs im April 1942 nach Prag. Er stieg in einem Hotel am Wenzelsplatz ab und bemühte sich um eine Audienz bei Heydrich auf der Burg. Heydrich liess ihn 3 Tage vergeblich warten und war nicht gewillt ihn zu empfangen. Erst mit Hilfe des Adjutanten Heydrichs gelang es ihm bei Heydrich vorzukommen. --- Naujocks bat nun Heydrich ihn vom SD Dienst freizugeben und ihm zu erlauben zur Organisation Todt einzutreten. Als Gründe hiefür gab er an, dass er krank sei, an chronischen Magengeschwüren leide, dass er ausserdem wegen seiner Degradierung und verbittert sei und jetzt ein neues Leben, bzw. Existenz gründen wolle und seine ganze Zukunft unpolitisch zu gestalten denke.

Heydrich war wütend, beschimpfte Naujocks vorerst und versicherte Naujocks schliesslich, dass er ihn freilassen werde.

Naujocks ~~erklärte~~ erklärte hiezu, dass er seinerzeit völlig ungerechnet degradiert wurde und dass dies ein Racheakt Heydrichs gewesen sei. Es wurden gegen ihn falsche Anschuldigungen, wie verschiedene Verfehlungen, Unterschlagungen, Gehorsamsverweigerung etc. aufgebaut, welche schliesslich zur Degradierung führten.

Naujocks bemerkte auch, dass ihm Heydrich nach dem Leben trachtete. Auf die Einwendung, dass Heydrich ihn ohne weiters in Berlin hätte umlegen lassen können oder ihn sogar im eigenen (Heydrichs) Büro erschiessen hätte können, erwidert Naujocks, dass dies wohl nicht gegangen wäre, weil er (Naujocks) in Berlin eine viel zu bekannte Person gewesen war.

Als dann eine Woche später Heydrich in Prag erschossen wurde, freute sich Naujocks und viele seiner SD Kameraden, dass Heydrich seinen Lohn erhalten habe und 2 atmeten Alle auf, wie sich Naujocks ausdrückte.

Naujocks erwähnt auch, dass sein Freund Werner Göttisch, Sturmbannführer beim SD, zuletzt beim SD Wien tätig, allmählich zur selben Anschauung gelangte und jetzt ein starker Nazigegner sei, trotzdem er noch gegenwärtig dem SD angehöre.

Naujocks bemerkte, dass seine letzte Dienstenteilung bei der Militär-Verwaltung Bruxelles war, wo er als Civilangestellter den "Schleichhandel (Black Market)" zu bekämpfen hatte, jedoch wie er selber bemerkt, er selbst für seine Bedürfnisse im Schleichhandel kaufen musste.

Nach der Invasion Frankreichs und Belgiens führte Naujocks seine Dienststelle nach Berlin, nahm Urlaub, fuhr nach Wien, wo er sich mit Werner Göttisch in Verbindung setzte. Nachher führte er den bereits gefassten Plan des Ueberlaufens zu den Alliierten aus.

Besuch der "slovakischen Delegation bei Goering",

Einige Tage vor der Besetzung der ČSR durch die Deutschen (vor dem 15. März 1939) bekam Naujocks vom SD den Auftrag eine slovakische Delegation am Flugfelde in Tempelhof zu erwarten und sie sodann zur Audienz zu GOERING zu begleiten.

Naujocks empfing diese Delegation, welche aus 5 bis 6 Personen bestand. Naujocks erinnert sich an die Namen der folgenden Teilnehmer der slovakischen Delegation:

TUKA Bela,
KARMASIN,
KIRCHBAUM,
MACH Šano und
DURČANSKÝ.

Naujocks brachte diese Delegation vorerst nach dem SD und begleitete sie sodann zur Audienz bei GOERING ins Luftfahrt Ministerium.

Naujocks war während der ganzen Audienz anwesend. Die slovakische Delegation ersuchte GOERING um "Schutz, Unterstützung und wirtschaftliche Hilfe für einen selbstständigen slovakischen Staat". Goering liess die Delegation kaum zu Worte kommen und sprach die ganze Zeit der Audienz, welche etwa eine halbe bis eine Stunde dauerte. Er beschwichtigte fortwährend die Delegation und führte aus, dass die Zeit noch nicht gekommen sei.

Es war an den Gesichtern der Delegation ersichtlich, dass diese mit den Ausführungen GOERING s nicht einverstanden und mit dem Ergebnis ihrer Vorsprache nicht einverstanden waren.

Naujocks meint, dass dies ganz besonders an DURČANSKÝ zu bemerken war, welcher sich dann auch in der Folge später von dieser Regierung zurückzog.

Eventuelle Verbindungen des SD in der ČSR:

Naujocks wird noch befragt, ob der SD ihm bei seinen Aufträgen in der ČSR irgendwelche Verbindungen, sei es private oder bei den deutschen amtlichen Vertretungen (Legation, Konsulat, etc.) genannt habe.

Naujocks erklärt, dass er weder die deutsche Legation, noch das deutsche Konsulat betreten habe, auch mit keinem Beamten deutscher Vertretungsstellen in der ČSR in Verbindung gekommen sei. Naujocks bemerkt, dass die ihm erteilten Aufträge unbedingt geheim bleiben mussten und von einer solchen Art waren, dass er die deutschen Vertretungsämter nicht einer Kompromittierung aussetzen durfte.

Beim Falle "Formis" waren nur die Beteiligten eingeweiht, während bei der geplanten Ermordung Otto STRASSER s der im Hotel Julia wohnhafte deutsche Agent von HUBER instruiert wurde und so von dem Plane wusste.

Naujocks erklärt ausdrücklich, dass er sonst mit Niemandem auf čs. Boden in Verbindung getreten sei.

Beurteilung der Person Naujocks:

Alfred Naujocks ist eine interessante Person. Die psychologische Analyse seines Charakters zeigt eine verbrecherische, fanatische Veranlagung, welche mit sentimentalischen Momenten und hysterischen Ausbrüchen in Konflikt gerät.

Es ist unzweifelhaft, dass Naujocks seine Aussagen spontan, willig und wahrheitsgemäß macht, soweit es die verhörenden Organe überprüfen können und soweit der Fall Formis den Organen bekannt ist.

Die bei dieser Tat erlittenen Verwundungen an der rechten Hand und am rechten Fuss, ebenso die Verätzungen der Handwunde sind noch heute sichtbar. Naujocks zeichnete auch eine kleine Lagekizze des Hotels, der Landstrasse und der Moldau (Vltava), welche genau stimmt, sodass der Beweis erbracht ist, dass er tatsächlich an der Tat teilgenommen hat.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Naujocks macht einen guten Eindruck und zeigt ein gutes Benehmen. Seine Antworten sind bereitwillig und korrigierte er sogar das verhörende Organ zu seinem Nachteil, als er in der kritischen Frage, ob Formis von Göttsch erschossen wurde entgegnet, dass er nicht wisse, ob sein eigener oder die von Göttsch abgegebenen Schüsse den Tod Formis herbeigeführt haben.

Bei der ganzen Schilderung der Tat wurde auch keinerlei Verteidigungslinie festgestellt, durch welche Naujocks eventuell getrachtet hätte etwas zu verharmlichen oder zu verdecken. Naujocks ist auch bereit alle Folgen seiner Taten auf sich zu nehmen.

Es ist den verhörenden Organen aufgefallen, dass Naujocks es versuchte, ganz unauffällig und wo es möglich war die Person der Edith Käsach zu schützen.

TOP SECRET

Translation of statement from NAUJOCKS submitted on 8.3.45

During the interrogation of the 5.3.45 by officers of Czech nationality, I was ordered to put down in writing what I know about the following incidents:-

30th June, 1934, ROEHM Putsch:

I was at this time a driver with the S.D. Oberabschnitt Ost and was ordered to stand to with the car at the office of the Secret Police because apparently they were short of cars there. I did duty for 5 days with the flying squad of the Gestapo and carried out orders of the flying squad leader like any other driver, as required. The officials for whom I drove were mostly making arrests, the people being brought to the Gestapo. I am, of course, unable to say whether the arrests had to do only with the ROEHM affair, nor can I say who the arrested people were. I later heard highly placed S.S. leaders saying that HEYDRICH had quite a number of people shot during the ROEHM Putsch against whom he had been unable to bring any evidence of their participation in the Putsch but who were in his way in other respects.

Attempt on HITLER's life in Munich, 8.11.39

According to an internal memorandum passed round in the S.D. it was stated that it had been established that the guilty people belonged to no political opposition group or party and that they had not been inspired by any third source. It concerned a mentally defective mechanic from the Schwaben district, I believe he came from Heidenheim, who had invented a new principle in connection with clocks that would keep them going for a long time; he had been obsessed with the idea that he would become instantly world-famous. So far as I know this explanation was never published in the press.

Reichstag Fire Berlin 1933

I can say nothing certain about this matter as I only came to Berlin one year later. I can merely repeat conversations which were often carried on in Nazi circles, according to which GOERING himself and HELLDORF instigated the fire and sacrificed Van der LUBBE to the public.

Camp 020
8.3.45
JB/MM/JEH

FOR THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF
MR. HILL.

485
PA
Maujacks
P.F.600,403/B.1.B/HPM.

10th March 1945.

Dear Hill,

Reference your letter Gen.449/17/4 of 6.3.45.,
we have applied for air passages to France for all cases
in which interrogation has been completed, and this
includes that of LEFILS.

As regards the Germans, we have written to
SHAERF asking what steps they wish taken with regard to
MAUJACKS and LORENZ, and as soon as we hear from them
I will communicate with you further on the point.

Yours sincerely,

H.P. Milne

H.P. Milne.

C.P. Hill Esq.,
Home Office.

HPM/MH.

11 MAR 1945

✓
Smt/WRHUC
11/3/45

P.F. 600,313) HM.
P.F. 600,483)

6th
3rd March 1945.

From: Mr. Milmo, War Office.

To: A.C. of S. G.2. C.I. Subdivision.
(For the attention of Colonel D.G. White).

The question of the ultimate disposal of certain German nationals sent originally to this country as Category A cases and now detained at Camp 020 requires consideration. In particular the cases of Alfred NAUJOCKS and Fritz Wilhelm LORENZ are in point. Since it is still possible, though unlikely, that P.W.E. may be able to utilise the services of LORENZ it may be advisable to consider the matter primarily in relation to NAUJOCKS.

Since D Day the practice has been to return to the Continent as soon as interrogation has been completed all Category A cases, there to be handed over by SHAEF and/or the Army Groups as agents of SHAEF for trial or other disposal by the national authorities in the territory involved. This practice has not only got Home Office approval but a specific undertaking has been given to the Home Office that Category A cases will in fact be returned to the Continent with the minimum of delay after the completion of the interrogation, though it is right to point out that the undertaking in question was given in connection with non enemy aliens, and that it is possible, and indeed probable, that the Home Office would not necessarily have taken the same view had they been dealing with enemy nationals.

Seen by R7 - No policy as yet

Over.

7 MAR 1945

8/3/45

[Signature]

[Signature]
8-3-45

- 2 -

NAUJOCKS was captured by 12th Army Group towards the end of October last year when coming through the lines. Investigation has failed to prove that he was at the time charged with any mission, and on the whole we are inclined to the view that NAUJOCKS' story of himself is substantially true insofar as he asserts that he was deserting the Nazi cause realising that its defeat was inevitable. From this it would follow:

- a) That no charge of espionage can be made against this man; and
- b) Being an enemy national the fact of his admitted employment over many years in the S.D. does not in itself make him liable to prosecution.

If, therefore, NAUJOCKS is returned to 12th Army Group his subsequent disposal must be considered problematical.

CyKs On the other hand, the investigation of this man's case has revealed matters which in due course should receive consideration by those whose duty it is to investigate war crimes, and it may well be that the prosecution of NAUJOCKS before a War Crimes Tribunal will play an important part in bringing home to the world in general the diabolical steps to which the Nazis went in staging "outrages" prior to their attack on Poland. Again, there is clear evidence upon which the Czechs may in due course apply to have NAUJOCKS handed over to them to face charges of murder.

We would be grateful if G.2. Counter-Intelligence Subdivision would give this case its consideration and advise us:

- a) as to whether it is desired that NAUJOCKS should be returned to 12th Army Group as an ordinary Category A case:
- b) if not, whether M.I.5. should endeavour to obtain Home Office authority for NAUJOCKS to remain in Camp

Over.

- 3 -

3rd March 1945.

020 until such time as he can be handed over
to the body charged with the investigation
and/or prosecution of such cases.



H.P. Milmo.

SHAEP MAIN
C/O B.L.A.

HPM/ML.

PF 600 485

TOP SECRET

161a
R.B.

WR4A

Mr. Robson-Scott,
E.5.(L).

NAUJOCKS.

I confirm that it has been arranged between all parties that the Czechs shall see NAUJOCKS at the Oratory Schools on Monday next, 5th March at 10 a.m. NAUJOCKS will be accompanied from Camp 020 by an officer who must remain in the room throughout the interview. I understand that you also will be present. Whilst one does not want to restrict unduly the liberty of the Czechs, it seems to me that it is desirable that they should confine themselves to the Czech aspect of the case and not range too wide a field.

Would you kindly let me know the names of the Czech officers who will attend so that I can inform Camp 001. I will find out for you the name of the 020 officer.

SH

S.H. Noakes,
 Captain.

B.1.b/PF.600,485
1.3.45.

2 MAR 1945

15/RS
4/3/45

Nauijocks.

see
145A

Note.

Photostat of dedication
on fly leaf of the book "Der
Faschismus" by Walter HEINRICH.

This is HEINRICH's
authentic handwriting.

S H Noakes

S.H. Noakes,
Captain.

PF.600,485/B.1.b.
23.1.45.

(NAUJOCKS)

24 JAN 1945

„Es ist der Gang Gottes durch die Welt,
daß der Staat ist.“ (Hegel.)

Schlöss Hadersfeld, den
26. September 1936.

Walter Heinrich.

Spere

"Es ist der Gang Gottes durch die Welt,
daß der Staat ist." (Hegel.)

Schlöss Hadersfeld, den
26. September 1936.

Walter Heinrich.

THE TRAVELLERS' CLUB,
PALL MALL,
S.W. 1.

142A

19.1.45.

Subject: Professor Walter HEINRICH.

Prof. HEINRICH, whom I last saw at Arosa in February 1938, resided at that time in Schloss Hadersfeld outside Vienna. He only occupied a few rooms with his family inside this restored old ruin. He was then a lecturer at the University of Vienna. Subjects - Economics & Sociology, I believe. The Professor had also written several books on similar problems notably "The Corporative State" (Der Ständestaat) a type of Constitution which he thinks to be ideal.

Here are a few facts about him drawn from my notes and memory and, I believe, accurate ones.

HEINRICH must be now between 40 and 50 years old, an Austrian born in Bohemia: his leanings have always been intellectual: I think he studied at Vienna as a pupil of Prof. Othmar SPAN, a Fascist Pan-German.

HEINRICH became dissatisfied with the lot of the German-speaking Austrians in the Czech Republic and founded there in 1931 the "Kameradschaftsbund" with other associates HENLEIN, RUTHA, KUNDT, SEBEKOWSKY and BRAND, all of whom went over to the Sudetendeutsche Partei in 1934.

When I met Prof. HEINRICH in 1935 for the first time he was working in Vienna and living at Schloss Hadersfeld. I found him likeable, mild-mannered, a Catholic with a humane reasonable outlook on life even when discussing his pet Fascist themes. His "Corporative State" was to be ruled by the Elite, and to these he only reckoned the Intellectuals and Intelligentsia, not the half-educated Nazi thugs. He looked frail and did not enjoy very good health. He had done a considerable amount of social-economic research in previous years at the "Institut fuer Staendewesen" in Duesseldorf: this Institute, I believe, was supported privately by Fritz THYSSEN and one or two fellow industrialists from Rhineland-Ruhr. I remember THYSSEN mentioning HEINRICH's name to me

in a conversation years later.

When he settled down in Vienna, HEINRICH, to the best of my knowledge, never joined up with Hauptmann LEOPOLD and his Nazi roughnecks. As an admirer of the former Bundeskanzler SEIPEL he wanted also "Anschluss" with the German Reich, or rather an "Anlehnung" in which Austria must retain self-Government. HEINRICH feared the neo-paganism and crude radicalism of the German Nazi leaders who despised the intelligentsia, and he was strongly opposed to any policy of enforcing Pan-Germanism or Fascism on anyone. We became good friends and he proved himself a very reliable source for information from behind the political scenes in Austria, Czecho and Germany.

HEINRICH had many friends, mostly professing some measure of Fascism, National Socialism, or Pan-Germanism: he associated with people like Prof. SERBK, the well known historian, Dr. von BORODAJKEWYCZ, a Catholic philosopher, the late Dr. Wilhelm WOLF, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Seyss-Inquart Transition Government 1938, Prince Anton ROHAN, politician and author, and several families of the Austrian Aristocracy, KHUENS, DUBSKYS and others, also Cardinal INNITZER. He was frankly critical of Bundeskanzler SCHUSCHNIGG: he considered that SCHUSCHNIGG entirely lacked the qualities of leadership and that his allegiance to the Habsburgs and his neglect of Austria's economic life was letting the country drift into apathy and impotence.

Despite all this HEINRICH was arrested and jailed by the Nazis when the Germans invaded Austria. The last I heard of him indirectly through friends was that he had been released.

Taking the worst view I would say that HEINRICH was an armchair revolutionary, but the last person likely to be knowingly or willingly associated with thugs.

On the other hand I certainly don't consider that he and especially his friends would be of anything more than passing temporary use for disruptive purposes: they would clearly be quite worthless as a nucleus for shaping Austria's future.

Note.

PA File
Copy File
138ANAUJOCKS

I saw Group Captain CHRISTIE at Room 055 to-day. I showed him the original letter brought by NAUJOCKS but this did not at first sight convey anything to him. He explained that his memory was bad and that he had retired from active work after the outbreak of war as a result of ill-health. When, however, I mentioned the name HEINRICH and gave him the barest outlines of the manner in which the letter had come into our possession, he appreciated the significance of the signature and gave me a great deal of information about HEINRICH.

For some time prior to the war CHRISTIE had been in touch with HEINRICH, a staunch Catholic who was a professor in some cultural subject at Vienna. His week-end residence was a ruined castle some distance away. He was a mild intellectual extremely fond of his home and children. On one occasion CHRISTIE invited HEINRICH to Arosa in connection with CHRISTIE's activities for this country. This must have been in February 1938. HEINRICH, according to CHRISTIE, was a National Socialist in a sense, but he was not in agreement with the Nazis. In fact he later spent a period in prison, though CHRISTIE thought that he had since heard of his release. HEINRICH's political philosophy was really a kind of Pan-Germanism but he did not agree with the incorporation of Austria in the Reich. What HEINRICH had ~~desired~~ ^{aimed} at was a close union of Austria and Germany (an *Anlehnung* as he called it). CHRISTIE, however, described HEINRICH as an arm-chair politician, much too lacking in drive ever to have any real force. If only for this reason, CHRISTIE expressed the view that HEINRICH would be of no value to the Allies, but he was not at all satisfied in his own mind with the genuineness of the letter itself. Although he had no concrete grounds for this suspicion, he thought it likely, either that HEINRICH had written it at the point of the pistol, or that he had by now changed his views and fallen into line with the Nazis. On the other hand, the letter made references to plans etc. which CHRISTIE did not understand and he wondered whether HEINRICH had written the letter at all. He is going to search his papers to see if there remains amongst them any example of HEINRICH's handwriting.

In the course of his description of HEINRICH, CHRISTIE referred to Professor BORODEIKEWITSCH, whom NAUJOCKS also says he met. BORODEIKEWITSCH is something of the same type as HEINRICH but rather more forceful. He also was a professor in some cultural subject and a Catholic, but anti-clerical. He was anti-Nazi in the sense that he did not agree with the methods of the Nazis though to a great extent he agreed with their aims. BORODEIKEWITSCH was, like HEINRICH, a Pan-German and hoped that Austria, with the support of Germany, would establish a strong influence in the Balkans. CHRISTIE thought that BORODEIKEWITSCH, however, would be more dangerous than HEINRICH and strongly advised against any attempt to make contact with him.

When later in the conversation I told CHRISTIE that the bearer of the letter was NAUJOCKS, CHRISTIE said he knew the name well as that of a Nazi thug, though he had never met him. He was quite sure that HEINRICH and BORODEIKEWITSCH would also know something of NAUJOCKS' history and he refused to believe that they would willingly have anything to do with him unless their views had radically altered.

CHRISTIE said that he would rack his brains and search his papers for any further light on NAUJOCKS. He was most willing to help and offered his services if at any other time we thought he could be of assistance.

S.H. Noakes

S.H. Noakes,
Captain.B. 1. b/FF. 600,485
18.1.45.

20 JAN 1945